' " 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev Ed), p 4423, § 1585, quoting from Leitensdorfer v Delphy, 15 Mo 160, 167 (55 Am Dec 137). [Scott, 301 Mich at 237.] In Kowatch v Darnell, 354 Mich 197; 92 NW2d 342 (1958), three different parties agreed to buy excess land adjacent to their properties from the Highway Commissioner, who agreed to sell the property because it was not needed for highway purposes. Id. at 199-200.
It was not necessary that Deutsche Bank obtain an assignment of Acoustic's contract rights in order to have standing to seek reformation of the mortgage instrument. Cf. Kowatch v Darnell, 354 Mich 197, 200-201; 92 NW2d 342 (1958) (a contractual arrangement was not a prerequisite for a party to seek reformation of a deed). Therefore, the trial court did not err in resolving the motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of Deutsche Bank and its servicer, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., and in denying defendants' motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2).
See Olson v. Aegis Mortgage Corp. (In re Bloxsom), 389 B.R. 52, 57 (Bankr. W.D.Mich.2008) (citing Kowatch v. Darnell, 354 Mich. 197, 92 N.W.2d 342, 343 (1958) (additional citations omitted)). "However, reformation is not available if the subject property has been acquired by a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice."
Michigan law permits a "court in equity" to "reform an instrument, including a mortgage, to include property that had been omitted by the mutual mistake of both the grantor and the grantee." See Olson v. Aegis Mortgage Corp. (In re Bloxsom), 389 B.R. 52, 57 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008) (citing Kowatch v. Darnell, 92 N.W.2d 342, 343 (Mich. 1958) (additional citations omitted)). "However, reformation is not available if the subject property has been acquired by a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice."
A court in equity can reform an instrument, including a mortgage, to include property that had been omitted by the mutual mistake of both the grantor and the grantee. Kowatch v. Darnell, 354 Mich. 197, 200-01, 92 N.W.2d 342 (1958); Zomerhuis v. Blankvoort, 235 Mich. 376, 379, 209 N.W. 56 (1926); Maki v. Karvonen, 322 Mich. 696, 699, 34 N.W.2d 469 (1948). Moreover, a privy to either party may also seek or be subject to reformation of a document.
Fla. Stat. 253.12(4) (1969) F.S.A. For prior law see C.G.L.Fla. §§ 1387, 1388, 1393, 1426, 1427 (1927). We think a more reasonable view of standing is found in Jones v. McNealy, 1904, 139 Ala. 378, 35 So. 1022; Williams v. Hebbard, 1939, 33 Cal.App.2d 686, 92 P.2d 657; Kowatch v. Darnell, 1958, 354 Mich. 197, 92 N.W.2d 342; Polhamus v. Hines, Sup.Ct. 1926, 128 Misc. 299, 218 N.Y.S. 401 (parties "sufficiently in privity"); and Houlihan v. Murphy, 1962, 93 R.I. 499, 177 A.2d 192 (no discussion of standing, but action allowed.) See also Annotation, 79 A.L.R.2d 1180.