Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-01-232 JEB
Submitted: May 2, 2000
Decided: October 1, 2001
Defendant Brandywine Innkeepers Limited Partnership's Motion for Reargument. Motion Granted.
Daniel P. Bennett, Esquire, Attorney for Defendants Brandywine Innkeepers Limited Partnership, Radisson Hotels Corporation and Radisson Hotels International, Inc.
Francis J. Jones, Esquire, Attorney for Defendant Concord Mall Partnership.
Joseph J. Rhoades and W. Christopher Componovo, Esquires, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
OPINION
Defendant Brandywine Innkeepers Limited Partnership ("Brandywine") has filed the present motion for reargument of this Court's April 20, 2000 decision denying Brandywine's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, Brandywine's motion for reargument is granted, and the Court's April 20, 2000 decision is REVERSED.
I. FACTS
In addition to the facts presented in this opinion, the Court will consider the facts as set forth in its April 20, 2000 opinion, which are incorporated herein by reference, to resolve the issues presented in Defendant's motion for reargument.
This matter concerns a personal injury lawsuit in which plaintiff, Andrea Kovach, fell and injured herself while on Brandywine's property.
On February 16, 1996, Ms. Kovach was to attend a seminar at the Radisson Hotel Wilmington ("Hotel") on Route 202. Ms. Kovach parked in the adjoining Concord Mall parking lot, mistakenly believing that she had parked in the Hotel's parking lot. It was snowing that day.
To reach the Hotel, Ms. Kovach walked up and across a grassy median on the Hotel's property which separated the Mall parking lot and the Hotel parking lot. The median strip had no steps or manmade walkway across it.
Ms. Kovach attended the seminar, which ended early around 4 p.m. due to worsening weather conditions and heavy snowfall. Ms. Kovach exited the Hotel and walked across the Hotel parking lot. She stepped onto the curb at the edge of the Hotel parking lot, intending to walk down the snow-covered median to her car below. As she descended the slope, she slipped and fell on the snowy, icy surface and sustained injury.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendant Brandywine contended, among other arguments, that Brandywine's duty to make its premises safe from snow and ice for Plaintiff Andrea Kovach as a business invitee had not yet begun at the time of Ms. Kovach's injury. More specifically, Brandywine cited the Woods v. Prices Corner Shopping Center Merchants Association for the proposition that it was entitled to await the end of the snowfall and a reasonable time thereafter before taking action to protect the safety of its hotel patrons. Brandywine further argued that because the snow had not ended when the seminar was excused and Ms. Kovach left the hotel, any duty that Brandywine owed to Ms. Kovach could not have arisen and therefore did not yet exist.
Del. Super., 541 A.2d 574 (1988).
Defendant Brandywine's Motion for Reargument at 7.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion for reargument is the proper device for seeking reconsideration by the Trial Court of its findings of fact, conclusion of law, or judgment. . . .The manifest purpose of all Rule 59 motions is to afford the Trial Court an opportunity to correct errors prior to appeal. . ." Reargument will be denied unless the Court has overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principles, or unless the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such as would affect the outcome of the decision. A motion for reargument is not intended to rehash the arguments already decided by the court.III. DISCUSSION
The Court did consider the Woods case in rendering its April 20, 2000 opinion. Upon reflection, the Court agrees in part with Brandywine that Woods provides a proper legal basis for summarily dismissing Brandywine from liability in this action.The principal rule in Woods is that an owner or occupier of land, who holds that land open with an implied invitation to the public to enter the land for the mutual benefit of each, "has an affirmative duty to keep the premises reasonably safe from the hazards associated with natural accumulations of ice and snow". This rule is an application of the fundamental principle that a landowner or occupier owes his invitees a duty to use reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe for the invitee's use.
Woods v. Prices Corner Shopping Center Merchants Association, Del. Super. 541 A.2d 574, 577 (1988).
Id. at 578
The Woods case does state "the landowner is entitled to await the end of the snowfall and a reasonable time thereafter to take reasonable action to make safe the hazardous condition created by the natural accumulation of ice and snow."
Id. at 578 (citing Young v. Saroukos, Del. Super., 185 A.2d 274, 282 (1962) ("The authorities are in substantial accord in support of the rule that a business establishment, landlord, carrier, or other inviter, in the absence of unusual circumstances, is permitted to await the end of the storm and a reasonable time thereafter to remove ice and snow from an outdoor entrance walk, platform, or steps. The general controlling principle is that changing conditions due to the pending storm render it inexpedient and impracticable to take earlier effective action, and that ordinary care does not require it")).
Brandywine is incorrect to say that "no duty yet existed" make its premises reasonably safe. The duty of a landowner to make premises safe is ongoing, and it is a duty to use reasonable precautions. Woods holds that waiting until the precipitation subsides is reasonable conduct on the part of the landowner during a snowstorm.
Plaintiffs are also incorrect in insisting that "even if defendant's duty did not arise until the end of the snowfall they assumed a higher duty by undertaking to remove and clear of ice and snow the parking lot of the hotel before the snowfall had ended." This argument is illogical and contrary to public-policy. Landowners should be encouraged to try to clear all public areas of snow and ice during and after snowstorms, if possible. Landowners should not fear legal liability for not clearing every inch of their property during an all-day snowstorm if they attempt to clear some public areas of snow during a snowfall. To hold otherwise would be a disincentive to vigilant efforts by landowners to monitor and clear snow during snowstorms. Every landowner would choose to wait out a snowstorm rather than clear a path for fear of legal jeopardy. Such a fear would be a grave detriment to the public.
Pls.' Answer to Def.'s Mot. for Reargument at 7.
Therefore, in light of the Woods case, landowners who attempt to clear some areas of their property while it is still snowing should not be penalized for doing so, nor should they lose the benefit of being able to wait out the end of the snowstorm before they must take steps to make their entire premises reasonably safe from snow and ice.
Since it continued to snow all day, Brandywine was entitled to await the end of the snowfall and a reasonable time afterwards before undertaking make its property reasonably safe by clearing it of snow and ice. The fact that Brandywine may have removed some snow before the snowfall ended is of no consequence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Brandywine Innkeepers Limited Partnership's Motion for Reargument on its Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.