Opinion
Civil Action 3:23-cv-62
04-08-2024
RUSSELL LEE KOUGH, JR. Plaintiff, v. JOHN TRAMARKI, DEVON NAGLE, CHRISTIAN M. SMITH, DOCTOR CAMACHO, and NURSING STAFF ASSIGNED TO CAMBRIA COUNTY PRISON Defendants.
District Judge Stephanie L. Haines
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KEZIA O. L. TAYLOR, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Devon Nagle, Christian M. Smith and John Tramarki be granted in part and denied in part. ECF No. 41. It should be granted in its entirety as to Defendant Smith. The Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant Tramarki should be granted. The Motion should be denied as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety against Defendants Tramarki and Nagle. It is further recommended that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss any negligence claim be denied without prejudice as to Defendants Tramarki and Nagle. Defendants' claim of qualified immunity should be granted as to Defendant Tramarki only as it relates to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. However, the claim of qualified immunity by Defendants Tramarki and Nagle should be denied without prejudice as it concerns the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Rita Camacho, M.D. should be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a Supplement to the Second Amended Complaint describing Dr. Camacho's personal involvement relating to Plaintiff's medical care of his second-degree burns. ECF No. 48. If Plaintiff fails to file a Supplement to the Second Amended Complaint within 30 days after the District Court's adoption of this Report and Recommendation, it is respectfully recommended that any claims against Dr. Camacho be dismissed with prejudice.
II. REPORT
A. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Corrections Officers John Tramarki (“Tramarki”) and Devon Nagle (“Nagle”). He also names the Superintendent of Cambria County Prison (“Prison”), Christian Smith (“Superintendent Smith”), Doctor Camacho (“Dr. Camacho”), and the Nursing Staff assigned to Cambria County Prison.
The Nursing Staff Defendants have yet to be identified and are not represented by counsel. Consequently, they are not movants on the pending Motions to Dismiss.
Plaintiff alleges that on January 21,2023, he was transported to the Conemaugh Memorial Hospital Emergency Room for a medical condition unrelated to the facts at bar. Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 37 at 1. The transport vehicle was driven by Defendant Tramarki. Id. Plaintiff was handcuffed to a restraint belt and shackled within the vehicle. Defendant Nagle accompanied Plaintiff during the transport. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle heater was set at 78 degrees Fahrenheit with the heater fan on high. Id. He states that Defendant Nagle and Tramarki were engaged in conversation and ignoring Plaintiff's numerous requests and complaints about the high temperature in the vehicle. Id. Plaintiff alleges that due to his physical size and placement next to the heater vent, and his inability to adjust his position, he received second degree burns on his right rear hip. Id.
Upon his return to the Prison, Plaintiff noticed blisters on his hip that had ruptured. Id. at 2. He alleges that he immediately notified Defendant Tramarki and Defendant Nurses of the burn and blistering. Id. They responded: “[L]eave it alone. You'll be fine.” Id. He was left untreated. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was given no burn cream, Tylenol, or any other type of ointment. Id.
A week later, the burn became infected. Id. He immediately submitted a sick call request and medical performed a culture of the infected area. Id. The culture was positive for MRSA. Id.
MRSA stands for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, a type of bacteria that is resistant to several antibiotics. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://cdc.gov/mrsa/community/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2024).
On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff was placed in medical isolation. Id. The isolation cell was dirty and his requests for cleaning were denied. Id.
On February 4, 2023, Plaintiff was started on antibiotics. He was not given supplies while in isolation to clean the wound area, nor was the wound cleaned by medical. Id. Plaintiff states that it was not until February 14, 2023, that medical cleaned the infected area with iodine and bandages. Id.; see also Pl's Resp., ECF No. 47 at 2.
Plaintiff concludes that for 24 days, his wound infected with MRSA was not properly cleaned or treated. ECF No. 37 at 2. He alleges that he complained via “sick call forms, grievances, a Prison Review Committee hearing before [the] Captain of Security and two Deputy Superintendents, and [a] request to Superintend[e]nt Christian M. Smith.” Id.
In a responsive brief to a previous motion to dismiss, Plaintiff clarifies that the delay in treating his burn wound by Defendant Dr. Camacho and Defendant Nursing Staff resulted in his “catching MRSA.” ECF No. 47 at 1. In the Second Amended Complaint, however, he alleges no facts against Defendant Dr. Camacho, even though he adds her as a named defendant in the caption of the case.
In liberally construing the pro se Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege claims for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants Tramarki, Nursing Staff and Dr. Camacho. He also alleges a claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety against Defendants Tramarki and Nagle. Finally, he alleges state law claims for negligence against all named Defendants. Id. at 2-3. He seeks $375,000 to compensate him for his pain and suffering, and ongoing medical issues. Id. at 3.
B. Legal Standards
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Although the court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint, the court is not “‘compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc)). In other words, a “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient ‘factual matter' to render them ‘plausible on [their] face.'” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “Conclusory assertions of fact and legal conclusions are not entitled to the same presumption.” Id.
In addition, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.'” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”) (citing Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
Finally, the Court recognizes that in a civil rights action, when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, a court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
C. Analysis
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . ...42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
1. Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Smith, Tramarki and Nagle
In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Tramarki and Nagle argue that at most, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims sound in negligence, and as a result, they are protected by state law statutory immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”). ECF No. 42 at 4-5.
Prison officials have a duty to provide humane conditions of confinement, which includes taking reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). To establish a claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety, a plaintiff must show that (1) an objectively serious risk to inmate health or safety; and (2) that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk. Id. at 834. Prison officials are deliberately indifferent when they know of and disregard excessive risks to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. The second element, unlike the first, is a subjective standard: “‘the official must actually be aware of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should have been aware.'” Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2005)). That is “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “However, subjective knowledge on the part of the official can be proved by circumstantial evidence to the effect that the excessive risk was so obvious that the official must have known of the risk.” Id. at 133 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).
Here, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety against Defendants Tramarki and Nagle. Plaintiff provides factual detail as to his position in the transport vehicle, and that because of his physical restraints, he was unable to position his body away from the heat vent. More importantly, he repeatedly complained to both Defendants Tramarki and Nagle about the excessively high heat in the vehicle, but they ignored his complaints and requests. That is, they were repeatedly informed by Plaintiff of the dangerous condition in the transport vehicle, yet they took no action to either turn down the heat or position Plaintiff away from the heat vent. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he sustained second degree burns on his right rear hip. Those burns resulted in blisters that ruptured, were left untreated by medical professionals, and Plaintiff contracted MRSA. Although a close question, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]” of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009).
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss Defendants Tramarki and Nagle should be denied as it relates to an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.
Plaintiff further alleges that he immediately reported the blisters to Defendant Tramarki and Defendant Nurses, and that they told him to just leave the blisters alone and he would be fine. ECF No. 37 at 2. Defendant Tramarki, as a non-medical corrections officer, was justified in relying on Defendant Nurses' medical judgment. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (A non-medical prison official will generally be justified in relying on the opinion of medical personnel.). Therefore, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendant Tramarki be granted. Any attempt to amend this claim against Defendant Tramarki would be futile as a matter of law.
Next, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Smith are insufficient to suggest a viable cause of action. “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element; a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims). Vicarious liability has no place in § 1983 jurisprudence, and therefore, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official's own actions, violated the constitution. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Personal involvement may be shown “through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 825 F.2d at 1207. However, the mere review of a grievance or mere concurrence in an administrative appeal process is insufficient to establish the personal involvement necessary for liability in a § 1983 action. See Simonton v. Tennis, 437 Fed.Appx. 60, 62-63 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] prison official's secondary review of an inmate's grievance or appeal is not sufficient to demonstrate the personal involvement required to establish the deprivation of a constitutional right.”); Brooks v. Beard, 167 Fed.Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a state prisoner's allegation that prison officials and administrators responded inappropriately, or failed to respond to later-filed grievances about his medical treatment, did not establish that the officials and administrators were involved in the underlying alleged unconstitutional conduct).
The Court agrees that Plaintiff does not state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Smith. Plaintiff alleges that Smith's only involvement related to Smith's alleged failure to respond to a request form. ECF No. 37 at 2. An official's alleged involvement concerning a request form will not constitute the personal involvement necessary to state a constitutionally cognizable claim. See Brooks, 167 Fed.Appx. at 925.
Therefore, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim as it relates to Defendant Smith be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile because no allegations suggest that Smith was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants Smith, Tramarki and Nagle argue that because Plaintiff is unable to state a constitutionally cognizable claim, they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 42 at 7-8.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity operates to ensure that, before they are subjected to suit, government officials are put on notice that their conduct is unlawful. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. “If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
In determining whether qualified immunity applies, the courts conduct a two-pronged inquiry. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015). First, the court must determine “whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); Spady, 800 F.3d at 637 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). “If the plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the [government official] is entitled to immunity.” Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002). If, however, the plaintiff can establish a constitutional violation, then the court must proceed to the second prong and determine “‘whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.'” Spady, 800 F.3d at 637 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). “The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. “This is an objective inquiry, to be decided by the court as a matter of law.” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2004). In conducting this analysis, courts have the discretion to decide which of the two prongs should be addressed first based on the circumstances of the particular case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see also Spady, 800 F.3d at 637 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
Here, as to Defendant Smith, the Court has determined that Plaintiff has failed to make out a constitutional claim. Therefore, the Court need go no further in the qualified immunity analysis as to Defendant Smith. The same is true as to the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs as to Defendant Tramarki. See Bennett, 274 F.3d at 186. Accordingly, Defendant Smith's claim of qualified immunity should be granted, and Defendant Tramarki's claim of qualified immunity as it concerns the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs should be granted.
As to the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety against Defendants Tramarki and Nagle, the Court has concluded that although a close question, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]” of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213. In light of the need to fully develop this claim in discovery, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has cautioned that “it is generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases.” Newland v. Reehorst, 328 Fed.Appx. 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009). “[I]t is possible for a claim to survive a motion to dismiss under Iqbal while not providing sufficient facts to allow the court to conduct a qualified immunity analysis.” Perano v. Arbaugh, Civil Action No. 10-cv-1623, 2011 WL 1103885, at *17 n.71 (E.D. Pa. March 25, 2011). And although the Court is mindful of the imperative to decide qualified immunity issues early in the litigation, this imperative is in tension with the reality that factual issues need to be resolved before determining whether a defendant's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the pro se Plaintiff's allegations in conjunction with the Defendants' failure to afford these allegations their most liberal construction in the application of the doctrine in their motion to dismiss demonstrates that the factual record is insufficiently developed to consider qualified immunity at this juncture. See Tempest v. Emeigh, Civil Action No. 21-3346, 2022 WL 1084742, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 11, 2022); Wagner v. Cnty. of Montgomery, Civil Action No. 10-2513, 2014 WL 4384493, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2014).
Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that the claim of qualified immunity by Defendants Tramarki and Nagle as it relates to the Eighth Amendment claim for Deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety be denied without prejudice to raising this issue on summary judgment.
STATE LAW IMMUNITY
Defendants Smith, Tramarki and Nagle assert that they are immune from Plaintiff's state law negligence claims under the PSTCA, 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 8541 et seq. The PSTCA provides local agencies and their employees governmental immunity from liability for injury to person or property caused by a negligent act of a local agency or employee, except as otherwise provided. See id. The PSTCA provides that, except for certain exceptions, local agencies are not liable “for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” Id. § 8541. There are eight limited acts or circumstances which may form the basis of a cause of action against a local agency. Generally, these include (1) liability arising from operation of a motor vehicle; (2) care, custody or control of personal property of others in the possession or control of the local agency; (3) care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency; (4) a dangerous condition of trees, traffic signs, lights or other traffic controls; (5) a dangerous condition of utility services; (6) a dangerous condition of streets; (7) a dangerous condition of sidewalks; and (8) care, custody, or control of animals in the possession or control of a local agency. Id. § 8542(b). Similarly, employees of local agencies are entitled to the same immunity from suit for actions taken within the scope of their employment. Id. § 8545. This immunity will not apply, however, when “it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ....” Id. § 8550.
Here, Defendant Smith will be protected by immunity on Plaintiff's negligence claim because Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to suggest that Defendant Smith acted with actual malice or willful misconduct. Plaintiff alleges only that he failed to respond to a request form. ECF No. 37 at 2. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the negligence claim against Defendant Smith should be granted. Any attempt to amend this claim would be futile because of Defendant Smith's alleged involvement in the facts at bar.
As to Defendants Tramarki and Nagle, Plaintiff's allegations suggest that their actions were willful in light of Plaintiff's repeated complaints and requests to lower the heat in the transport vehicle. Consequently, any claim for negligence against Defendants Smith and Nagle should not be dismissed at this time. Defendants may raise the issue of state law immunity on summary judgment after the factual record has been developed.
Therefore, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the negligence claim against Defendant Smith be granted and denied without prejudice as to Defendants Tramarki and Nagle.
2. Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Dr. Camacho
Defendant Dr. Camacho argues that other than adding her to the caption in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sets out no allegations against her. In liberally construing the claims of the pro se Plaintiff, the Court considers a responsive brief filed by Plaintiff where he contends that the delay in treating his burn wound by Defendant Dr. Camacho and Defendant Nursing Staff resulted in his “catching MRSA.” ECF No. 47 at 1.
Prison officials are required under the Eighth Amendment to provide basic medical treatment to prisoners. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). In order to establish a violation based on the Eighth Amendment, “evidence must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
To satisfy the first prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. “Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are ‘serious.'” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10304). Serious medical needs include those that have been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or that are so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for doctor's attention, and those conditions which, if untreated, would result in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or a lifelong handicap or permanent loss. See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that his medical needs are serious for Eighth Amendment purposes.
The second element requires an inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. The “deliberate indifference” standard is a stringent standard of fault requiring proof that a defendant disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his actions. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). The defendant must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The test for whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent is whether that defendant “acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 841. Only egregious acts or omissions can violate this standard. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a prison official: (1) “knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it;” (2) “delays necessary medical treatment for non-medical reasons;” (3) “prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment”; or (4) “persists in a particular course of treatment in the face of reluctant pain and risk of permanent injury.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Third Circuit also has held that “[n]eedless suffering resulting from a denial of simple medical care, which does not serve any penological purpose,” violates the Eighth Amendment. Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 266; see also Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346; Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff adds Defendant Dr. Camacho to the caption of the Second Amended Complaint but alleges no facts relating to Dr. Camacho. The pro se Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual matter in the Second Amended Complaint describing Dr. Camacho's personal involvement in his medical care. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is required; a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims). Otherwise, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Camacho should be dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, it is recommended that Dr. Camacho's Motion to Dismiss be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a Supplement to the Second Amended Complaint. This Supplement should include facts describing Dr. Camacho's personal involvement in the alleged wrongs related to the medical care afforded Plaintiff for his second-degree burns. If Plaintiff fails to file a Supplement to the Second Amended Complaint within 30 days after the District Court's adoption of this Report and Recommendation, it is recommended that any claims against Dr. Camacho be dismissed with prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Devon Nagle, Christian M. Smith and John Tramarki be granted in part and denied in part. ECF No. 41. The Motion should be granted in its entirety as to Defendant Smith. The Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant Tramarki should be granted. The Motion should be denied as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety against Defendants Tramarki and Nagle. It is further recommended that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss any negligence claim be denied without prejudice as to Defendants Tramarki and Nagle. Defendants' claim of qualified immunity should be granted as to Defendant Tramarki only as it relates to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. However, the claim of qualified immunity by Defendants Tramarki and Nagle should be denied without prejudice as it concerns the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Rita Camacho, M.D. should be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a Supplement to the Second Amended Complaint describing Dr. Camacho's personal involvement relating to Plaintiff's medical care of his second-degree burns. ECF No. 48. If Plaintiff fails to file a Supplement to the Second Amended Complaint within 30 days after the District Court's adoption of this Report and Recommendation, it is respectfully recommended that any claims against Dr. Camacho be dismissed with prejudice.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.