Opinion
Case No. 4:03-CV-72
May 12, 2004
ORDER AND PARTIAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Opinion of this date;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all claims against Defendant United Auto Worker 1666 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Parker Hannifin Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 20) is DENIED.
OPINION
Defendant Parker Hannifin Corporation has moved to dismiss this action on several grounds, including absence of diversity jurisdiction, statutory preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)), exhaustion of remedies, and prevention of double recovery for emotional distress. Plaintiff Nicholas J. Koubaitary, through counsel, has responded in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Upon review of the briefing, including the reply, the Court determines that oral argument is unnecessary and would serve only to unduly protract proceedings.I. BACKGROUND
This is a diversity discrimination suit alleging state law claims of national origin discrimination and harassment, retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff is citizen of the State of Michigan and a person of Syrian ancestry. Defendant Parker Hannifin Corporation, Plaintiff's employer, is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio. Defendant United Auto Workers, Local 1666, is a non-diverse party since it is an unincorporated association with members (including Plaintiff) who are Michigan citizens.
Plaintiffs Count 1 alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("MELCRA"), Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2202(1)(a), by condoning ethnic harassment and terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff's Count 2 alleges that he engaged in protected speech (complaints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the workplace discrimination) and that Defendants retaliated in violation of MELCRA because of the protected speech. Plaintiff's Count 3 alleges that the harassment he suffered in the workplace was inflicted intentionally by Defendants and caused him extreme emotional distress.
Plaintiff and Defendant United Auto Workers, Local 1666, have requested dismissal of claims against United Auto Workers, Local 1666, and have attached a Stipulation (approved by them, but not by Defendant Parker Hannifin). (Resp., Attach. 1.) Plaintiff indicates that this is done to preserve diversity of citizenship and because Defendant United Auto Workers, Local 1666, has assisted Plaintiff by representation during grievance proceedings and by assistance in implementing an arbitration decision which has resulted in his reinstatement.
II. DISMISSAL STANDARDS
Defendant Parker Hannifin has moved to dismiss the whole of this action for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The allegations of the complaint must be construed in the favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The rules generally require only a "short and plain statement of the claim" and not detailed allegations. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). Nevertheless, the complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). The court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987).
In addressing a diversity suit, the district court must apply the law of the forum state-in this case, Michigan. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Tech. Dry, Inc., 336 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 2003); Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2001). State law is determined, first and foremost, by applying decisions of the state supreme court. Talley v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 223 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2000); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1999). When an issue of law is undecided by the state supreme court, the district court must "anticipate how that court would rule." Imperial Hotels Corp. v. Dore, 257 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2001). To do so, it must consider decisions of a state's intermediate appellate courts unless it is "convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise." West v. ATT Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
III. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Of first importance is Defendant Parker Hannifin's argument that this suit should be dismissed because of lack of diversity jurisdiction. It is true that Defendant United Auto Workers, Local 1666, as an unincorporated association, is considered a citizen of the states of its members-including Plaintiff, who is a citizen of Michigan. See Bundy v. Penn. Cent. Co., 455 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1972); Sweeney v. Hiltebrant, 373 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1967). It is also true that complete diversity of citizenship is a necessary condition for diversity jurisdiction. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); Coyne v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 492-93 (6th Cir. 1999); SHR Ltd. P'ship v. Braun, 888 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1989).
Nevertheless, as acknowledged by the parties, the district courts have authority in cases such as this (where the non-diverse parry is not a necessary party) to preserve jurisdiction by the dismissal of the non-diverse party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 21; Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832-34 (1989); Soberay Mach. Equip. Co. v. MRF Ltd., Inc., 181 F.3d 759, 763 (6th Cir. 1999). In this case, there is no reason not to exercise this discretion, since the decision by Plaintiff to seek the voluntarily dismissal of the non-diverse party was made early in the proceedings and the dismissal will not prejudice the rights of any other party. Accordingly, the non-diverse party will be dismissed without prejudice in accordance with Rule 21.
IV. DISMISSAL ARGUMENTS a. Statutory Preemption
Defendant Parker Hannifin has argued that the state law discrimination claim and other state law claims should be dismissed because they are statutorily preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The United States Supreme Court has recognized statutory preemption under section 301. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985); compare Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1988). Preemption applies, according to the case precedent, in those cases in which the adjudication of the claims asserted depend upon an interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410-11; De Coe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.2d 212, 214 (6th Cir. 1994); Lowe v. Ford Motor Co., 465 N.W.2d 59, 61 (1991).
In the instant case, the Complaint has been carefully pled and very clearly does not require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to assess liability on the claims. The various terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("Agreement") are not disputed and need not be consulted to explain the pertinent legal standards. They are also not pertinent to the claims-since the claims depend on an assessment of the nature of any ethnic harassment which may have occurred, the nature of any retaliation which may have occurred, and the nature of any emotional distress which may have been intentionally inflicted. Those torts may be separately weighed and assessed according to general legal standards apart from the terms of the Agreement. None of the claims made are inextricably intertwined with the meaning and substance of the terms of the Agreement. As such, according to the precedent, especially the decisions in Lingle and Lowe, preemption is not mandated by section 301.
b. Exhaustion of Arbitration Remedies
Defendant Parker Hannifin argues the Agreement requires that Plaintiff arbitrate the claims made and that Plaintiff cannot, in the absence of exhaustion of contract remedies, bring this suit.
As argued by Plaintiff, this argument fails in two respects. First of all, the arbitration clause only requires the arbitration of "[a]ny disputes regarding the meaning, interpretation or application of the terms and provisions of the agreement and any alleged discriminatory application thereof." (Agreement, at 11.) Given the Court's interpretation above, these terms do not mandate arbitration since the dispute does not relate to the meaning or application of any term of the Agreement. See also Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78-79 (1998). Second, the Supreme Court has previously held that "the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48(1974). The rationale in Alexander was applied by the Michigan courts, in the context of state discrimination claims, in the case of Arslanian v. Oakwood United Hosp., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 380, 385 (Mich.Ct.App. 2000). Arslanian held that it was improper to apply an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement as constituting a waiver of the state law claims for discrimination, retaliation, infliction of emotional distress, defamation and interference with contractual relations. Similarly, this Court finds that the instant contract language was not such a clear waiver of Plaintiff's rights to sue on the claims brought as to constitute a waiver of suit in the absence of the prior arbitration of the claims. Therefore, Defendant's dismissal argument must be denied.
c. Dual Recovery as to Emotional Distress Damages
Defendant Parker Hannafin has argued that Count 3 (claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress) should be dismissed to prevent a dual recovery of emotional distress damages. Neither case law nor the usual practice of this Court commends this result. Rather, as recognized by Plaintiff's Response, dual recovery can be prevented by adequate instructions to the jury regarding damages. The Court need not dismiss one of the competing presumably valid claims to achieve this result. Therefore, this argument is also rejected.
CONCLUSION
An Order and Partial Judgment shall enter consistent this Opinion, dismissing claims against Defendant United Auto Workers, Local 1666, but denying Defendant Parker Hannafin's Motion to Dismiss.