Opinion
NO. 2011-CA-002116-ME
02-22-2013
FREDERICK KOSZAREK APPELLANT v. MARGARET MINZNER APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Deanna L. Dennison Covington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: John A. Berger Covington, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RICHARD A. WOESTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-01585
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
BEFORE: CAPERTON, MAZE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. VANMETER, JUDGE: Frederick Koszarek appeals from the May 24, 2010, September 7, 2010, and October 21, 2011, orders of the Campbell Family Court that, among other things, declined to modify his child support obligation before setting such obligation in the final decree. For the following reasons, we vacate that portion of the order and remand this matter to the family court for further proceedings.
Frederick and Margaret Minzner were married on July 5, 2003, and had a daughter in 2005. Following a separation, Margaret obtained an emergency protection order ("EPO") in Indiana against Frederick that also granted her sole custody of the parties' daughter. Frederick then filed the underlying petition for dissolution in Campbell Family Court on October 10, 2007. The family court referred the parties to mediation on the contested issues of child custody, a parenting schedule, and child support. The parties successfully mediated an agreement whereby Frederick agreed to pay $901.52 per month in child support to Margaret on the basis that at that time she had sole custody of the parties' daughter. In a later hearing, the family court did not extend full faith and credit to the Indiana EPO, and awarded Frederick temporary joint custody. Thereafter, the parties entered into a partial property settlement agreement whereby, in lieu of paying certain marital debts, Frederick "waives his right to claim an offset for child support, although he is currently operating under a shared parenting arrangement."
Frederick subsequently moved to modify his child support obligation on the basis that by the family court's order, the parties now shared joint custody of their minor child and thus, he now shared more time with the minor child. Opposing the motion, Margaret argued that Frederick waived his right to modify the temporary child support order on the basis of timesharing when he waived his right to claim an offset for child support in the settlement agreement. Frederick claimed he did not waive his right to modify; rather, that the clause referred to overpayments of child support he believed he made following the court's award of joint custody. The family court found that Frederick waived his right to modify his child support obligation on the basis of timesharing, and therefore any modification must be based on a change of circumstances other than timesharing. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Frederick argues the family court erroneously construed the settlement agreement to find that he had waived his right to seek modification of his child support obligation on the basis of a change in parenting time. We agree.
KRS 403.180(1) promotes the amicable settlement of disputes between parties attendant upon their dissolution of marriage. Settlement agreements entered into by the parties in furtherance of this goal are scrutinized under the principles of contract law. KRS 403.180(5).
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Under Kentucky contract law, the parties' intent in an agreement is to be discerned from the four corners of the document itself. Baker v. Coombs, 219 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Ky. App. 2007). In the absence of ambiguous terms, the contract will be enforced strictly in accordance with its terms. Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003) (citations omitted). The contractual terms are interpreted by "assigning language its ordinary meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence." Id. (citation omitted). This interpretation of a contract is a question of law that we review de novo. Baker, 219 S.W.3d at 207 (citations omitted).
The pertinent contractual language in the case at hand is found under a section titled "Debts" and states that in lieu of certain debt assignments between the parties, Frederick "waives his right to claim an offset for child support, although he is currently operating under a shared parenting arrangement." "Offset" is defined as "[s]omething (such as an amount or claim) that balances or compensates for something else[.]" Black's Law Dictionary 1115 (7th ed. 1999). With this in mind, the plain language of the settlement agreement provides that Frederick agreed to waive his right to an amount or a claim to an amount paid for child support that would either balance or provide compensation to him by Margaret. The record indicates that during the initial mediation settlement, Frederick agreed to pay Margaret $901.52 per month in child support because at the time of the mediation, she had sole custody of the parties' daughter. Frederick states that the mediation agreement provided that once the family court ruled on the EPO in Indiana granting sole custody to Margaret, the court was to revisit the child support obligations. However, when the family court awarded him joint custody, the child support obligations were not revisited. Therefore, in the settlement agreement, Frederick claims he agreed to waive any right he may have had to seek an offset for the child support he paid from the time he was awarded joint custody. Frederick's explanation conforms to the plain language of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the family court's interpretation that this provision acted to waive Frederick's right to at any time seek modification of his child support obligation on the basis of a shared parenting arrangement is not in accordance with the plain language of the settlement agreement, and is therefore erroneous. As a result, we must vacate this portion of the order, and remand this matter to the Campbell Family Court to address Frederick's motion to modify his child support on its merits.
The aforementioned portion of the Campbell Family Court order is hereby vacated, and this action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Deanna L. Dennison
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: John A. Berger
Covington, Kentucky