Opinion
HHDCV156056670S
02-03-2016
Vladimir Kostek v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#113)
Sheila A. Huddleston, Judge.
The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the plaintiff was injured on August 21, 2013, while he was riding a bicycle in Boston, Massachusetts, when a motorist turned his vehicle into the plaintiff's lane of travel and struck him. The plaintiff alleges that the motorist who struck him was underinsured and he now seeks underinsured motorist benefits under a policy of insurance issued to his parents.
The defendant insurer has moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff was not a resident of his parents' household in Ridgefield, Connecticut, when the accident occurred. The defendant concedes that the plaintiff was listed as a driver under his parents' policy but argues that he is only entitled to liability coverage, not to underinsured motorist benefits as a member of the household. The defendant argues that the undisputed facts establish that the plaintiff was a Massachusetts resident when the accident occurred. The plaintiff contends, to the contrary, that there are sufficient facts in dispute to require submission of the issue of his residency to a jury. The court agrees with the plaintiff.
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried . . . However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury . . . the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). " [S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way . . . [A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party . . . [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
In D'Addio v. Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 30 Conn.App. 729, 734, 622 A.2d 609 (1993), the Appellate Court articulated a two-prong test to apply to determine whether a person qualifies as a " resident of the same household" as an insured. First, the evidence must establish that the plaintiff had a " close, family-type relationship" with the insured. Id. Second, the facts must establish that the plaintiff actually lived in the household. Id. The defendant concedes that the first prong is satisfied in this case.
As to the second prong, our courts have " recognized that a trier of fact must determine where an individual resides by analyzing the facts unique to each case . . . In undertaking this analysis, the trier of fact must consider a conglomeration of factors . . . These factors include: the intent of the individual; the frequency of contact between the individual and other household inhabitants; the frequency with which the individual spends time at the household; the maintenance of a separate residence for the individual; whether the individual is emotionally and financially capable of establishing and maintaining a residence independent of the household; the location of personal belongings; the location of and address used for personnel and business records; the address at which mail is received; and the address used for formal purposes such as voting, licenses, and income tax filings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Remington v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 240 Conn. 309, 314-15, 692 A.2d 399 (1997). A person may have more than one residence at a time. Taylor v. Taylor, 168 Conn. 619, 621, 362 A.2d 795 (1975).
In support of its claim that the plaintiff was not a resident of his parents' household, the defendant adduced evidence from the plaintiff's deposition to establish the following facts: (1) the plaintiff was over the age of eighteen and had graduated from college in 2012, more than a year before the accident at issue; (2) after graduating, the plaintiff lived in and around Boston, and at the time of the accident, he was living in an apartment in Brighton, Massachusetts; (3) the plaintiff did not pay income taxes in 2013 in Connecticut, but did pay income taxes in 2013 in Massachusetts; (4) the plaintiff gave his Brighton address as his home address on a W-4 form he filled out for his employer more than a month before the accident; (5) at the time of his deposition, the plaintiff had a Massachusetts driver's license; and (6) the plaintiff did not vote in Connecticut in 2013.
In opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiff adduced evidence from his deposition to establish the following facts: (1) the plaintiff considered his parents' home in Ridgefield to be his home and did not consider Brighton to be a permanent address; (2) the plaintiff was not on the Brighton lease, but was merely staying with friends there; (3) the plaintiff traveled to Ridgefield once or twice a month and stayed for the weekend there and while there, he would sleep in the bedroom he had occupied during high school, which was kept in the same manner as when he was in high school; (4) the plaintiff kept many of his clothes at his parents' home; (5) although the plaintiff had graduated from college and, at the time of the accident, had been working in Boston for several months, he still received financial support from his parents, who owned the car he drove, paid the insurance for it, paid his cell phone bill, and gave him money to give his friend to stay in the Brighton apartment; (6) the plaintiff received mail at his parents' Ridgefield address, including doctor bills and bank statements from a Connecticut branch of Chase Bank; (7) at the time of the accident, the plaintiff had a Connecticut driver's license and did not have a Massachusetts driver's license and he did not vote in Connecticut in 2013.
Although each case must be decided on its particular facts, this case is similar to Schratwieser v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 44 Conn.App. 754, 692 A.2d 1283 (1997). In Schratwieser, the plaintiff had graduated from college approximately a year before the accident at issue, obtained a full-time job in Washington, D.C., moved into an apartment in Virginia, and her automobile was registered and insured in Virginia. Id., 756. Based on those facts, the trial court had granted summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff was not a resident of her parents' home. Id. The Appellate Court disagreed. Id., 757. It reviewed the evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim, which included evidence that the plaintiff frequently visited her parents' home, kept belongings there, kept a bedroom at their home that was not used by anyone else, received mail there, and used her parents' home as her permanent home. Id., 758. It concluded that such evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact and accordingly reversed the judgment. Id.
In this case, while some of the evidence supports the defendant's position, other evidence supports the plaintiff's position. In such a case, a triable issue of fact exists and must be decided by the trier of fact, not on summary judgment. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.