" 156 Mont. at 139. Wichita Federal cites Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558, 278 S.E.2d 140 (1981), which was a trover action brought for the recovery of a valuable diamond ring. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff gave the ring to her as a gift.

To prevail on their conversion claim, Cronic and K & J must have owned the Audi at the time Duvall and Duvall Ford engaged in acts of dominion over it. See Kornegay v. Thompson , 157 Ga. App. 558, 559 (2), 278 S.E.2d 140 (1981). Duvall and Duvall Ford argue that a question of fact exists on this point, because there is evidence supporting a conclusion that Bundy, as an agent with apparent authority from Cronic and K & J, effected a valid sale of the vehicle to Duvall in June 2012.

To prevail on their conversion claim, Cronic and K & J must have owned the Audi at the time Duvall and Duvall Ford engaged in acts of dominion over it. See Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558, 559 (2) (278 SE2d 140) (1981). Duvall and Duvall Ford argue that a question of fact exists on this point, because there is evidence supporting a conclusion that Bundy, as an agent with apparent authority from Cronic and K & J, effected a valid sale of the vehicle to Duvall in June 2012.

(Citations omitted.) Clover Cable of Ohio, Inc. v. Heywood, 260 Ga. 341, 345(6) ( 392 S.E.2d 855) (1990); see generally Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558 ( 278 S.E.2d 140) (1981). The Bank's argument fails because Timms introduced evidence of ownership.

In any event, the governing statute of limitation is O.C.G.A. § 9-3-32 which provides for a four year period to initiate suit after the action accrues for the recovery of personalty or damages for its conversion. Comerford v. Hurley, 246 Ga. 501, 503 ( 271 S.E.2d 782) (1980); Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558, 559 (1) ( 278 S.E.2d 140) (1981). "The true test to determine when a cause of action accrues is to ascertain the time when the plaintiff could first have maintained her action to a successful result.

On retrial, should the jury find that Lamb provided his consent, no action for conversion would lie as a matter of law because an essential element of that tort, unauthorized appropriation of personal property, would be absent. Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558, 559-560 (2) ( 278 S.E.2d 140) (1981). State Farm's refusal to unconditionally return the vehicle after Lamb demanded it back is controlled by Connors v. Omni Ins. Co., 195 Ga. App. 607 (1) ( 394 S.E.2d 402) (1990) (demand and wrongful refusal are prerequisites to a trover action).

Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 ( 356 S.E.2d 877) (1987); see Adams Adams, Ga. Law of Torts, § 2-7." Katz v. Harris, 217 Ga. App. 287, 289 (2) ( 457 S.E.2d 239). Gill's reliance, in the case sub judice, on Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558, 559 (2), 560 ( 278 S.E.2d 140), is misplaced in light of proof which would authorize a finding that Gill, without authority, unfairly converted the Partnership's property. See Lovinger v. Hix Green Buick Co., 110 Ga. App. 698, 700 (2) ( 140 S.E.2d 83).

To recover in such an action, ordinarily the plaintiff must show either title or right of possession, since title is generally presumed to follow possession. Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga.App. 558, 560(4), 278 S.E.2d 140 (1981). In this case, Sam showed possession; the clock had been in his possession for ten years when Edwin removed it.

Appellants urge Stargate must make a demand for the return of such personal property before a conversion action can lie because it allowed use of its computers wherever Orion might choose, making the resulting use "authorized," and that no demand has been made. See Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558, 559 (1) ( 278 S.E.2d 140) (1981). As held in Division 6, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Orion and Rumph were authorized to use, or remove, Stargate computers.

OCGA § 44-12-150 provides that "[i]n actions to recover the possession of chattels, it shall not be necessary to prove any conversion of the property if the defendant is in possession when the action is brought." However, in Kornegay v. Thompson, 157 Ga. App. 558, 560 ( 278 S.E.2d 140) (1981), we recognized that OCGA § 44-12-150 does not apply "where the property has been lawfully acquired by the defendant."