Opinion
June 20, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e). A period of approximately 10 months elapsed before the plaintiffs sought leave to serve a late notice of claim in connection with an alleged trip and fall accident in Brooklyn.
The foregoing delay, considered in conjunction with the transitory nature of the alleged defect (see, Matter of D'Andrea v. City of Glen Cove Pub. Schools, 143 A.D.2d 747; Caselli v. City of New York, 105 A.D.2d 251), the failure of the plaintiffs to provide a reasonable excuse for their inaction (see, Chattergoon v. New York City Hous. Auth., 161 A.D.2d 141, affd 78 N.Y.2d 958; Carbone v. Town of Brookhaven, 176 A.D.2d 778; Gaye v. City of New York, 144 A.D.2d 532), and the fact that the original notice of claim was inadequate because it misidentified the actual location where the accident allegedly occurred (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e; Setton v. City of New York, 174 A.D.2d 723; Mitchell v. City of New York, 131 A.D.2d 313), amply supports the Supreme Court's exercise of discretion in denying leave to serve a late notice of claim. Balletta, J.P., Rosenblatt, Ritter and Friedmann, JJ., concur.