By agreement of the parties approved by this Court the record in the 1959 appeal is considered as filed in all three cases; the parties filed one set of briefs, and the three appeals were heard together as one for the purpose of decision. This Court has jurisdiction of these appeals for the reason, among others, that the construction of the revenue laws of this state are involved. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, Mo.Sup., 321 S.W.2d 686. Taxpayer's petitions for review alleged that the assessments were excessive, erroneous, unlawful, unfair, unequal, improper, arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, void and unconstitutional because they were excessive, and disproportionate.

We have jurisdiction because the matter involves a construction of the revenue laws. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, Mo., 321 S.W.2d 686; Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission, Mo., 319 S.W.2d 590. Petitioner insists here that the decision of the Tax Commission is not supported by competent and substantial evidence; and therein, it says that any presumption of validity inhering in the assessment disappeared when evidence was introduced to show an unlawful discrimination. More specifically, it claims that a discrimination was shown by evidence of the use of 1937 reproduction costs in residential valuations and 1942 reproduction costs on industrial buildings.

A view may be taken by the trier of fact to enable it to understand the evidence, but that view may not constitute evidence in the case. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 696[10] (Mo. 1959); McDowell v. Schuette, 610 S.W.2d 29, 40[24] (Mo.App. 1980). "`[A] view cannot replace testimony; the visual observations of the trier cannot be substituted for testimony; and the only legitimate purpose of an inspection is to illustrate the evidence and provide a base for understanding and comprehending testimony upon the record.'"

Our cases hold that once evidence of unlawful discrimination is introduced, however, the presumption in favor of the assessor ceases to exist. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 693 (Mo. 1959). The introduction into evidence of these ratio studies constitutes sufficient evidence to vitiate the presumption in appellant's favor.

The Circuit Court found and concluded that the decision of the Tax Commission was arbitrary and not supported by competent and substantial evidence, and set it aside; furthermore, it remanded the matter to the Commission with directions to enter an order reinstating the assessment of the Greene County assessor. From that order and judgment Hermel has appealed. We have jurisdiction of the appeal because our cases have held that similar appeals involved the construction of our revenue laws. Drey v. State Tax Commission, 345 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1961); State ex rel. Kahler v. State Tax Commission, 393 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1965); Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1959). The School District of Springfield, R-12, has appeared here by counsel as amicus curiae, both by brief and in oral argument.

Thus, not only is the county an "interested" party, this proceeding is definitely a "contested case" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure and Review Act, section 536.010. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, (Mo.) 321 S.W.2d 686, 693. In part, the appellant's argument assumes that there is a contest and a conflict of interest between the State Tax Commission and the county.

There was no evidence, substantial or otherwise, to the contrary. Accord: State ex rel. Kahler v. State Tax Commission, 393 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Mo. 1965); Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1959). In finding the second element — that the food was intended for consumption off the premises — the Board relied "upon the nature of the Applicant's business and the size and character of the proposed building, including available seating capacity."

The plaintiffs cite five cases where the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed injunctions directed at the State. See Weinschenk v. State , 203 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Mo. banc 2006) ; Brooks v. State , 128 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Mo. banc 2004) ; Rolla 31 Sch. Dist. v. State , 837 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc 1992) ; Pohl v. State Highway Comm’n , 431 S.W.2d 99, 107 (Mo. banc 1968) ; Koplar v. State Tax Comm’n , 321 S.W.2d 686, 697 (Mo. 1959). These five cases, plaintiffs assert, show it is "perfectly ordinary" to enjoin the State itself to force compliance with its obligations.

While Taxpayers asserted at oral argument that intentional discrimination essentially never occurs, this Court's cases show otherwise. See Koplar v. State Tax Comm’n, 321 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Mo. 1959) (Owners of downtown buildings claimed the assessor intentionally discriminated against them by valuing non-downtown buildings at a lower percentage of value.); Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 329 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Mo. 1959) (Commercial property owner claimed discrimination based in part on an allegation commercial property was assessed on a different basis than residential property.); Breckenridge Hotels Corp. v. Leachman, 571 S.W.2d 251, 351 (Mo. banc 1978) (Property owners claimed discrimination because new properties were assessed as of 1975 while properties already on the tax roll had not been reassessed since 1964.).

Seeid. at 78. Additionally, Savage cites Koplar v. State Tax Comm'n, 321 S.W.2d 686, 695 (Mo. 1959), when discussing the "constitutional requirement of uniformity." Savage, 722 S.W.2d at 78.