Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-06-129-VAB.
Submitted: May 10, 2000.
Decided: June 6, 2000.
Letter Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment MOTION DENIED on coverage greater than the per-person limitation of $100,000; No order entered on issue of coverage for property damage.
Dear Mr. Marvel, Mr. Balaguer, and Ms. Harron,
This is the Court's Letter Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated herein, Summary Judgment is DENIED as to any claim that the Nationwide policy should provide bodily injury coverage greater than the per-person limitation of $100,000. No order is entered on the issue of coverage for property damage sustained in the accident up to the property damage policy limit of $50,000.
FACTS
This case involves the tragic death of Joseph Kopema and his companion, Candice Sparklin, on November 7, 1996. Kopema and Sparklin were sitting in Koperna's car parked on the shoulder of I-95. Their car was struck by an automobile driven by Nancy McClaskey. Kopema and Sparklin died as a result of the accident and subsequent fire that ensued. It was later determined that, at the time of the accident, Ms. McClaskey had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15. Koperna's and Sparklin's respective estates filed suit against Ms. McClaskey for her negligence.
Ms. McClaskey was insured by the Nationwide Insurance Company ("Nationwide"). Her policy provided liability coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence, as well as property damage coverage of $50,000. Sparklin's estate settled with Nationwide for the per-person policy limit of $100,000. Subsequently, Kopema's estate reached a settlement agreement with Nationwide. That agreement provided that the parties would settle their claims after a determination by this Court of the applicable policy limits of McClaskey's Nationwide policy. The Court takes the agreement to constitute a stipulation that Nationwide can intervene as a party for this limited purpose and the stipulation is hereby approved by the Court.
The Plaintiff claims that the Nationwide policy is ambiguous and that, because of the ambiguity, Plaintiff should be able to recover $200,000 from Nationwide. Defendant claim that the policy is unambiguous, in that the policy only provides for coverage of $100,000 per person per accident.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court's function is to examine the record to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist. Oliver B. Cannon Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., Del. Super., 312 A.2d 322, 325 (1973). If, after viewing the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, Summary Judgment will be appropriate. Id. Summary Judgment will not be granted if the record indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of law to the circumstances. Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del. Supr., 4 Storey 463, 180 A.2d 467 (1962).
DECISION
In Delaware, the interpretation of contract language is treated as a question of law. Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 742, 745 (1997). All written contracts, as well as legislative acts, are to be read, understood, and interpreted according to the plain and ordinary meaning and import of the language employed in them. Neary v. Philadelphia, W. B.R. Co., Del. Ct. Err. and App., 7 Houst. 419, 9 A. 405, 407 (1887); Phillips Home Builders v. Travelers Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 700 A.2d 127, 129 (1997) ("[I]f the relevant contract language is clear and unambiguous, courts must give the language its plain meaning"). Contract language must be susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations to be deemed ambiguous. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (1992); Fisher v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Del. Super., 95C-06-307, Quillen, J. (Dec. 11, 1997), aff'd, Del. Supr., 719 A.2d 490 (1998). However, an insurance contract is not rendered ambiguous solely because parties do not agree as to its construction. Rhone-Poulenc, 616 A.2d at 1196. If language in an insurance contract is deemed to be ambiguous, the Court will construe the language in a manner that would reflect the reasonable expectations of the insured. Hallowell v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., Del. Supr., 443 A.2d 925, 927 (1982); Fisher, 95C-06-307, at *3. And, if there is ambiguity in an insurance contract, the contract language is construed most strongly against the insurance company who drafted it. Emmons, 697 A.2d at 745; National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Stauffer Chem. Co., Del. Super., 558 A.2d 1091, 1093 (1989); Delledonne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Del. Super., 621 A.2d 350, 352 (1992).
In this case, the Court holds that the policy language is unambiguous. Therefore, the Court must give effect to the plain meaning of the contract language. The relevant language from McClaskey's insurance policy with Nationwide states:
Our obligation to pay Property Damage or Bodily Injury Liability losses is limited to the amounts per person and per occurrence stated in the Declarations. The following conditions apply to these limits:
The terms "bodily injury" and "death" are defined synonymously under the policy. Policy at Dl, ¶ 11.
There is no dispute in this case that the per-person limitation is $100,000 and the per-occurrence limitation is $300,000.
1. The limit shown:
a) for Property Damage Liability is for all property damage in one occurrence.
b) for Bodily Injury Liability for any one person is for all legal damages, including all derivative claims, claimed by anyone arising out of and due to bodily injury to one person as a result of one occurrence. The per-person limit is the total amount available when one person sustains bodily injury, including death, as a result of one occurrence. No separate limits are available to anyone for derivative claims, statutory claims, or any other claims made by anyone arising out of bodily injury, including death, to one person as a result of one occurrence.
c) for Bodily Injury Liability for each occurrence is the total limit of our liability for all legal damages when two or more person sustain bodily injury, including death, as a result of one occurrence. No separate limits are available to anyone for derivative claims, statutory claims, or any other claims arising out of bodily injury, including death, to two or more persons as a result of one occurrence. This total limit is subject to the limit for any one person.
Nationwide Policy at L4 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff argues that the language of section (c) is ambiguous. Plaintiff states:
The first sentence [of Section (c)] obviously applies the per occurrence limits since it states that bodily injury for each occurrence is the total limit of liability of $300,000.00 for all legal damages when two or more persons sustained bodily injury including death as a result of one occurrence. If that sentence stood alone, it is obvious that the $300,000.00 per occurrence limit is applicable. . . . That sentence, standing alone, is confusing and ambiguous.
Plaintiffs Opening Br. at 9.
The problem with Plaintiffs argument here is that the passage does not stand alone. The Court must examine all relevant portions of the policy rather than reading a single passage in isolation. Sherman v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, Del. Super., Civ. A. No. 97 M-09-028, Graves, J. (Nov. 2, 1999); Cheseroni v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Del. Super., 402 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1979), aff'd, Del. Supr., 410 A.2d 1050 (1980). Any ambiguity about the construction of the isolated sentence in section (c) is resolved by the last sentence of the section which states: "[t]his total limit is subject to the limit for any one person." Thus, the meaning of the section is clear, despite the inarticulate phrasing of the one sentence. The inarticulate phrasing seems to result from the use of boilerplate clauses not adjusted for different dollar coverages. That awkwardness does not create ambiguity if the language is viewed in its entirety. The policy only provides $100,000 of coverage for each person for each occurrence. While the insurance contract must be construed most strongly against the insurance company who drafted it, the plain language of the insurance contract only mandates $100,000 of liability coverage in, this situation. Thus, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiff also argues that Nationwide has refused to reimburse for the destruction of the decedent's automobile in the accident. Plaintiff claims that Nationwide has asserted that the damage to the automobile is covered under the bodily injury limits in the policy. The declarations page of the policy is clear that there is $50,000 of property damage coverage for each occurrence. The property damage coverage limits are separate and distinct from the bodily injury liability limits. Additionally, in section (a), described above, the policy clearly contemplates separate coverage for property damage and personal injury. While the Court thinks it is clear that Nationwide must provide separate coverage up to $50,000 for property damage sustained in the accident, it is not clear to me that the issue was formally submitted for decision under the agreement. Therefore I will enter no order on this point.
Defendant did not address this argument in its answering Brief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Summary Judgment is DENIED as to any claim that the Nationwide policy should provide bodily injury coverage greater than the per-person limitation of $100,000. IT IS SO ORDERED.