The bankruptcy court added, moreover, that "the language of the UCC quite naturally lends itself to defining the normal use as focusing `. . . on the inherent qualities of the collateral and the uses to which such collateral would normally be put.'" Id. (quoting Konkel v. Golden Plains Credit Union, 778 P.2d 660, 663 (Colo. 1989)(en banc)). Thus, the precedent relied upon by the district and bankruptcy courts leads us to a conclusion different than that of those courts with respect to whether the collateral in question constitutes "mobile goods" within the meaning of the U.C.C. as adopted in Pennsylvania.

Having decided that the software is a good, I am left with the remaining decision of whether it is an ordinary or mobile good. I am constrained to rule that it is an ordinary good because although the technology of the source code in one sense is "normally used in more than one jurisdiction" it is physically located in one place, and it is not "equipment or . . . inventory leased". See NHRSA 382-A:9-103(3)(a). Source Code is much different than the typical mobile good, like a combine, see Konkel v. Golden Plains Credit Union, 778 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1989) (en banc), or an airplane. Ordinary Goods

Under the facts presented, the result will turn on the proper situs for perfection. That, in turn, will depend on the legal classification of the screener under Article 9. Konkel v. Golden Plains Credit Union, 778 P.2d 660, 662 (Colo.1989). As the proponent of the notion that the Defendant's security interest is unperfected, the Plaintiff has the burden of proof.

The sole issue presented at trial was whether the February, 1998 filing properly perfected the Defendant's security interest. Under the facts presented, the result will turn on the proper situs for perfection. That, in turn, will depend on the legal classification of the screener under Article 9. Konkel v. Golden Plains Credit Union, 778 P.2d 660, 662 (Colo. 1989). As the proponent of the notion that the Defendant's security interest is unperfected, the Plaintiff has the burden of proof.

If the secured creditor does not reperfect its interest in the jurisdiction of the debtor's new location within the four month period, perfection of the creditor's security interest ceases. See Konkel v. Golden Plains Credit Union, 778 P.2d 660, 665 (Colo.1989) (citations omitted). Summit agrees that, if in fact Nemko did move its chief executive office from New Jersey to New York in 1988, perfection of its security interest lapsed as neither it or its predecessor, United Jersey Bank, has taken any steps to perfect its security interest in New York.

Moreover, the language of the UCC quite naturally lends itself to defining the normal use as focusing ". . . on the inherent qualities of the collateral and the uses to which such collateral would normally be put." The language cited was used in Konkel v. Golden Plains Credit Union, 778 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1989) to describe the "normal use" test. The Konkel court provided further descriptions of the "intended use" test as well as the "actual use" test.