Opinion
C.A. No. 02A-09-011 RRC.
Submitted: May 1, 2003.
Decided: June 6, 2003.
Upon Appeal From a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.
AFFIRMED.
Robin C. Kondzielawa, Newark, Delaware.
David J. Ferry, Esquire, Jason C. Powell, Esquire, Rick S. Miller, Esquire, Ferry, Joseph Pearce, P.A. Wilmington, Delaware.
Stephani J. Ballard, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Carvel State Office Building, Wilmington, Delaware.
Dear Ms. Kondzielawa and Counsel:
Robin C. Kondzielawa ("Claimant") applied for unemployment compensation benefits following her separation from employment with Ferry, Joseph Pearce, P.A. ("Employer"). Claimant's application was denied at all administrative levels on the ground that Claimant had voluntarily resigned, i.e., quit her employment, without good cause attributable to her employment, pursuant to title 19, section 3315(1) of the Delaware Code. Following the adverse decision by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board"), Claimant filed a pro se appeal in this Court. For the reasons below, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
Section 3315(1) provides in pertinent part that a claimant is disqualified from benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and for each week thereafter. . . ."
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In affirming the Appeals Referee's decision, the Board adopted the factual findings that the referee had made; accordingly, this Court will review also the Appeals Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, upon appeal from a denial of unemployment insurance benefits, this Court is limited to consideration of the record that was before the Board.
See Boughton v. Dept. of Labor, 300 A.2d 25, 26 (Del.Super.Ct. 1972) (holding that when the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board adopts the findings of an Appeals Referee, a reviewing court "relies [also] upon the [r]eferee's determination[s] . . .").
Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 352 A.2d 761, 763 (Del. 1976); see also SUPER.CT.CIV.R. 72(g) (providing that unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, appeals to this Court shall be heard and determined solely on the record below).
The Court therefore begins by restating the factual findings made by the Appeals Referee, substantially in their entirety:
The [C]laimant was employed as a legal assistant . . . from June 2000 until May 8, 2002 when she resigned from her employment. The [C]laimant . . . [w]as a full-time employee.
The [C]laimant had been on a medical leave for three and one-half weeks because of a medical condition. The [C]laimant returned to work on May 8 although she was nervous and panicky with stress because she had to face catching up to her work. The [C]laimant also had concerns about hemorrhaging because of lifting that needed to be done in the office.
The [C]laimant had been under the care of her physician . . . as well as her gynecologist. . . . The [C]laimant did not submit any medical documentation to suggest that she was advised to leave her job for reasons of health.
The [C]laimant became emotional at approximately 7:30 a.m. in her office on May 8. The [C]laimant obtained her personal belongings and walked down the hall, went out the reception area and left . . . the office. . . .
The [C]laimant had [previously] considered quitting her job. . . . Although the [C]laimant had given the impression she needed a day or two to get back into the mode of working again [after returning on May 8, 2002], the [C]laimant never returned to work [after that day]. The [E]mployer sent the [C]laimant a confirmation of her resignation on May 8, 2002.
The [C]laimant had been previously counseled [by members of Employer's firm] . . . about conduct in the office. There had been continuing work available for the [C]laimant at the time she resigned.
R. at 0010.
On appeal from the Appeals Referee's decision denying Claimant's application for unemployment insurance benefits, the Board declined to hold a further evidentiary hearing. The Board did however consider the evidence presented to the Appeals Referee, as well as the referee's decision, before finding as follows:
The appeal is without merit because the issue on appeal (whether [C]laimant voluntarily quit her employment) is factual and the [Appeals] Referee's findings of fact in this regard are supported by substantial evidence. It is undisputed that [C]laimant became angry and upset on the morning of May 8, 2002, grabbed her things, walked off the job[,] and never returned. While [C]laimant was under medical care for various problems, there was no evidence that [C]laimant was medically advised to quit her job at that time. There was continuing work available for [C]laimant at the time she left. The Board adopts the [Appeals] Referee's findings of fact herein.
The appeal is also without merit as the [Appeals] Referee's decision is controlled by settled Delaware law and is free from errors of law. The Appeals Referee concluded that [C]laimant voluntarily left her work without good cause attributable to the work, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and is disqualified from the receipt of benefits. The law in this area is well settled: a [c]laimant who voluntarily leaves employment must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before quitting. Even if [C]laimant was having medical problems or felt that the stress of the office was too much for her, the [Appeals] Referee correctly held that [C]laimant did not avail herself of any administrative remedies in this regard; rather, she simply walked off the job. The [Appeals] Referee correctly held that, under the circumstances, [C]laimant was disqualified from the receipt of benefits.
R. at 0059.
Both the Appeals Referee and the Board therefore found that Claimant was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to that work. This appeal followed.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Claimant now urges this Court to reverse the Board so that she may be awarded unemployment insurance benefits. Claimant has submitted an eight-page Opening Brief that is partially typed and partially handwritten and a thirteen-page Reply Brief entirely handwritten in support thereof. The Opening Brief has numerous attachments that this Court will not now consider, as they were apparently not produced at the hearing below.
Hubbard, 352 A.2d at 763.
Claimant asserts that she is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits because she was "forced to quit her job due to [a] unhealthy working environment" and cites Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board to support that supposition. Claimant asserts that Employer knew that Claimant's work environment "aggravated" Claimant's pre-existing mental and physical illnesses, and she cites O'Neal's Bus Service, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission and White v. Security Link in support of her argument that this establishes good cause for her resignation. Lastly, Claimant cites two cases from outside of this jurisdiction, Hinds v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and Mauro v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, to further support her argument that her voluntary resignation was made for good cause.
Claimant's Op'g Br. at 4.
325 A.2d 374 (Del.Super.Ct. 1974) (holding that claimant induced to resign under pressure from employer was discharged without "just cause" and therefore entitled to benefits under title 19, section 3315(2) of the Delaware Code).
269 A.2d 247 (Del.Super.Ct. 1970) (holding that bus driver had good cause to quit his job because students continually harassed him while he was driving but employer did not remedy situation following driver's complaints).
658 A.2d 619 (Del.Super.Ct. 1994) (holding that a claimant who quits in response to an employer-demanded change in work hours creating a conflict with the claimant's parental obligations has good cause to quite, provided the claimant first makes reasonable efforts to resolve the conflict).
474 A.2d 422 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1984) (holding that claimant had met her burden under Pennsylvania law that her voluntary termination was "necessitous and compelling" when she was experiencing health problems, made her employer aware of those problems, and remained available for substitute work not dangerous to her health relative to those problems).
751 A.2d 276 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 2000) (holding that claimant who had quit in response to an employer-demanded change in work hours that created a conflict with the claimant's parental obligations made a reasonable effort to preserve his employment by asking if there was something that could be worked out).
In response, Employer contends that the Board's decision was free of legal error and was supported by substantial evidence. Employer posits that those parts of the record indicating that Claimant left work without good cause, i.e., she walked out on May 8, 2002 with no intention of coming back and without trying to resolve any differences with Employer, are "uncontradicted." Employer alternatively contends that even if Claimant can show good cause for her voluntary termination, "she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies." Lastly, Employer suggests that Claimant's legal authorities are "unpersuasive and distinguishable." Employer therefore urges the Court to affirm the Board's ruling.
Employer's An'g Br. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of factual findings of an administrative agency; the function of the reviewing court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. On appeal, the court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. The reviewing court merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. If substantial evidence exists and the Board made no error of law, its decision must be affirmed.
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965).
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981).
Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3323(a) (1995) (providing that, absent fraud, the factual findings of the Board shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of a reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law).
Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Del. 1988).
Pursuant to title 19, section 3315 of the Delaware Code, a claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and for each week thereafter. . . ." Good cause has been defined as "such cause as would justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed. . . ." The burden to show good cause is on the claimant. Additionally, a claimant "must do something akin to exhausting . . . administrative remedies by, for example, seeking to have the situation corrected by proper notice to . . . [the] employer."
O'Neal's Bus Service, Inc., 269 A.2d at 249 (citation omitted).
Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 287 A.2d 690 (Del.Super.Ct. 1971), aff'd, 293 A.2d 295 (Del. 1972).
O'Neal's Bus Service, Inc., 269 A.2d at 249 (citation omitted).
Here, Claimant voluntarily left work on the day immediately following her return from a three and one-half week medical leave of absence. Although the record reflects that Claimant did so because of anxiety that was largely the result of the backlog of work awaiting her, the record also reflects that Claimant did not return following her early-morning departure, and she did not attempt to reconcile her anxiety and escalated workload with Employer before (or after) her abrupt departure that day. Claimant has therefore failed to meet her burden of showing good cause for leaving in connection with her employment situation.
Furthermore, the case law cited by Claimant is either distinguishable or nonpersuasive, and therefore does not aid Claimant in her efforts to secure unemployment insurance benefits. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. is an unemployment insurance benefits case having to do with "just cause" for employee discharge under section 3315(2), and therefore does not apply here. The Security Link case largely involved accommodation of routine parental obligations and is therefore also inapposite here. The Pennsylvania cases Claimant cites appear to be decided under a different standard than is embodied by section 3315(1) and are therefore nonpersuasive, not to mention that both cases center upon the efforts the claimants therein made to resolve their difference with their employers at the time of separation, and thus are "exhaustion" of administrative-type remedy cases, and are distinguishable from the facts here. And the O'Neal's Bus Service, Inc. case, although involving the factual establishment of good cause therein, actually supports Employer's contentions under the facts of this case, as established at the proceedings below.
It may well be that Claimant's concerns with her work conditions vis-á-vis Claimant's health problems were serious. However, as recognized by the O'Neal's Court, "an employee does not have good cause to quit merely because there is an undesirable or unsafe situation connected with . . . [the] employment." On the record presently before this Court, it is clear that Claimant made no effort to resolve her concerns with Employer. As has been stated in at least one treatise, "[g]ood faith is an essential element of good cause"; Claimant has failed to show on this record that good faith which would be required under the circumstances, and the Board did not err when it found that Claimant had not legally established that her voluntary departure on May 8, 2002 was for good cause for reasons having to do with her work.
O'Neal's Bus Service, Inc., 269 A.2d at 249.
81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 226 (1977).
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. The Board otherwise committed no error of law. The decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.