Opinion
NO. 2012 CA 1072
02-19-2013
MARK ALAN JOLISSAINT SLIDELL, LA ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT PANAGIOTIS KONDYLIS CHARLES M. HUGHES, JR. RYAN G. DAVIS MAN DEVI LLE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES SHERIFF JACK STRAIN, JR. AND DEPUTY CARL PERILLOUX
Appealed from the
22nd Judicial District Court
in and for the Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2011-14655
Honorable Martin E. Coady, Judge
MARK ALAN JOLISSAINT
SLIDELL, LA
ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
PANAGIOTIS KONDYLIS
CHARLES M. HUGHES, JR.
RYAN G. DAVIS
MAN DEVI LLE, LA
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
SHERIFF JACK STRAIN, JR. AND
DEPUTY CARL PERILLOUX
BEFORE: KUHN, PETTIGREW, AND MCDONALD, JJ.
PETTIGREW , J.
In this case, plaintiff, Panagiotis Kondylis, challenges the trial court's judgment sustaining the no cause of action and prematurity exceptions raised by defendants, Sheriff Jack Strain, Jr. and Deputy Carl Perilloux, and dismissing, with prejudice, plaintiff's claims against defendants. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 18, 2010, plaintiff was an inmate at the St. Tammany Parish Jail. According to the record, on said date, plaintiff was ordered by Deputy Perilloux to remove some paper that was obstructing the ceiling light fixtures in plaintiff's dorm room. As plaintiff was attempting to remove the paper, he fell from his bunk causing injuries. Subsequent to this incident, plaintiff filed suit against defendants on August 12, 2011, claiming negligence on the part of Deputy Perilloux and vicarious liability on the part of Sheriff Strain.
In response to plaintiff's petition for damages, defendants filed exceptions raising the objections of prematurity and no cause of action, arguing that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure ("CARP"), La. R.S. 15:1171, etseq., by failing to initiate, much less exhaust, the required administrative procedure. Plaintiff opposed the exceptions, arguing that La. R.S. 15:1173 mandates that Sheriff Strain publish his individual administrative remedy procedures ("ARP") with the Office of the State Register and because he had not done so, the ARP was ineffective and unenforceable.
Added by La. Acts 1985, No. 672, §1.
The matter proceeded to a hearing before the trial court on February 8, 2012, at which time the matter was argued by counsel who agreed to stipulate that Sheriff Strain did not publish the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office ARP with the Office of the State Register and that plaintiff did not timely file a grievance within ninety days of the incident in question. The matter was then submitted. After allowing for post-hearing memoranda by the parties, the trial court issued written reasons for judgment, ruling that a reading of the statutes together, i.e., CARP, La. R.S. 15:1171, et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), La. R.S. 49:954(A), "supports that the publication requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act and Administrative Remedy Procedure apply to state bodies and not local political subdivisions," The trial court concluded that St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office was not required to register or publish its individual ARP with the Office of the State Register. Accordingly, the trial court found that the ARP was enforceable at the time of plaintiff's incident and, because plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of same, sustained defendants' exceptions. A judgment in accordance with these findings was signed by the trial court on February 29, 2012.
It is from this judgment that plaintiff has appealed, assigning the following specification of errors:
A. The trial court erred in holding that Appellee Sheriff Strain was not obligated to publish his corrections administrative remedy procedure in the State Register because he was a political subdivision of the state and not a state agency. The Appellee was required to publish his corrections administrative remedy procedure in the State Register pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1173 and La. R.S. 49:954(B).
B. The trial court erred in not holding that the Appellee Sheriff Strain's corrections administrative remedy procedure was unenforceable because it was unconstitutional in keeping with the Louisiana Supreme Court holding in Pope V. State of Louisiana, 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713.
Because we find merit to plaintiff's first assignment of error and reverse the trial court's judgment, we pretermit consideration of this issue.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The function of the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Ourso v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008-0780, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/14/08), 998 So.2d 295, 298, writ denied, 2008-2885 (La. 2/6/09), 999 So.2d 785. The exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, and, for the purposes of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. Id, 2008-0780 at 4, 998 So.2d at 298. The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause of action is upon the mover. Foti v. Holliday, 2009-0093, p. 6 (La. 10/30/09), 27 So.3d 813, 817. In reviewing a trial court's ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of action, appellate courts conduct a de novo review, because the exception raises a question of law, and the trial court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Torbert Land Co., L.L.C. v. Montgomery, 2009-1955, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/9/10), 42 So.3d 1132, 1135, writ denied, 2010-2009 (La. 12/17/10), 51 So.3d 16.
Prematurity is determined by the facts existing at the time the suit is filed. Prematurity raises the issue of whether a cause of action has not yet come into existence because some prerequisite condition is unfulfilled. Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Bd., 99-2241, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/7/01), 798 So.2d 143, 147, writ denied, 2001-0818 (La. 1/4/02), 805 So.2d 1188. The standard of review of a judgment sustaining a dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity is that of manifest error. Pinegar v. Harris, 2008-1112, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/12/09), 20 So.3d 1081, 1088.
DISCUSSION
Principles of Statutory Interpretation
Legislative intent is the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation, and rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute. State v. Campbell, 2003-3035, p. 7 (La. 7/6/04), 877 So.2d 112, 117. It is presumed that the legislature enacts each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Id., 2003-3035 at 8, 877 So.2d at 117. Thus, legislative language will be interpreted on the assumption that the legislature was aware of existing statutes, rules of construction, and judicial decisions interpreting those statutes. It is further presumed that the legislature intends to achieve a consistent body of law. Id.
The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. In re Clegg, 2010-0323, p. 20 (La. 7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1141, 1154. The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law. Id., 2010-0323 at 21, 41 So.3d at 1154. it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when two statutes deal with the same subject matter, the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the more general statute. Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water Dist., 2002-0439, p. 20 (La. 1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 28.
In interpreting the Revised Statutes, "[w]ords and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language." La. R.S. 1:3. When the wording of a section of the Revised Statutes "is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." La. R.S. 1:4.
The Law Applicable to Plaintiff's Claims
The APA applies to all agencies unless excepted by either the APA itself or the constitutional provisions and statutes governing each individual agency. Corbello v. Sutton, 446 So.2d 301, 303 (La. 1984). As previously indicated, the general rule regarding applicability of laws is that the more specific governs over the more general. Fontenot, 2002-0439 at 20, 836 So.2d at 28. With regard to administrative agencies, the more specific laws are those that govern the agency; these specific laws govern over the more general laws of the APA. Corbello, 446 So.2d at 303. The provisions of the APA were not intended to supersede specific provisions of other administrative acts, or to supersede the rights and remedies created under those acts. Rather, the APA was intended to create procedures in those instances where none existed. Id. Where agency laws are silent, it is the function of the APA to fili in the gaps and to provide rules for procedure. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Ins. Rating Com'n, 96- 0793, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97), 696 So.2d 1021, 1027, writs denied, 97-2069, 97- 2062 (La. 12/19/97), 706 So.2d 451, 452.
CARP allows the Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPSC") and each individual sheriff to adopt administrative procedures, in accordance with the APA, at each of their facilities. CARP provides that the "procedures, including the adult and juvenile offender disciplinary process, promulgated and effective prior to June 30, 1989, shall be deemed to be the exclusive remedy for complaints and grievances to which they apply insofar as federal law allows." La. R.S. 15:1171(B), As set forth, in pertinent part, in La. R.S. 15:1172(A):
Upon adoption of the administrative remedy procedure, in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and the implementation of the procedure within the department or by the sheriff, this procedure shall constitute the administrative remedies available to offenders for the purpose of preserving any cause of action they may claim to have against the state of Louisiana, the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, or its employees, the contractor operating a private prison facility or any of its employees, shareholders, directors, or officers, or a sheriff, or his employees or deputies.Moreover, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1173, "[t]he administrative remedy procedure shall be published in the State Register." (Emphasis added.)
This "exclusive remedy" provided by CARP was enacted to force prisoners to file their grievances within an administrative process before resorting to the courts for relief. Moreover, the "exclusive remedy" language in these Title 15 statutes means that CARP's administrative procedures, rather than the more general APA procedures, are to be used at the administrative level. Victorian v. Stalder, 99-2260, p. 1 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/14/00), 770 So.2d 382, 386 (Gonzales, 1, concurring).
On appeal, plaintiff argues that La, R.S. 15:1173 imposes a duty on Sheriff Strain to publish his individual ARP with the Office of the State Register. Plaintiff further alleges that contrary to the reasoning of the trial court, the APA and CARP are not intended to be read together to determine their meaning. Rather, plaintiff maintains that the provisions of CARP and, more specifically, the clear and unambiguous language of La. R.S. 15:1173 supersedes the various provisions of the APA to the extent that they are inconsistent.
Defendants argue that the provisions of the APA exempt political subdivisions like the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office from publishing their individual ARPs. They point to La. R.S. 49:954(A), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No rule adopted on or after January 1, 1975, is valid unless adopted in substantia! compliance with this Chapter. Each rule making agency shall file a certified copy of its rules with-the Department of the State Register. Mo rule, whether adopted before, on, or after January 1, 1975, shall be effective, nor may it be enforced, unless it has been properly filed with the Department of the State Register.Noting that La. R.S, 49:951(2) specifically excludes political subdivisions such as the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office from the definition of "agency," defendants maintain that it is the intent of the APA that State bodies, not local governments and political subdivisions, be required to comply with the rules of the APA, such as publication with the Office of the State Register. Based on our review of the applicable statutes and jurisprudence, we agree with plaintiff's argument and find that the trial court erred in ruling that Sheriff Strain did not have an obligation to publish his individual ARP with the Office of the State Register.
Once Sheriff Strain adopted an ARP in accordance with the APA, he was bound by the provisions of same but only to the extent necessary "to fill in the gaps and to provide rules of procedure" where CARP was silent. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 96-0793 at 9, 696 So.2d at 1027. Because CARP is not silent on the issue of publication and there is no gap to fill, the trial court erred in going beyond CARP in an attempt to alter its meaning on the issue of publication. The language in La. R.S. 15:1173 is "clear and unambiguous," and its application herein does not lead to absurd consequences. Thus, the statute must be applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in search of the Legislature's intent. In re Clegg, 2010-0323 at 20, 41 So.3d at 1154. Accordingly, La. R.S. 15:1173 clearly applies and obligated Sheriff Strain to publish St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Office's ARP with the Office of the State Register.
CONCLUSION
Because Sheriff Strain failed to publish St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Office's APR with the Office of the State Register as required by La. R.S. 15:1173, they were without effect and, thus, plaintiff's suit against defendants could not be deemed premature for failure to follow these procedures. Moreover, considering the alleged facts of the petition, and accepting them as true, we find plaintiff has stated facts sufficient to support a cause of action in tort against defendants. Thus, the trial court's February 29, 2012 judgment sustaining defendants' exceptions was in error and is hereby reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Appeal costs in the amount of $1,005.10 are assessed against defendants, Sheriff Jack Strain, Jr. and Deputy Carl Perilloux,
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PANAGI0T1S KONDYLIS VERSUS SHERIFF JACK STRAIN, JR.
AND DEPUTY PERILLOUX
2012 CA 1072
McDONALD, J. Concurring
While I agree that Appellees' administrative remedy procedures were invalid in the absence of publication, I do not believe the majority's reasoning goes far enough in reaching this conclusion. The majority relies on CARP's publication requirement to reach the conclusion that, because a gap in the law did not exist, Appellees were required to publish any administrative remedy procedures. However, the majority subsequently fails to recognize that the absence of a penalty provision forms a gap within CARP, requiring deference to the APA.
It is clear that both CARP and the APA require any administrative remedy procedure to be published in the State Register. See La. R.S. 15:1173, 49:954(A). It is from this requirement that the majority concludes that the law is clear and unambiguous, leaving no gap to fill. However, CARP curiously makes no mention of the ramifications resulting from a failure to publish. If we are bound by the confines of CARP as the majority suggests, we are left with a publication requirement but no penalty for noncompliance. Surely there exists no clearer illustration of a gap in our law.
The APA was intended to create procedures in those instances where none existed. Corbello v. Sutton, 446 So.2d 301, 303 (La. 1984). Though the majority asserts that nonconformity with CARP's publication requirement results in invalid procedures, I am unable to locate any provision within CARP that implies such a result. As such, we must allow the APA to serve its gap-filling function in this instance. The APA explicitly provides us with the proper action to be taken when a political subdivision fails to comply with CARP's publication requirement, declaring that "[n]o rule . . . shall be effective, nor may it be enforced, unless it has been properly filed with the Department of the State Register." La. R.S. 49:954(A). Ultimately, I believe that it is deference to the APA, rather than to CARP, that renders Appellees' procedures invalid.
Accordingly, Defendants' failure to publish their administrative remedy procedures in the appropriate register resulted in their invalidity and as such, Plaintiff was clearly entitled to bring his claims for injury.
For these reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority.