Opinion
23-P-454
11-08-2024
HENRY KOMOSA v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF MONTAGUE.
J. Mark Dickison for the taxpayer. Ellen M. Hutchinson for board of assessors of Montague.
Heard: April 17, 2024.
Real Property, Agricultural or horticultural use, Tax.
Taxation, Assessors, Appellate Tax Board: appeal to Appeals Court, Real estate tax: classification of property. Administrative Law, Agency's interpretation of statute. Statute, Construction.
Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board.
J. Mark Dickison for the taxpayer.
Ellen M. Hutchinson for board of assessors of Montague.
Present: Vuono, Rubin, & Walsh, JJ.
VUONO, J.
The taxpayer, Henry Komosa, appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (tax board), affirming the town of Montague's board of assessors' (assessors) refusal to assess his land, consisting of 5.6 acres on some of which he grows and harvests hay ("haying"), pursuant to G. L. c. 61A, commonly known as the Agricultural Classification Act (c. 61A or the statute)- Land which is classified under c. 61A receives a lower tax assessment because it is valued on the basis of its agricultural or horticultural use rather than its full and fair value. See Adams v. Assessors of Westport, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 180, 180-181 (2010). "Essentially, c. 61A provides a tax break for landowners who devote at least five acres of their property to agricultural or horticultural use." Id. at 181. The tax board determined that haying is a horticultural use, but that Komosa devoted an insufficient amount of its land, only approximately 3.6 acres of the 5.6 acres at issue, to haying and that the remaining area did not have a reasonable relationship to the haying operation. Consequently, the tax board concluded that the use of the property did not meet the five-acre requirement to qualify for c. 61A classification. Komosa challenges the tax board's interpretation of the statute. He contends that the statute requires only that the property at issue exceed five acres, produce $500 in income annually, and that some portion of the land be devoted to horticulture use. We conclude that the tax board's interpretation of the statute is correct, and that its decision is based on substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
Chapter 61A is entitled "Assessment and Taxation of Agricultural and Horticultural Land."
Additional requirements include that the land had been actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural use for at least the two years immediately preceding the tax year in issue and that the horticultural use had generated more than $500 of income annually. G. L. c. 61A, §§ 4 and 3, respectively. There is no dispute that Komosa met these two requirements.
The tax board noted that "the parties did not dispute that haying is considered a horticultural use under G. L. c. 61A, § 2.
Procedural and factual background.
The procedural history and facts are taken from the tax board's findings of fact and report promulgated on February 24, 2023. We supplement our summary with undisputed facts from the record where necessary to provide context to our discussion.
Komosa owns several parcels of land totaling 6.6 acres in Montague, a small town located in Franklin County. The parcels are identified by the parties and on the relevant applications and decisions as parcels 51-96, 51-97, 51-98, and 51-100. Komosa purchased the parcels, which were formerly known as the "Podlensky Farm," in 2007. Soon thereafter, he began to grow and harvest hay, which he sold to local farms as feed for animals. Komosa asserted that this activity generated between $750 and $925 annually, and as noted by the tax board, the town conceded that it at least generated over $500.
The record suggests that the parcel numbers derive from assessors' map 51 and lot numbers 96-98 and 100.
Komosa's property was classified as land devoted to horticultural use and taxed at the reduced rate permitted by the statute through fiscal year 2020. In early 2020, Komosa notified the assessors that he was changing the use of one of the parcels, 51-100, from horticultural use to residential use, thereby reducing the property he designated as being in horticultural use to 5.641 acres. This change prompted the following chain of events. First, the assessors imposed rollback taxes on parcel 51-100. That assessment is not at issue in this appeal. Second, the assessors conducted an investigation into the use of the remaining three parcels, 51-96, 51-97, and 51-98 (the parcels at issue). Following that investigation, which included a visit to the property, the assessors concluded that due to the topography of the parcels at issue, which included trees, slopes, and wetlands, only 3.6 of the 5.6 acres were devoted to haying. Because c. 61A requires that at least five acres be actively devoted to a horticultural use, the assessors determined that the parcels at issue no longer qualified for the reduced tax rate under c. 61A and voted to disallow or revoke the c. 61A classification for fiscal year 2021. For reasons not relevant here, this tax year is not at issue in this appeal. Next, following the same reasoning, the assessors denied Komosa's application seeking c. 61A classification for the tax year 2022. Komosa filed a request for modification pursuant to G. L. c. 61A, § 19, which the assessors denied. Komosa then appealed to the tax board, also pursuant to G. L. c. 61A, § 19, which ruled in favor of the assessors. The tax board issued findings of fact and report at Komosa's request. That decision is the subject of this appeal.
There are no residential, industrial, or commercial structures on the remaining parcels.
Roll-back taxes are the difference between the taxes actually paid under c. 61A and what would have been paid if the land had been assessed at its fair and full value for up to the preceding five tax years. See Sudbury v. Scott, 439 Mass. 288, 295 n.8 (2003).
This decision appears to be a change in how the assessors viewed the property. The record indicates that the parcels at issue received c. 61A classification for tax year 2013 without the inclusion of parcel 51-100.
Komosa appealed this decision to the tax board; however, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The taxpayer has made no argument here that the tax board erred in dismissing that appeal.
Following an evidentiary hearing, at which Komosa and Assessor Karen Tonelli testified, the tax board found that the assessors provided "credible, detailed testimony and documentation." Assessor Tonelli, who had thirty years of experience as an assessor in Montague and other rural towns, testified that she used a "sophisticated mapping system" to measure those portions of the property that were not conducive to haying. Based on her prior visit to the property, she confirmed that some of the land was heavily treed or had significant slopes thereby preventing those areas from being hayed. She asserted that horticultural use took place on only 3.6 acres of the 5.641-acre parcel. The tax board found Tonelli's testimony credible and agreed that Komosa failed to meet the five-acre requirement.
Komosa provided a significantly different description of his property and the haying operation. Komosa acknowledged that the parcels at issue contained some steep slopes and that not all the land was used for haying, however, he asserted that land not used for haying was used for access roads, bad hay compost, and brush piles, all of which supported horticulture. In addition, Komosa challenged the assessors' calculation of which portions of the parcels at issue were being used to grow hay and argued that by relying on satellite imagery the assessors failed to account for how land hidden under a canopy of trees was being used.
The tax board rejected Komosa's claim that the land not used for growing hay still supported horticulture, describing his testimony on this point as "unsubstantiated." The tax board further found that Komosa's documentary evidence provided "no mechanism to distinguish property lines" and that he "offered no reliable measurements" regarding what portion of the land was comprised of trees. The tax board thus concluded that Komosa had failed to meet his burden of establishing that his land qualified for the lower tax rate and that the assessors had properly denied Komosa's application for c. 61A classification. In reaching its conclusion, the tax board observed that while Komosa did not have to establish that "every square inch of five acres were primarily and directly cultivating hay to meet the requisite of G. L. c. 61A, § 4, he had the burden of proving that portions not dedicated to haying had some reasonable relationship to the primary use, some customary and necessary use in raising such products and preparing them for market."
Standard of review.
A decision by the tax board will not be modified or reversed if it "is based on both substantial evidence and a correct application of the law." Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 443 Mass. 276, 285 (2005) . "Although the proper interpretation of a statute is for a court to determine, we recognize the [tax] board's expertise in the administration of tax statutes and give weight to the [tax] board's interpretations." Raytheon Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 455 Mass. 334, 337 (2009), citing Bell Atl. Mobile of Mass. Corp., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 451 Mass. 280, 283 (2008). See Veolia Energy Boston, Inc. v. Assessors of Boston, 483 Mass. 108, 112 (2019), quoting AA Transp. Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 454 Mass. 114, 119 (2009) ("because the board is an agency charged with administering the tax law and has expertise in tax matters, we give weight to its interpretation of tax statutes, and will affirm its statutory interpretation if that interpretation is reasonable"); Northeast Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 395 Mass. 207, 213 (1985) (describing court's "traditional deference to the expertise of the [tax] board in tax matters involving interpretation of the laws of the Commonwealth"). In addition, where, as here, Komosa is challenging the assessment of his property, he bears the burden of proving his entitlement to a reduced tax rate under c. 61A. See Raytheon Co., supra at 339 & n.ll; General Elec. Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 599 (1984).
Discussion.
The assessors argue that the tax board reasonably interpreted c. 61A and correctly concluded that Komosa's property does not qualify for the tax relief afforded by c. 61A. The tax board determined that c. 61A is unambiguous and requires that a taxpayer must establish that at least five acres of land is actively devoted to a horticultural use to qualify for c. 61A classification. The tax board pointed first to G. L. c. 61A, § 4, which states in relevant part:
"For general property tax purposes, the value of land, not less than five acres in area, which is actively devoted to agricultural, horticultural or agricultural and horticultural uses during the tax year in issue . . . shall, upon application of the owner of such land and approval thereof, be that value which such land has for agricultural or horticultural purposes" (emphasis added).
Next, the tax board observed that "horticultural use" is defined in G. L. c. 61A, § 2, as land that is "primarily and directly used" for a stated horticultural purpose, including, as is the case here, growing feed for animals, or when "primarily and directly used in a related manner which is incidental to those uses . . . ."
General laws c. 61A, § 2, provides in relevant part:
"Land shall be considered to be in horticultural use when primarily and directly used in raising fruits, vegetables, berries, nuts and other foods for human consumption, feed for animals, tobacco, flower, sod, trees, nursery or greenhouse products, and ornamental plants and shrubs for the purpose of selling these products in the regular course of business ... or when primarily and directly used in a related manner which is incidental to those uses and represents a customary and necessary use in raising these products and preparing them for market" (emphases added).
Based on the plain language of these two sections of the statute, the tax board concluded that Komosa was required to prove that at least five acres of his land were "actively devoted" to haying. In other words, five acres must be "primarily and directly" used for haying or uses reasonably related to haying -- it is not enough that "a portion of the five acres" is "actively devoted" to horticultural use.
Komosa contends that the tax board's conclusion is incorrect. He claims that the statute is ambiguous, and points to the language of G. L. c. 61A, § 3, which, he contends, provides a different way to qualify land as agricultural for tax purposes. That section provides in relevant part:
"Land not less than five acres in area shall be deemed to be actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural uses when the gross sales of agricultural, horticultural or agricultural and horticultural products resulting from such uses together with the amount, if any, payable under a soil conservation or pollution abatement program of the federal government or the commonwealth total not less than five hundred dollars per year . . . ."
Komosa asserts that, based on the language quoted above, the statute merely requires that he prove that his property (1) exceeds five acres, (2) generates $500 in annual sales, and (3) is, at least in part, devoted to haying "and is not otherwise devoted to residential, commercial, or industrial use."
Although there is no doubt that G. L. c. 61A, § 3, imposes an additional requirement of a minimum annual income, Komosa's reliance on G. L. c. 61A, § 3, alone is misplaced because we do not read each section of the statute in isolation. "All the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning, and each clause or phrase is to be construed with reference to every other clause or phrase without giving undue emphasis to any one group of words, so that, if reasonably possible, all parts shall be construed as consistent with each other so as to form a harmonious enactment effectual to accomplish its manifest purpose" (citation omitted). Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013). We conclude, as did the tax board, that read harmoniously, the plain language of the statute requires that a minimum of five acres must be actively devoted to a horticultural use or uses, or ones reasonably related thereto, to receive c. 61A classification. Furthermore, the minimum income requirement set forth in G. L. c. 61A, § 3, on which Komosa relies, is an additional, not an alternative, criterion that the landowner must meet to qualify for c. 61A classification. The interpretation advanced by Komosa ignores the language of G. L. c. 61A, §§ 2 and 4, and places undue emphasis on § 3. As such, it is inconsistent with a harmonious interpretation of the statute.
We note that the tax board's interpretation is further supported by additional language included in G. L. c. 61A, § 4, regarding "contiguous land." That portion states:
"For the said tax purposes, land so devoted shall be deemed to include such contiguous land under the same ownership as is not committed to residential, industrial or commercial use and which is covered by application submitted pursuant to section six. . . . All such land which is contiguous or is deemed contiguous for purposes of this chapter shall not exceed in acreage one hundred per cent of the acreage which is actively devoted to agricultural, horticultural or agricultural and horticultural uses."The distinction between contiguous land and the primary land (five acres) which is actively devoted to a horticultural use means contiguous land (under the same ownership) may receive the tax benefit of c. 61A only when five acres are actively devoted to a horticultural use.
In addition, contrary to Komosa's assertion, the tax board's interpretation is consistent with the intent of the Legislature. As the Supreme Judicial Court explained in Sudbury v. Scott, 439 Mass. 288, 299 (2003), the statute was enacted because "[t]he Legislature was concerned with the rapidly decreasing number of farms in the Commonwealth during the 1940's and 1950's, and the resulting loss of a vital resource for the people of the Commonwealth." Therefore, the Legislature commissioned several studies between 1955 and 1970, which proposed as a solution the assessment and taxation of land used for agricultural and horticultural purposes at a reduced rate. Id. The studies "were unanimous in recognizing that real estate taxation contributed to the demise of farms," but also voiced concern that the proposed lowered assessments, while alleviating some of the economic burden on farmers, could also "accelerate the worrisome loss of farmland to speculators and developers who would acquire and hold agricultural property at a low rate of taxation while awaiting the opportunity to convert or sell the land for development." Id. at 299-300. Accordingly, certain provisions, including the roll-back tax discussed above, were included to address these concerns. Id. at 300-301 & n.17.
"Where the words [of a statute] are plain and unambiguous in their meaning, we view them as conclusive as to legislative intent" (quotations and citation omitted). Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 479 Mass. 265, 271 (2018) . Where a statute contains seemingly conflicting language, we strive to make it "an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason" and consistent with "the legislative intent" (citations omitted). Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass. 699, 704 (2004) .
The tax board's interpretation recognizes the need to alleviate economic burden on farmers and protect farmland from speculators and developers. Komosa's interpretation, which focuses on ownership of a minimum parcel of five acres rather than the number of acres that are put to horticultural use, does not achieve these goals. In fact, Komosa's interpretation would permit a landowner to devote a tiny portion of land to horticultural use and still receive the benefit of c. 61A classification. We are confident that such a result was not one intended by the Legislature.
Lastly, we are not persuaded by Komosa's argument that the tax board erred in concluding that he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the portions of his property not devoted to haying were, in fact, devoted to other purposes incidental to the haying operation. "The decision of the [tax] board shall be final as to findings of fact," G. L. c. 58A, § 13, although it may be challenged as "not supported by 'substantial evidence'" (citation omitted). Schussel v. Commissioner of Revenue, 472 Mass. 83, 86 (2015). Here, the tax board specifically found that Komosa's testimony and documentary evidence did not support his assertion that the remainder of the property was devoted to such incidental uses. Komosa, himself, characterized such uses as infrequent. The tax board weighed the conflicting evidence regarding the manner in which those portions of the property not devoted to haying were used and found the evidence presented by Komosa insufficient to support a finding that the requisite amount of that land was devoted to incidental uses. The tax board's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 89-90.
Conclusion. We agree with the reasoning of the tax board in all material respects and affirm the decision denying Komosa's application to classify the parcels at issue pursuant to c. 61A.
So ordered.