Opinion
Record No. 1766-91-1
November 10, 1992
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY ROSEMARIE P. ANNUNZIATA, JUDGE.
(Peter M. Baskin, on brief), for appellant.
(Dennis J. Smith; Shoun, Smith Bach, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Moon and Bray.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated publication.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
Matthew A. Komos appeals the award of attorney's fees to his former wife, Mary Ellen Slugg. The final decree of divorce, entered November 4, 1983, reserved the right of the trial court to determine support and attorney's fees at a later date. Since the parties were unable to reach agreement on child and spousal support matters, the circuit court held a day-long hearing on October 22, 1990. The court denied Slugg's request for spousal support, ordered Komos to pay child support, made provisions regarding visitation, and awarded $3,000 in attorney's fees to Slugg.
On appeal, Komos argues that the award of attorney's fees was inappropriate in this case. There was no recalcitrance or failure to cooperate on his part which required Slugg to expend funds for an attorney. In fact, he contends that both parties made efforts to resolve their differences, but were unable to do so without intervention by the trial court. Komos asserts that Slugg, as a practicing attorney, is well able to compensate her counsel.
The amount of counsel fees to be awarded to a party is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, after considering the circumstances and equities of the case. Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 29, 225 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1976); Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 378 S.E.2d 626 (1989). We may review such a decision on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987).See also Poliquin v. Poliquin, 12 Va. App. 676, 681, 406 S.E.2d 401, 405 (1991).
Here, Komos cannot show that the circuit court abused its discretion. Slugg's attorney conducted pre-hearing discovery, participated in the day-long hearing, and prepared the court's final order. Slugg estimated that she incurred between $4,500 and $5,000 in legal fees in the circuit court. The record reveals that, although Slugg is an attorney, Komos' income is over four times greater than Slugg's. In light of all these factors, on this record, we could not hold that the circuit court's award of $3,000 in counsel fees to Slugg was unreasonable or constituted an abuse of discretion.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
Affirmed.