The defendants also failed to meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345; Knight v James, 183 A.D.3d 709). Although the Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d), the defendants failed to submit competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a fracture as a result of the accident (see Insurance Law § 5102[d]; Knight v James, 183 A.D.3d at 710; Kolios v Znack, 237 A.D.2d 333, 333). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, the court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d), without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ.

The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (seeToure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). They failed to submit competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a fracture as a result of the accident (seeAlexander v. Gordon, 95 A.D.3d 1245, 1246, 945 N.Y.S.2d 397 ; Kolios v. Znack, 237 A.D.2d 333, 655 N.Y.S.2d 443 ; cf.Kline v. Mitchell, 149 A.D.3d 924, 925, 52 N.Y.S.3d 450 ; Uribe v. Jimenez, 133 A.D.3d 844, 20 N.Y.S.3d 555 ). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiff's opposing papers were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (seeChe Hong Kim v. Kossoff, 90 A.D.3d 969, 934 N.Y.S.2d 867 ).

We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in denying her motion with respect to the fracture category of serious injury. Defendant failed to meet her initial burden of establishing that plaintiff's alleged thumb fracture was not related to the accident (seeKolios v. Znack, 237 A.D.2d 333, 333, 655 N.Y.S.2d 443 [2d Dept. 1997] ). In any event, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact through the affirmation of her treating physician, who opined that the thumb fracture was causally related to the accident (seeHaddadnia v. Saville, 29 A.D.3d 1211, 1212, 815 N.Y.S.2d 319 [3d Dept. 2006] ).

Although the record demonstrates that an affirmed copy of Dr. Haynes' report was later submitted with the reply of Exide and Gray in further support of their cross motion, the affirmed copy of the report must be rejected since it sought to remedy basic deficiencies in their original cross motion papers rather than respond to arguments contained in the plaintiffs opposition to the cross motion ( see Henry v Peguero, 72 AD3d 600, 602; Batista v Santiago, 25 AD3d 326; Migdol v City of New York, 291 AD2d 201). Inasmuch as triable issues of fact exist regarding whether the plaintiff was unable, as a result of the accident, to perform her usual and customary daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days immediately following the accident, we need not reach those branches of the defendants' cross motions which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on other threshold injury grounds ( see Kolios v Znack, 237 AD2d 333). Accordingly, the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint, and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed.

The report of the plaintiff's treating chiropractor, who examined the plaintiff several days after the subject accident, established limitations in the plaintiff's thoracolumbar spine range of motion and the report of the plaintiffs treating physician noted fractures in the plaintiff's cervical spine. The defendants' submission of these documents precluded a finding that they were entitled to judgment dismissing the complaint as a matter of law ( see Lesane v Tejada, 15 AD3d 358; Kolios v Znack, 237 AD2d 333; Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515). Since the defendants failed to satisfy their burden in support of the motion, we need not address the sufficiency of the plaintiff's papers submitted in opposition ( see Coscia v 938 Trading Corp., supra).

We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in denying that part of his motion seeking partial summary judgment on the threshold issue whether he sustained a serious injury in the motor vehicle accident. A serious injury is defined in relevant part as a fracture ( see Insurance Law § 5102 [d]; Kolios v. Znack, 237 AD2d 333; Gonzalez v. Brayley, 199 AD2d 1013). Plaintiff met his burden on that part of the motion by submitting the sworn report of a medical expert establishing that plaintiff fractured the lateral talus in his right ankle as a result of the accident.

This evidence was sufficient to raise an issue of fact whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d). Accordingly, the court erred in awarding summary judgment to the defendants (see Kolios v. Znack, 237 A.D.2d 333; Bethea v. Pacheco Auto Collision, 207 A.D.2d 424). Further, based on the foregoing evidence, the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

During the damages trial, the Supreme Court charged the jury that the plaintiff sustained a fractured foot as a matter of law. Since a fracture is included within the statutory definition of "serious injury" (see, Insurance Law § 5102[d]; Kolios v. Znack, 237 A.D.2d 333), the Supreme Court erred in instructing the jury to determine, inter alia, whether the plaintiff sustained a permanent consequential limitation of his foot. Moreover, the Supreme Court erred in instructing the jury to determine whether the plaintiff's sternum was fractured and whether the plaintiff sustained a permanent consequential limitation of his sternum . "If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that any one of several injuries that he or she sustained in an accident is a `serious injury' within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d), he or she is entitled to seek recovery for all injuries incurred as a result of the accident" (O'Neill v. O'Neill, 261 A.D.2d 459, 460; Preston v. Young, 239 A.D.2d 729, 731 n *; Kelley v. Balasco, 226 A.D.2d 880). Under the circumstances, a new trial is required.

Dr. Colon examined plaintiff again in May 1996, and diagnosed him with "traumatic internal derangement of the right knee." This evidence establishes that plaintiff sustained a fracture, which constitutes a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Matter of Travelers Ins. Co. v. Job, 239 A.D.2d 289, 290; Kolios v. Znack, 237 A.D.2d 333; cf., Wells v. State of New York, 228 A.D.2d 581, 582, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 814). Causation was also proven, even in the absence of expert medical testimony, since the results of this alleged act of negligence are "within the experience and observation of an ordinary layman" (Mitchell v Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 11 A.D.2d 579; see also, Meiselman v. Crown Hgts. Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389; Parrott v. Pelusio, 65 A.D.2d 914, 914-915).

A nasal fracture constitutes a threshold "serious injury" for purposes of Insurance Law §5102(d). See, Estaba v. Quow, 74 A.D.3d 734, 735 (2d Dept. 2010); Poma v. Ortiz, 2 A.D.3d 616 (2d Dept. 2003); Kolios v. Znack, 237 A.D.2d 333 (2d Dept. 1997). In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant proffers the December 11, 2018 IME report of otolaryngologist Aaron Spingarn, M.D. Dr. Spingarn notes the allegation of nasal bone fracture in Plaintiffs bill of particulars.