Opinion
2:17-CV-00217-MRH
12-05-2022
JASON KOKINDA, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, JOHN DOE #4, CHCA; ROBERT GILMORE; JOHN DOE #3; SGT. GIBSON; CO W. SANDERS; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; L. S. KERNS-BARR; C.O. PEGRAM; RN K. MILLS; ELON MWAURA; JANE DOE #1; JOHN DOE #5; AND JOHN DOE #6 Defendants
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
This prisoner civil rights action was initiated in this court on February 16, 2017, by pro se Plaintiff Jason Kokinda, who is a former inmate at SCI-Greene. At issue is a motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 filed by Defendant Elon Mwaura. (ECF No. 178). For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Mwaura's motion for summary judgment be granted.
II. REPORT
A. Factual and Procedural History
Kokinda was incarcerated at SCI-Greene from September 3, 2014, through October 30, 2015, and he has unsuccessfully pursued another action based upon matters arising from his incarceration concerning an alleged soy allergy. In this action, Kokinda claims that while incarcerated at SCI-Greene during the period between February 20, 2015, and March 21, 2015, he suffered several violations of his constitutional and statutory rights.
Specifically, Kokinda alleged that a doctor and nurse at SCI-Greene violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to order a non-soy diet to treat Kokinda's alleged soy allergy. It was the doctor's professional opinion that Kokinda suffered from a possible soy intolerance and that ordering a non-soy diet was not medically indicated. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. See Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 2017 WL 11461569 (W.D. Pa. 2017), affirmed, 797 Fed.Appx. 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Greene I”).
Although Kokinda has a long medical history throughout his time at various institutions, relevant at this juncture for factual purposes is Mwaura's actions between February 20, 2015, and March 21, 2015, only. She saw him twice during that period. On February 24, 2015, while in a restricted housing unit, Kokinda “was seen [by Mwaura] for a sick call ... regarding his complaint of needed a soy free diet.” Def.'s Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”) (ECF No. 180) at ¶ 36; see also Exhibit A (ECF No. 178-2) at p. 46. Mwaura consulted Kokinda's medical records, which stated that “soy is optional/alternative” and that Kokinda “should eat regular food.” Id. Mwaura told Kokinda that he should eat from his regular tray, and Kokinda “maintained that everything has soy and only wanted vegetables.” Id. Mwaura saw Kokinda again on March 9, 2015, when Kokinda “complained of needing his weight to be taken.” Id. at ¶ 37. Mwaura recorded Kokinda's weight as 178 pounds, his height as six feet tall, and therefore he had a Body Mass. Index (“BMI”) of 23. Id. Mwaura took no additional medical action.
Kokinda suggests that “Defendant Mwaura was predetermined to deny [] a soy-free diet” and that she was “deliberately indifferent to his starvation or whether soy was in regular diet and is a required accommodation.” Kokinda's Counterstatement of Material Facts (“CSF”) (ECF No. 188) at ¶ 36.
This is a BMI in the normal range for an adult man. Kokinda asserts that the “scale was rigged.” Kokinda's CSF (ECF No. 188) at ¶ 37. He further claims that he “reported muscular pain from starvation, severe fatigue, and inability to even walk or stand for any duration of time.” Id. He claims Mwaura's “records are fraudulent attempts to whitewash the abusive treatment.” Id.
On February 16, 2017, Kokinda filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1), which was granted on February 27, 2017. (ECF No. 2). Also on February 27, 2017, Kokinda filed his initial complaint. (ECF No. 3). On March 7, 2017, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 6) regarding Kokinda's original complaint, which recommended that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), only certain claims against certain defendants be allowed to proceed, and that all other claims and defendants named in the complaint be dismissed sua sponte with prejudice. It was further recommended that Kokinda be denied leave to file an amended complaint and that the original complaint, as modified by the Report and Recommendation, be served on the remaining defendants.
Rather than filing objections to the Report and Recommendation as instructed, Kokinda filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 7) on March 11, 2017. Sixty-two defendants were named and the FAC had 231 numbered paragraphs. The Court reviewed Kokinda's allegations, determined that they did not change the Court's prior recommendation, and entered a second Report and Recommendation taking the amendments into consideration. (ECF No. 10). On April 4, 2017, the Honorable Mark R. Hornak adopted the Report and Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court, and entered an Order denying Kokinda leave to file a second amended complaint and dismissing certain claims. (ECF No. 14). The Court permitted Kokinda to proceed on his First Amendment retaliation claim, Eighth Amendment claim, Fourteenth
The following claims and defendants were dismissed: all Section 1983 claims against the Pennsylvania DOC and individual Defendants employed by the DOC who were acting in their official capacities; all conspiracy claims in the complaint, including the claims asserted under §§ 1985(3) and 1986; the access to the courts claim; the Fourth Amendment claim; and the Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim.
Amendment procedural due process claim, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim under a “class of one” theory against the following Defendants: C.O. Pegram, Sergeant Gibson, C.O. Sanders, Hearing Examiner L.S. Kerns-Bar, Superintendent Gilmore, RHU Nurse K. Mills, and Nurse Elaine Waula. Kokinda was also permitted to proceed with his ADA claim against the DOC.
Nurse Elaine Waula is actually Nurse Elon Mwaura, the Defendant who filed the motion for summary judgment at issue in this matter. This Court will refer to this Defendant as Mwaura hereinafter.
After this initial screening, some defendants were served. On June 22, 2017, Defendants Gibson, Sanders, Kerns-Barr, Gilmore, Mills, and the DOC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 51). On June 22, 2019, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the motion be granted as to Kokinda's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, and ADA claims, and be denied with respect to the First Amendment retaliation claim against Gibson and Sanders and the Eighth Amendment claims against Gilmore and Mills. (ECF No. 94). On May 3, 2019, Chief Judge Hornak adopted this Court's Report and Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court. (ECF No. 104). The two-year timeframe between the filing of the motion to dismiss and the issuance of the Report and Recommendation occurred for several reasons. Specifically, the motion was held in abeyance twice pending Kokinda's unsuccessful appeals. (ECF Nos. 57, 68). Additionally, Kokinda requested a stay pending an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, and the stay was eventually denied. (ECF Nos. 77-79, 81). Kokinda has also filed numerous frivolous motions for recusal. (ECF Nos. 15, 16, 23, 25, 37, 39, 83). He has filed numerous motions for reconsideration of the decisions denying recusal. (ECF Nos. 19, 20, 50, 86). He also sought extensions of time to file responses to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 73, 80).
Defendant Mwaura was eventually served, and on September 23, 2019, she filed a motion dismiss for failure to state a claim and brief in support thereof. (ECF Nos. 121, 122). Kokinda filed a response on April 15, 2021, as well as a supplemental response on May 11, 2021. (ECF Nos. 157, 160). On May 13, 2021, the undersigned filed a Report and Recommendation recommending that all of Plaintiff's claims against Mwaura be dismissed except for his Eighth Amendment claim. (ECF No. 161). Kokinda filed objections, and on July 8, 2021, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and required Mwaura to file an answer within 30 days. (ECF No. 163). Mwaura filed her Answer on August 9, 2021 (ECF No. 167), and the undersigned entered a case management order setting forth discovery deadlines for all claims against all defendants. (ECF No. 168). After the close of discovery, the undersigned entered an order for all parties wishing to file motions for summary judgment do so by March 15, 2022. (ECF No. 175). That deadline was extended by agreement, and on April 5, 2022, Mwaura filed the instant motion for summary judgment, brief in support thereof, and concise statement of material facts. (ECF Nos. 178-180). Kokinda filed a responsive brief; Mwaura filed a reply brief; and Kokinda filed a sur-reply. (ECF Nos. 187, 188, 190, 191). This motion is now ripe for disposition.
Initially, rather than actually responding to the motion, Kokinda claimed that due to his continued “unlawful confinement,” he does not have a copy of the motion or access to his case file. Therefore, he stated that “filing a response is ... pointless even if the case file were available.” Pl.'s Resp. (ECF No. 157) at 2. Nevertheless, the Court ordered permitted Kokinda to file an additional response, which he did on May 11, 2021. (ECF Nos. 159, 160).
Kokinda has filed numerous motions for stay and sought other avenues to delay the disposition of this motion, along with the rest of this case. For example, shortly after Defendant Mwaura filed the motion to dismiss, on October 16, 2019, Kokinda filed a motion for stay. (ECF No. 125). Because Kokinda claimed he was incarcerated and had no access to a law library, on November 25, 2019, this Court administratively closed the case and held this motion in abeyance. (ECF No. 132). On December 1, 2020, Kokinda represented to the Court that the charges that were keeping him in jail would be resolved by February 23, 2021, and therefore this Court ordered Kokinda to file a response to Defendant's motion to dismiss by February 26, 2021. (ECF Nos. 148, 150). Nevertheless, on February 16, 2021, Kokinda requested another stay in this matter. (ECF No. 151). This Court extended Kokinda's date to file a response to March 31, 2021. (ECF No. 152). On March 30, 2021, rather than filing a response, Kokinda filed another motion for recusal. (ECF No. 154). This Court denied that motion and ordered a response to be filed by April 12, 2021. (ECF No. 156).
Despite being permitted to do so, no other Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
B. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact is one that could affect the outcome of litigation. Willis v. UPMC Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). However, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” N.A.A.C.P. v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The initial burden is on the moving party to adduce evidence illustrating a lack of genuine, triable issues. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-moving party must present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue, in rebuttal. Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587). When considering the parties' arguments, the court is required to view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). The benefit of the doubt will be given to allegations of the non-moving party when in conflict with the moving party's claims. Bialko v. Quaker Oats Co., 434 Fed.Appx. 139, 141 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., 44 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Nonetheless, a well-supported motion for summary judgment will not be defeated where the non-moving party merely reasserts factual allegations contained in the pleadings. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)). The non-moving party must resort to affidavits, depositions, admissions, and/or interrogatories to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue. Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 773 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
Furthermore, “on a motion for summary judgment, a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under Rule 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[M]erely because a non-moving party is proceeding pro se does not relieve him of the obligation under Rule 56(e) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.
C. Discussion
Mwaura moves for summary judgment in her favor on the sole remaining Eighth Amendment claim against her on two bases. First, she asserts that this claim is precluded by prior adjudications of this Court. See Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 179) at 3-7. Second, she claims that there are no genuine issues of material fact that would permit a jury to find in Kokinda's favor. Id. at 11-18. This Court will address these issues together.
Mwaura contends that summary judgment should be granted in her favor because Kokinda's “allegations of ‘deliberate indifference' are unsupported by the record evidence.” Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 179) at 7. It is Kokinda's position that the evidence presented by Mwaura is “self-serving” and “highly contested.” Pl's Br. (ECF No. 187) at 1. Specifically, he contends that the scale used to weigh him was rigged to display “a false reading.” Id. at 15.
The Eighth Amendment, enforced against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees incarcerated persons humane conditions of confinement. In this regard, prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). It is well settled that prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment if they result in serious deprivations of basic human needs. See Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000). A condition of confinement implicates the Eighth Amendment if it is so reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under contemporary standards or deprives an inmate of minimal civilized measures of the necessities of life. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). However, the Eighth Amendment does not mandate that prisons be free of discomfort. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).
In order for Kokinda to prevail, the “evidence must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003)). The undersigned will consider both.
1. Serious medical need
Mwaura first contends that summary judgment should be granted in her favor because Kokinda is once against raising “allegations of a ‘soy allergy' against a similarly-situated clinician who was not named in his prior lawsuits.” Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 179) at 7. Thus, Mwaura contends that the issue of whether Kokinda suffered a serious medical need has already been litigated and resolved in favor of defendants. In other words, Mwaura seeks to utilize the doctrine of issue preclusion to resolve this matter.
The doctrine of issue preclusion [] derives from the simple principle that “later courts should honor the first actual decision of a matter that has been actually litigated.” 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4416 (1981) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]. This doctrine ensures that “once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation,” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). The prerequisites for the application of issue preclusion are satisfied when: “(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.” In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 628-29 n. 5 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1066, 111 S.Ct. 782, 112 L.Ed.2d 845 (1991)).Burlington N. R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
“Complete identity of parties in the two suits is not required for the application of issue preclusion.” Id. at 1232. Because Mwaura was not a party to any other lawsuit regarding the soy allergy, and she attempts to use this issue against Kokinda, who was a party to the other lawsuits, it is referred to as “offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, which has been recognized as proper by the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979).” Id. (footnotes omitted). “The Court in Parklane concluded that ‘a litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may nevertheless use that judgment ‘offensively' to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding,' [Parklane, 439 U.S. 326], 99 S.Ct. at 649, subject to an overriding fairness determination by the trial judge.” Id.
The following factual and procedural history is relevant at this juncture. On December 7, 2015, Kokinda filed a pro se civil action at 15-cv-1593, which raised, inter alia, issues related to medical treatment for his purported soy allergy at SCI-Fayette (“Fayette Case”). On February 22, 2016, the District Court filed a Memorandum Opinion dismissing Kokinda's complaint without prejudice and ordered he file an Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from that order.
On October 7, 2016, the Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the order of the District Court. Kokinda then requested the Third Circuit stay its mandate, which would result in a stay at the District Court as well. The District Court stay was granted pending outcome of the Third Circuit stay. This case did not continue again until January 4, 2018, when the undersigned searched the public docket and learned that the stay had been denied.
Meanwhile, while the appeal in the Fayette case was pending, on August 26, 2016, Kokinda filed Greene I, a pro se civil action at 16-cv-1303, which raised, inter alia, issues related to medical treatment for his purported soy allergy at SCI-Greene. On August 20, 2018, the District Court entered a Memorandum Order overruling objections to the report and recommendation of the undersigned which granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Jin and Nurse Greco. In that Report and Recommendation, the undersigned concluded that “there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. Kokinda was not suffering from a sufficiently serious medical condition.” Report and Recommendation (Greene I) (ECF No. 173) at 16. On appeal from the District Court's order, the Third Circuit, on November 27, 2019, assumed arguendo that the soy allergy was a serious medical need, but concluded that the District Court did not err in finding that neither Jin nor Greco acted with deliberate indifference, and therefore, Kokinda could not maintain an Eighth Amendment claim on this basis. See Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 797 Fed.Appx. 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2019).
In other words, at this juncture, the Third Circuit did not address the issue of whether the District Court erred in concluding that Kokinda did not have a serious medical need.
Accordingly, when it came time for a motion to dismiss in the Fayette Case, on October 22, 2018, the undersigned concluded that “the determination that [Kokinda] did not suffer a serious medical need was essential to the prior judgment against him.” Report and Recommendation (Fayette Case) (ECF No. 84) at 17. Thus, the undersigned dismissed the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against the defendants in that case. After the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, Kokinda appealed to the Third Circuit, challenging that conclusion. The Third Circuit found no error in the undersigned's conclusion regarding the preclusive effect of the prior determination, and on February 11, 2020, affirmed the judgment entered by the District Court. See Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 803 Fed.Appx. 574, 577 (3d Cir. 2020).
Based on the foregoing, the Third Circuit has concluded that it is appropriate to apply offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel with regard to the issue of whether Kokinda presented with a serious medical need. Thus, the undersigned respectfully recommends the same at this juncture, and would conclude that this issue is dispositive as to Mwaura's motion for summary judgment. Because Kokinda cannot establish that he suffered from a serious medical need, it is respectfully recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of Mwaura and Kokinda's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against her be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Deliberate Indifference
However, even if this Court were to assume that Kokinda did suffer from a serious medical need, the undersigned would respectfully recommend that summary judgment still be granted.
This is exactly what the Third Circuit did in Greene I. See Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 797 Fed.Appx. 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2019) (“We may assume that Kokinda's soy allergy constituted a serious medical need.”). This is not a conclusion that Kokinda did indeed have a serious medical need; rather, it permitted the District Court, then the Third Circuit, to address the issue of deliberate indifference. The Third Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of two medical defendants, concluding they did not act with deliberate indifference. Id. at 71-72.
A “failure to provide adequate care ... [that] was deliberate, and motivated by non-medical factors” is actionable under the Eighth Amendment, but “inadequate care [that] was a result of an error in medical judgment” is not. Durmer [v. O'Carroll], 991 F.2d [64,] 69 [(3d Cir. 1993)]. “We have found ‘deliberate indifference' in a variety of circumstances, including where the prison official (1)
knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).Parkell, 833 F.3d at 337.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kokinda, the credible evidence of record demonstrates that access to a soy-free diet for Kokinda was deemed medically optional. See Exhibit A (ECF No. 178-2) at p. 46. Mwaura reviewed this information in making her recommendation to Kokinda that he eat what he could from the tray provided. Id. Moreover, when Kokinda was concerned about his weight, Mwaura weighed Kokinda and found him to be of normal weight. Id.; see also Declaration of Mwaura (ECF No. 178-4). Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates that Mwaura did not intentionally deny, delay, or prevent medical treatment to Kokinda. Therefore, Kokinda has not established any genuine issues of material fact that would permit a jury to decide in his favor on this Eighth Amendment claim. Thus, it is respectfully recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of Mwaura and against Kokinda. See Armstrong v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 632 Fed.Appx. 675, 677 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming order granting summary judgment where plaintiff “failed to produce any credible evidence that any of the Defendants were aware of, and deliberately indifferent to, a serious risk”).
D. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant Mwaura's motion for summary judgment be granted and she be dismissed from this action with prejudice.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, because Kokinda is a non-electronically registered party, he must file objections, if any, December 22, 2022, and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by December 19, 2022. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within these timeframes “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections shall have fourteen days from the date of service of objections to respond.
cc: The Honorable Mark R. Hornak
Counsel of Record
(via ECF electronic notification)
JASON KOKINDA
3646487
Northeast Ohio Correctional Center
2240 Hubbard Road
Youngstown, OH 44505
(via U.S. Mail)