Opinion
C.A. No. 98L-12-117
February 2, 2000.
ORDER
This the 2nd day of February, 2000, upon consideration of the Defendants' Motion for Reargument and the record in this case it appears that:
1. The Plaintiffs instituted this litigation against the Defendants on December 31, 1998, alleging that the Plaintiffs were entitled to damages, including a mechanic's lien against a certain parcel of land, against the Defendants. Defendant Moonland Construction, listed as a Maryland corporation, is owned by Dean Mullins, who was not sued individually.
2. A summons and complaint were filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3104 for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction over Moonland Construction. Certified copies of those documents were sent to Moonland Construction at the address listed for that entity, 143 Parktowne Drive, Elkton, Maryland. No answer was filed as proscribed by 10 Del. C. § 3104. As a result, the Plaintiffs filed a "Direction for Entry of Judgment by Default" representing that the Defendant had failed to appear, plead or otherwise defend the action as provided by the rules of this Court. A default judgment was entered by the Court on March 15, 1999.
The date of receipt of the summons and complaint is in dispute by both parties. Mr. Mullins, in his affidavit and in testimony given during the hearing on the motion to vacate, stated that he no longer resided at the Maryland address, and did not sign for or receive the summons and complaint until early March. A copy of the return receipt indicates that the date of delivery was February 16, 1999.
3. The Court held a hearing on a Motion to Vacate Default Judgment on April 26, 1999. After hearing argument from both sides, the Court granted the Defendants motion based on Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b). Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to reargue the merits the aforementioned ruling.
4. In essence, the Plaintiffs complain that the decision to vacate constituted an abuse of discretion by the Court. More specifically, they argue that the Court was inclined to grant the motion based on the policy considerations favoring the resolution of litigation on the merits, and did not have an opportunity to carefully consider the Plaintiffs' response to that motion prior to doing so. They also allege that the decision to grant the motion to vacate was not accompanied by any supportive explanation or reasoning.
5. A Motion for Reargument is governed by Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). Rule 59 was enacted in order to afford the trial court an opportunity to. correct errors prior to an appeal. Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, Del. Supr., 260 A.2d 701, 702 (1969). Motions for reargument will generally not be granted unless a party is "advanc[ing] new arguments to convince [the Court] to reconsider or accept [a party's] position as a matter of law." Zaleski v. Mart Associates, Del. Super., C.A. No. 82C-NO-11, Poppitti, J. (Aug. 26, 1988) (ORDER). "[U]nless the Court has overlooked a decision or principle of law that would have controlling effect or the Court has misapprehended the law or the facts so that the outcome of the decision would be affected," a motion for reargument is generally denied. Re Miles, Inc. v. Cookson America, Inc., Del. Ch., 677 A.2d 505 (1995) (quoting Stein v. Orloff, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 7276-NC, Hartnett, V.C. (September 25, 1985) (Slip Op.) at 3).
Rule 59(e) reads in part: A motion for reargument shall be served and filed within five days after the filing of the Court's opinion or decision. The motion shall briefly and distinctly state the grounds therefor. Within 5 days after service of such motion, the opposing party may serve and file a brief answer to each ground asserted in the motion. The Court will determine from the motion and answer whether reargument will be granted.
6. Motions to Vacate Default Judgments are controlled by Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b), which provides in part:
Mistake; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Resolution of such lie within the sound discretion of the Court. Wife B. v. Husband B., Del. Supr., 395 A.2d 358 (1978).
7. The standard for determining Rule 60(b) motions is:
In exercising its discretion under Rule 60(b)(1), the Court, with deference to the policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, generally favors such motions upon almost any reasonable excuse. However, the Court must examine the considerations of each case, in order to determine whether the conduct of the moving party was the conduct of a reasonably prudent person. Only where the conduct can be so characterized, and the moving party establishes: 1) the possibility of a meritorious defense, and 2) no substantial prejudice to the non-moving party, will the court grant the motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).Keith v. Melvin L. Joseph Construction Co., Del. Supr., 451 A.2d 842, 846 (1982). Any doubt as to errors which fall within the rule should be resolved in favor of the movant. Model Finance Co. v. Barton, Del. Super., 188 A.2d 233 (1963).
8. The Court expressly based its decision to grant the Motion to Vacate Default Judgment on Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b). During the hearing the Plaintiffs candidly conceded that they would suffer no real prejudice if this default judgment were to be reopened. (Tr. at 8) Also, the Plaintiffs did not contest the existence of a meritorious defense.
9. It is apparent from the record that there is some confusion regarding the service of the summons and complaint. There are issues as to when and where it was delivered, as well as who received it. That, coupled with the Plaintiffs' failure to concede any prejudice occurring as a result of the vacation of default, framed the basis for the Court's decision to grant the motion to vacate, particularly in light of the general policy which favors resolution of litigation on the merits. It therefore appears that the lack of timely response by Mr. Mullins and Moonland Construction was the product of excusable neglect under 60(b).
Courts "generally favor such motions upon almost any reasonable excuse." Id. (quoting Vechery v. McCabe, Del. Super., 100 A.2d 460 (1953).
10. Having reviewed the Plaintiff's motion, it is apparent that they have not presented any argument and/or evidence that was not considered by the Court in reaching its original decision. Under these circumstances, the motion for reargument must be, and hereby is, denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.