Opinion
Record No. 0603-92-4
April 27, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY MARCUS D. WILLIAMS, JUDGE.
Richard J. Byrd (Byrd, Mische, McKechnie, Bevis Bowen, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Ruth Lankford Chamowitz (Bruce B. McHale; Chamowitz Chamowitz, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Willis and Fitzpatrick.
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
In this appeal from an award of child support, we reverse the award and remand the case for further proceedings because the trial court used an incorrect amount as the presumptive guideline for child support and used an inappropriate factor in determining the amount of support to award.
The trial court found that the presumptive amount of support for the mother to pay the father was $1,639 per month. The parties agree $1,639 per month in support is the presumptive amount of child support to be paid by both the mother and the father and that the presumptive amount for the mother to pay under the guidelines was $901 per month based upon the court's findings regarding the parties' gross incomes. Furthermore, the trial court based its award of $650 per month on the amount of support the mother was paying to an adult daughter. Although the actual monetary support paid for other children is a factor a trial court may use to deviate from the presumptive amount of child support, the statutory provisions regarding the determination of child support do not authorize a trial court to use that amount as a basis for awarding the same amount for the benefit of another child. See Code § 20-107.2. Thus, we reverse the award and remand the matter for a redetermination of child support.
In doing so, we briefly address other issues raised by the parties as follows: (1) the father's answers to interrogatories were statements of a party admissible into evidence "to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence"; see Rule 4:8(e); (2) the expense of a private tutor for a child with a learning disability results from a "mental condition of the child" and is, therefore, a factor to be considered in determining whether to deviate from the presumptive amount of child support;see Code § 20-108.1(B)(8); (3) the trial court may deviate from the presumptive amount of child support to the extent that the factors enumerated in Code § 20-108.1 "may be reflected in the child support or other provisions of an agreement which indirectly benefit a child"; see Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 158, 409 S.E.2d 470, 474 (1991); and (4) although a deviation from the presumptive amount of child support requires a trial court to "make written findings of enough detail and exactness to allow for effective appellate review of the findings," these findings may be incorporated in an order of the court prepared and submitted for approval by trial counsel.See Richardson v. Richardson, 12 Va. App. 18, 22, 401 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1991).
For these reasons, the trial court's order awarding child support is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.