; Koestner v. Derby Cellular Prod., 518 F.Supp.2d 397, 403 (D. Conn. 2007) (same). The motion to dismiss as to count ten is GRANTED.

Koestner v. Derby Cellular Prod., 518 F.Supp.2d 397, 403 (D. Conn. 2007) (same).

; Koestner v. Derby Cellular Prod., 518 F.Supp.2d 397, 403 (D. Conn. 2007) (same). The motion to dismiss as to Count Six is GRANTED.

District courts in this Circuit have found that a three-month lapse between alleged discriminatory statements and an adverse employment action is too long a gap to find the remark probative of discrimination.Sethi v. Narod, 12 F. Supp. 3d 505, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases); see also Rolon v. Pep Boys--Manny, Moe & Jack, 601 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (D. Conn. 2009) (a reasonable jury could view the supervisor's alleged remarks as discriminatory because they were made approximately two months between the plaintiff's return from maternity leave and her termination); Koestner v. Derby Cellular Prod., 518 F. Supp. 2d 397, 402 (D. Conn. 2007) (concluding that remarks were probative of an employer's discriminatory animus because they "were made in November 2003 and January 2004, which was not long before [the plaintiff] was terminated in February 2004"). Curtin's alleged remarks to Plaintiff a few weeks after DHD did not provide Plaintiff with leads weighs in favor of finding that the remarks are probative of discrimination.

rly granted where plaintiff claimed that defendants conspired to engage in a pattern of harassment including denial of a position, initiation of disciplinary actions without proper investigation, and defamation and intimidation of plaintiff), cert. denied, 931 A.2d 935 (2007); Appleton, 757 A.2d at 1063 (summary judgment against plaintiff on IIED claim was proper where defendants made condescending comments about plaintiff in front of colleagues, questioned plaintiff's vision and ability to read, informed plaintiff's daughter that she was acting differently and should take time off, asked police to escort plaintiff from school, required plaintiff to subject herself to psychiatric testing, forced plaintiff to take leave of absence, suspended plaintiff, and forced plaintiff to resign); see also Allen v. Egan, 303 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78 (D. Conn. 2004) ("Although employment discrimination is illegal, it does not per se give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress."); Koestner v. Derby Cellular Prod., 518 F. Supp. 2d 397, 403 (D. Conn. 2007) (same). The motion to dismiss as to Count Six is GRANTED.

See, e.g., Roginsky v. Cty. of Suffolk, N.Y., 729 F. Supp. 2d 561, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently stated a claim under the ADEA based on, inter alia, allegations concerning supervisor's comments that the plaintiff "was getting 'old' and that the plaintiff "was not going to be around much longer"); Schreiber, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (decision-maker's comments that he did not want "older people" in his trading group made three months before plaintiff's termination and "in the context of a complaint by [the plaintiff] that he could not get into his preferred trading group" "reflected a discriminatory atmosphere and, consequently, constituted evidence of discrimination"); Koestner v. Derby Cellular Products, 518 F. Supp. 2d 397, 402 (D. Conn. 2007) (concluding that remark that the defendant company "needed to get younger" was probative of age discrimination because it was made by a decision-maker, three months before the plaintiff's termination, "expressed a desire to take action relating to the age of [the defendant's] employees," and was made during a manager's meeting); compare Mesias v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 106 F. Supp. 3d 431, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (the plaintiff failed to allege a connection between supervisor's comments that he was tired of working with menopausal women and the plaintiff's termination where comments were made three months and one year prior to termination and the plaintiff failed to allege comments were part of any decision-making process). The Court acknowledges that the inference of discrimination is weakened by the fact that plaintiff was hired when he was a member of the protected class and the fact that Stuckert both hired and fired plaintiff.

"Courts have generally held that remarks about an employee's 'energy level' do not indicate age-based animus, as an employee's level of energy -- or lack thereof -- is a legitimate business concern." Koestner v. Derby Cellular Prods., 518 F. Supp. 2d 397, 401 (D. Conn. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, energy level is an important, job-related attribute that can be possessed by people of all ages and assessed in an interview.

A district court should not simply classify discriminatory remarks as "stray" or "not stray" and reject those falling in the former category as insufficient to prove discrimination. See Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007); Koestner v. Derby Cellular Prods., 518 F. Supp. 2d 397, 402 (D. Conn. 2007) ("[T]he Court does not need to determine whether the remarks . . . are `stray.' Instead, the Court focuses on whether the remarks are sufficiently probative of age discrimination such that the jury could reasonably find that [plaintiff] was terminated because of his age."); Carras v. MGS 782 Lex, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67876, at * 15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2007).

The United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit “has been hesitant to conclude that ‘ambiguous stray remarks' constitute evidence of pretext.” Reilly, 2008 WL 795322 at *10 n. 19; see also Koestner v. Derby Cellular Prods., 518 F.Supp.2d 397, 402 (D.Conn.2007) (“In determining whether a comment is a probative statement that evidences an intent to discriminate or whether it is a non-probative ‘stray remark,’ a court should consider the following factors: (1) who made the remark, i.e., a decisionmaker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker; (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark, i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory; and (4) the context in which the remark was made, i.e., whether it was related to the decisionmaking process.” (quoting Schreiber v. Worldco, LLC, 324 F.Supp.2d 512, 518–19 (S.D.N.Y.2004))).

employee should retire significant when buttressed by plaintiff’s replacement with employee twenty-five years younger); Tomassi v. Insignia Financial Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2006) (evidence of ageist remarks by decision maker made monthly and at time of firing, combined with plaintiff’s replacement by someone thirty-eight years younger, sufficient to raise triable question of fact); Hasemann v. United Parcel Services of America, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:11CV554 (VLB) (D.Conn. February 26, 2013) (comments by superiors months before termination deemed unrelated to employment decision, even when coupled with plaintiff’s replacement by much younger worker); Weichman v. Chubb & Son, 552 F.Supp.2d 271 (D.Conn. 2008) (single age-based remark by decision maker, without other indicia that employer acted with discriminatory intent, not probative of discrimination); Koestner v. Derby Cellular Products, 518 F.Supp.2d 397, 401 (D.Conn. 2007) (remarks by corporate executives not involved in employment decision that to reduce insurance premiums company " had to get younger" sufficient to raise inference of discrimination, but decision maker comment that " someone more energetic would be better for the job" not probative of age-based animus); Hayes v. Compass Group USA, supra, 343 F.Supp.2d 120 (age-related remarks of two decision makers coupled with weak statistical evidence of pattern and practice of age discrimination and evidence of possible inconsistent policy of terminating managers over forty years old but demoting those under forty sufficient to reach jury); Jackson v. Post University, 836 F.Supp.2d 65, 96-97 (D.Conn. 2001) (isolated derogatory remark of low-level supervisor, not the decision maker, insufficient to establish racial discrimination). " In determining whether a comment is a probative statem