Opinion
No. 3-122 / 02-0511.
Filed March 12, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, GARY E. WENELL, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her lawsuit pursuant to Iowa Rule Civil Procedure 1.944. AFFIRMED.
Brien O'Brien, Sioux City, for appellant.
Michael Frey of Hellige, Meis, Erickson Frey, Sioux City, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
This case presents the conflict between the orderly functioning of the courts and the desire to give every litigant her day in court. Dismissed pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.944, the plaintiff sought reinstatement of her petition. After denial of her motion she seeks redress from the appellate court. We review these appeals for errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4.
The relevant events are: the filing of the petition on April 30, 1999, a notice to try or dismiss pursuant to rule 1.944 on July 20, 2000, a dismissal under the rule on January 5, 2001, an order reinstating on January 23, 2001 (extending the dismissal date to July 31, 2001), a motion to reinstate filed February 11, 2002, and an order denying the motion to reinstate dated February 26, 2002. The case was set for trial and continued by order of the court three times, and the clerk of court sent out a notice stating, "this case has been dismissed as of January 2, 2002." Plaintiff's problem is she has come up against the time constraints of the rule. It provides, "Application for such reinstatement, setting forth the grounds therefore, shall be filed within six months from the date of dismissal." Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.944(6).
When a case subject to rule 1.944 is reinstated following dismissal for lack of prosecution, the case is not removed from the operation of the rule but is simply given a later deadline for trial or other disposition. See Miller v. Bonar, 337 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Iowa 1983) (holding that a continuance merely moved the mandatory dismissal date back six months); Brown v. Iowa Dist. Court, 272 N.W.2d 457, 458 (Iowa 1978) ("If the order continuing the case is not complied with, the case stands dismissed."). The order continuing or reinstating the case merely holds the dismissal in suspension on certain conditions which, if not met, result in automatic dismissal. Allied Gas Chem. Co., Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Iowa 1985); Rhiner v. Arends, 292 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1980). The order reinstating a case remains an integral part of the implementation and operation of the rule, and the automatic dismissal pursuant to such an order is subject to the reinstatement provision in the last paragraph of the rule. Sladek v. G M Midwest Floor Cleaning, Inc., 403 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Iowa 1987)
First adopted in 1961, rule 1.944 and its effects have been described as follows:
[I]t is grounded on a number of clear but hard-learned premises. Dismissal has been the only effective antidote for the tendencies which allow cases to become stale. Dismissal, when called for, must be automatic; the impetus to move cases would be lost if dismissals were selected on a case-by-case basis.Greif v. K-Mart Corp., 404 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 1987)
Although the clerk of court sent a letter stating the case was dismissed as of January 2, 2002, the case was automatically dismissed when the continuance expired July 31, 2001. No motion to reinstate was filed until February 11, 2002. This was beyond the six-month period for the filing of such motions. The trial court correctly ruled it lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the case. Id. at 155.