The second cause of action, which seeks to impute liability to the town for the claimed negligence of its Town Justice, was dismissed and plaintiff now appeals. We affirm. It has repeatedly been observed that a municipality is not accountable for the tortious acts of its judicial officers committed in the performance of their duties ( Jones v Town of Johnstown, 41 A.D.2d 866; Koeppe v City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443, 446). As for the argument, advanced for the first time in plaintiff's appellate brief, that the Town Justice is individually liable for his acts, we note that even if this contention possessed merit (which is doubtful in light of Bardascini v Reedy [ 51 A.D.2d 271]), there is no need to address it, for it was neither urged upon Special Term nor in the pleadings ( Board of Trustees of Vil. of Lansing v Pyramid Cos., 51 A.D.2d 414, 416). Order affirmed, with costs.
The trial court answered both issues in the negative and we agree. It has been held consistently by our courts that a municipality is not responsible for the tortious acts of its judicial officers in the performance of their duties. ( Jameison v. State of New York, 7 A.D.2d 944; Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443.) This is so even though a Justice of the Peace acts in other capacities. (See Town of Putnam Valley v. Slutzky, 283 N.Y. 334.
In addition, assuming arguendo that he were a State officer, a mere erroneous determination of law or fact by a court which commits an individual to prison is not ground for liability on the part of the State so long as there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter ( Harty v. State of New York, 29 A.D.2d 243, affd. 27 N.Y.2d 698; Hicks v. State of New York, 22 A.D.2d 837) which is clearly the case here (see, CPL 410.10 et seq.). Finally, "the State is not liable for errors of a judicial officer on the theory of respondeat superior or otherwise" ( Jameison v. State of New York, supra, p. 945; Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443) and, of course, cannot be liable when prison authorities obeying the order of a court, confine an individual within their walls ( Jameison v. State of New York, supra; Nastasi v. State of New York, 275 App. Div. 524, affd. 300 N.Y. 473; Douglas v. State of New York, 269 App. Div. 521, affd. 296 N.Y. 530). Appellant's constitutional arguments have no merit, and accordingly the judgment should be affirmed.
However, this also has its limitations. (See Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498; Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443; and Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, where municipalities were held liable for the negligence of the public police department.) I can discern no compelling public policy reasons to extend by implication this broad cloak of immunity to the private police force set up by the Housing Authority. As to the circumstance that it was done pursuant to law, it could not have been established without authorization of law and the fact that it was so authorized by statute does not equate it to the public police force of the city.
The State is not liable under its general waiver of immunity (Court of Claims Act, § 8) for the misconduct of a judicial officer on the theory of respondeat superior. ( Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443; Jameison v. State of New York, 7 A.D.2d 944.) A coterminus exception obtains, in our opinion, in the case of the head of the State's Department of Law where, as here, he functioned in a matter committed by law to his control and supervision which necessarily involved the exercise of judgment and discretion. (General Corporation Law, §§ 91, 92, 93, 95; see Beaudrias v. State of New York, 47 N.Y.S.2d 509.) A claim asserted against the State without its consent, of course, does not lie. The judgment and orders should be affirmed.
The award of damages for any period beyond the time of arraignment would clearly be improper even if there had been no lawful arrest. The State of New York would not be liable for judicial or quasi-judicial errors of the Justice of the Peace or for malfeasance or misfeasance of the Warden of the County Penitentiary nor for detention subsequent to the arraignment resulting from such mistakes or errors ( Warner v. State of New York, 297 N.Y. 395, 400; Jameison v. State of New York, 7 A.D.2d 944; Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443, 445; Berger v. Village of Seneca Falls, 3 Misc.2d 647, 650; Farrell v. State of New York, 204 Misc. 148). Further, the State may not be held liable for mistakes of a county or local officer such as the Justice of the Peace or Warden ( Saunders v. State of New York, 14 Misc.2d 881; Jameison v. State of New York, supra; Fishbein v. State of New York, 282 App. Div. 600; Farrell v. State of New York, supra).
( Farrell v. State of New York, 204 Misc. 148.) The court below also properly held that irrespective of the foregoing proposition the State is not liable for the errors of a judicial officer on the theory of respondeat superior or otherwise ( Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443; Newiadony v. State of New York, 276 App. Div. 59). What was said in the Koeppe case (p. 446) about the liability of a Judge acting without jurisdiction should perhaps be tempered lest a false impression be created.
The second cause of action stated in the complaint, which must be taken by us as entirely true, alleges that the officers of the defendant village induced plaintiff to pay the village $750 to install water and sewer lines because of a representation by the public officers that such a payment was "the usual practice" and such payment was made by "all" other "property owners". It is alleged that the representation was false. If false it is actionable since the tort thus described relates to a subject in the official control of the officers of the village and led to the payment of money, not to the officers, but to the village itself. (Cf. McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, and Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443, 447.) Order unanimously affirmed, with $10 costs.
The only allegation contained in the claim is that a State trial court judge erred in failing to hold a suppression hearing prior to claimant's trial (Verified Claim ΒΆ 2). It is well settled that a ' "[j]udge is immune from civil liability for acts done in the exercise of his [or her] judicial function' " (Best v State of New York, 116 AD3d 1198 [3d Dept. 2014], quoting Salzano v Town of Poughkeepsie, 300 AD2d 716, 717 [3d Dept. 2002][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Likewise, the State cannot be held responsible, under the theory of respondeat superior, for any alleged errors made by its judges in their judicial capacity (see Koeppe v City of Hudson, 276 AD 443 [3d Dept. 1950]; Pooler v State of New York, UID No. 2013-044-542 [Ct Cl, Schaewe, J., Oct. 15, 2013]). The only two exceptions to the doctrine of judicial immunity are: (1) when a judge does not act as a judge, and (2) when a judge, though acting under color of judicial authority, lacks any jurisdiction supporting judicial authority for the action taken (see Mireles v Waco, 502 US 9, 11-12 [1991]; Alvarez v Snyder, 264 AD2d 27, 34 [1st Dept. 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 759 [2000]).
It is well-settled that the doctrine of judicial immunity bars claims against judges of the State for their judicial acts, as well as against the State - under the theory of respondeat superior - for any alleged errors made by its judges in their judicial capacity (see e.g. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Mosher-Simons v County of Allegany, 99 NY2d 214 [2002]; Murray v Brancato, 290 NY 52 [1943]; Koeppe v City of Hudson, 276 App Div 443 [3d Dept 1950]). Judicial immunity also extends to those who act in a quasi-judicial capacity (Welch v State of New York, 203 AD2d 80 [1st Dept 1994]; Lockwood v State of New York, UID No. 2010-045-028 [Ct Cl, Lopez-Summa, J., Dec. 7, 2010]), as well as to non-judicial personnel who are integral parts of the judicial process, such as Court Clerks (see Mosher-Simons, 99 NY2d at 220; Hennessy v State of New York, UID No. 2008-015-504 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., May 22, 2008]).