Opinion
Case No. 98 C 5157.
February 20, 2002
ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Koch-Weser, a high school teacher at Riverside Brookfield High School, has filed suit against defendants Board of Education of Riverside Brookfield High School District 208 ("School Board"), Riverside Brookfield High School District No. 208, Leslie Roy Wilson, and Charles Klingsporn. On September 6, 2001, this court granted summary judgment on Count III of Koch-Weser's complaint in favor of defendants. In that count, Koch-Weser had alleged that the defendants' delay in assigning him a classroom with windows constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Presently before the court is Koch-Weser's motion to vacate, alter, or amend the summary judgment order. For the reasons set forth below, Koch-Weser's motion is denied.
Background
In its September 6, 2001 opinion, this court observed that Koch-Weser had failed to timely respond to defendants' properly filed motion for summary judgment. Koch-Weser v. Bd. of Educ. of Riverside Brookfield High Sch. Dist. 208 et al., No. 98-5157, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14044, at *2, (N.D.Ill. Sept. 6, 2001). Specifically, Koch-Weser filed a motion for leave to file a response instanter nearly five months after the deadline set by the court. The court denied Koch-Weser's motion to file a response and held that "the material facts set forth in defendants' statement of facts are deemed admitted in this case." Id. at *5. The court then summarized the merits of defendants' motion:
In support of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff points only to the defendants' delay in placing him in a room with windows, given their knowledge of his Seasonal Affective Disorder. . . . The admitted facts indicate that the delay was a result of Koch-Weser's failure to submit an instructional plan for his Honors Advanced Biology course, that Koch-Weser sought a room with windows only for two class periods, and did not complain about his windowless rooms for certain other class periods, that Koch-Weser was never told that his assignment to the windowless room for those two periods was a permanent assignment, and that Koch-Weser was placed in a room with windows for those two periods after he turned in an acceptable instructional plan. Given these undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that defendants' actions were extreme and outrageous.
Id. at *18-19. Thus, the court granted summary judgment on Count III. Id. at *19.
Discussion
Koch-Weser brings his present motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), which allows a court to reconsider an interlocutory order "at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Courts will grant motions to reconsider where
the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis for a motion to reconsider would be a controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the Court. Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.
Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va. 1983)).
Koch-Weser argues that this court's earlier summary judgment ruling was based on a "misapprehension." (Pl.'s Rep. Mem. at 2.) He points to two pieces of evidence found in defendants' exhibits that he argues show a material dispute as to whether defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous. Koch-Weser is arguing that the court made an error in reasoning, which is inappropriate under a Rule 54(b) motion. See Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191. "[T]his Court's opinions are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure." Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D.Ill. 1988).
Koch-Weser's memorandum and reply in support of his motion are filled with factual allegations and arguments as to why this court should find a genuine issue of material fact concerning Count III. He may not rely on these arguments.
Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Such motions cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during pendency of the summary judgment motion. The non-movant has an affirmative duty to come forward to meet a properly supported motion for summary judgment. . . . Nor should a motion for reconsideration serve as the occasion to tender new legal theories for the first time.
Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665-66 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (internal citations omitted), aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Publishers Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publ'ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985). All of the evidence on which Koch-Weser's argument now rests was available to him when he failed to respond to defendants' summary judgment motion. Failure to raise this evidence and to make his present arguments in opposition to the summary judgment motion waives his right to do so now. Publishers Resource, Inc., 762 F.2d at 561.
However, in an "abundance of caution," id. at 561 n. 2, the court has reviewed Koch-Weser's arguments on the merits and remains unconvinced that it should vacate its earlier opinion. To succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Koch-Weser must show that: (1) the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendants either intended or knew that there was a high probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendants' conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress. Strasburger v. Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 351, 358-59 (7th Cir. 1998).
Koch-Weser first points to defendants' Exhibit 50, a September 10, 1996 memo from Koch-Weser to the School Board "explaining how little overlap there was between the Honors Advanced Biology course that he had taught for years and Advanced Placement Biology that he was being asked to `pilot.'" (Pl.'s Mot. at 3.) Koch-Weser suggests that this evidence renders meaningless the court's finding that Koch-Weser was never told that his assignment to the windowless room for those two periods was a permanent assignment. In other words, because of Koch-Weser's perceived inability to modify Honors Advanced Biology into Advanced Placement Biology, he perceived his windowless room assignment to be permanent, which aggravated his depression. Because defendants were aware of this, he argues, their continued delay in assigning him to a room with windows constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct, or so a reasonable jury might find. The court disagrees. The September 10 memo states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he overlap of the present advanced biology course (ecology based) and AP biology (molecular biology and survey based) is only about 20%. . . . Minor modifications cannot change the one into the other." (Defs.' Ex. 50.) This evidence is not proof that defendants knew or even should have known that Koch-Weser thought his windowless room assignment was permanent. In no way does it show that defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous.
Second, Koch-Weser points to defendants' exhibits showing that when assistant principal Bill Lehotsky finally assigned Koch-Weser to a room with windows, it was on a full-time basis. This, Koch-Weser argues, shows that defendants' purported reason for the delay in the room assignment — that they were waiting for Koch-Weser to submit his instructional plan — was pretext. In other words, if a room with windows was available all along, there was no need to make Koch-Weser wait six weeks before assigning him such a room. A closer look at the evidence reveals the failure in Koch-Weser's logic. Lehotsky testified at his deposition that there was never any intent not to give Koch-Weser a room with windows, that he had trouble finding a room with windows to assign to Koch-Weser, and that he eventually assigned him such a room because he was able to find it. This undisputed evidence does not support an inference that defendants knew that a room with windows was always available. No reasonable jury could conclude that defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to vacate, alter, or amend judgment is denied.