This appeal is concerned solely with count VI of the complaint, which alleged ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant school district in furnishing plaintiff with an ill-fitting and inadequate football helmet. The trial court granted the district's motion to strike count VI on the ground that under section 34-84a of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 122, par. 34-84a), as construed by this court in Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165, and as applied to the circumstances set forth in the complaint, the plaintiff could not recover damages unless he alleged and proved willful and wanton conduct on the part of school personnel. We allowed plaintiff's 302(b) motion to transfer to this court his appeal under Rule 304(a) (58 Ill.2d Rules 302(b), 304(a)), the trial court having found there to be no just reason for delaying enforcement and appeal.

The school football program was voluntary, conducted after regular school hours, encompassed practice and scheduled varsity games, and provided the student participants with equipment, including helmets and face masks. Although admission fees were charged to spectators, the players were not compensated. At the time the circuit court dismissed count I, Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165, had only recently been handed down, and the following relevant statutory provisions were in effect: Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 85, par. 1-101 et seq., hereafter Tort Immunity Act), and sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 122, pars. 24-24, and 34-84a, which applies to cities over 500,000 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 122, par. 34-1)), which are identical in the relevant paragraph and provide: "Teachers and other certificated educational employees shall maintain discipline in the schools.

The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss count one. The court reasoned that the language of section 24-24 of the School Code and the trend of supreme court decisions, following Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165, interpreting the section, preclude any action for personal injury against a school district or employee thereof on a negligence theory. Section 24-24 provides in relevant part as follows:

To recover for such an injury, a plaintiff student must plead and prove that the teacher committed willful and wanton misconduct by such supervision. Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill.2d 165, 171-73 (1976). Those sections apply equally to public and private schools.

The trial court allowed the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the sole ground that plaintiff was a licensee on the defendant's premises and that there was no proof whatsoever that defendant had breached its duty to refrain from wilful and wanton misconduct. On appeal, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that a verdict should be directed in favor of the defendant but stated that it preferred that such ruling be based upon the immunity granted by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 85, par. 1-101 et seq.) and section 24-24 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 24-24) as construed by this court in Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165. Considering the state of the record before us, we are unable to concur with the appellate court's conclusions regarding defendant's immunity under the above-referred-to statutes and are likewise unable to agree with the court's further determination that "irrespective of the standard of care which might have been required in this case, no verdict in favor of the plaintiff could stand as against the defendant school directors." 43 Ill. App.3d 331, 334.

7 Ill.2d at 619. Since Nudd, the supreme court's treatment of parental immunity has been confined to six cases: (1) Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill.2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137; (2) Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705; (3) Tanari v. School Directors of District No. 502 (1977), 69 Ill.2d 630, 373 N.E.2d 5; (4) Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill.2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323; (5) Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 77 Ill.2d 165, 395 N.E.2d 538; and (6) Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill.2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355. We examine these cases to determine if parental immunity was ever adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court.

The plaintiffs further argue that the first amended complaint successfully stated a negligence cause of action under the theory of premises liability. We find that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705, is authority for not applying a premises liability analysis to the facts of this case. Accordingly, we affirm.

( Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill.2d 451, 454-55 ( obiter dictum referring to underlying policy of family harmony and stating that parental immunity doctrine was "review[ed]" in Nudd); Kobylanskiv. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165 (relying on Mroczynski and Nudd to hold that teachers standing in loco parentis under the School Code are immunized to same extent as parents); Tanari v. School Directors (1977), 69 Ill.2d 630, 636 (citing Nudd and stating, "parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent wilful and wanton misconduct"); Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill.2d 47 (citing Kobylanski, Mroczynski and Nudd and stating that, based on public policies, general rule in State prevented children from suing parents for mere negligence); Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 77 Ill.2d 165 (citing Nudd and Mroczynski for rule that children may not maintain actions for negligence against their parents); Cockrum v. Baumgartner (1983), 95 Ill.2d 193 ( obiter dictum citing Thomas and recognizing rule that children may not sue parents for negligence).) Through frequent repetition and approval, the rule has become established.

" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, pars. 24-24, 34-84a. This court first interpreted sections 24-24 and 34-84a in Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165. Kobylanski consisted of two consolidated cases in which the defendants were both the school districts and the teachers involved. Both suits alleged that students were injured in gymnastics classes because they had been negligently supervised by their teachers.

The quoted statutory provision, although inapplicable to Ross, extends in loco parentis status to teachers and other certificated educational employees for "`matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children.'" ( Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165, 173.) This status confers immunity from liability for negligence arising out of such matters.