Dorsey v. Clements, 202 Ga. 820, 823 ( 44 S.E.2d 783) (1947). See also, Kobryn v. McGee, 232 Ga. App. 754, 756-757 (1) ( 503 S.E.2d 630) (1998) ("When the trial court can apply statutory rules of construction to the express terms of the [contract] to reach only one legal meaning, no ambiguity exists.") And, normally, only if the ambiguity is not resolved by application of the rules of construction may parol evidence may be introduced to explain the agreement.
To the extent that the 1922 deed's description of a 90-foot frontage on Webb Street conflicted with its description of being bound on the "South by Southern Railway right-of-way," the artificial boundary controls. See Kobryn v. McGee, 232 Ga.App. 754, 755 (1) (503 S.E.2d 630) (1998) (where deed's metes and bounds description of property line conflicted with deed provisions setting the western property line as the "'center line of a ditch,'" natural boundary prevailed). See also Lyons v. Bassford, 242 Ga. 466, 470 (1) (249 S.E.2d 255) (1978) (boundary fence referred to in deed prevailed over distances called for in the deed).
"When the trial court can apply statutory rules of construction to the express terms of the deed to reach only one legal meaning, no ambiguity exists." Kobryn v. McGee, 232 Ga. App. 754, 756 ( 503 SE2d 630) (1998). Further, "where the boundary line can be accurately determined from within the four corners of the deed by the proper application of the legal rules of construction, parol evidence cannot be resorted to by a party to vary the boundary.
Dorsey v. Clements, 202 Ga. 820, 823 ( 44 S.E.2d 783) (1947). See also Kobryn v. McGee, 232 Ga. App. 754, 755-756(1) ( 503 S.E.2d 630) (1998). And, normally, only if the ambiguity is not resolved by application of the rules of construction may parol evidence be introduced to explain the agreement, at which point the question of what was intended becomes an issue of fact for the jury.
"When the trial court can apply statutory rules of construction to the express terms of the [contract] to reach only one legal meaning, no ambiguity exists." Kobryn v. McGee, 232 Ga. App. 754, 756 (1) ( 503 S.E.2d 630) (1998). To the extent that the amount of rent established by the "special stipulations" to the contract is ambiguous, being stated both as dollars per month and dollars per square foot, the trial court should have applied the rule of contract construction that handwritten portions of a contract control when they appear to be in conflict with printed provisions.