Opinion
Civil No. 00-227-HO.
June 27, 2001.
O R D E R
Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights while incarcerated at the Lane County Jail. Plaintiff moves for transfer of venue to Colorado and demands disqualification of all Oregon District Court Judges (#42). The City and County defendants move for summary judgment (#36, #41).
Plaintiff requests transfer to Colorado because that is where he is now located. However, none of the defendants are located there and none of the actions alleged to give rise to plaintiff's cause of action occurred in Colorado. Furthermore, the interests of justice do not favor a transfer to the District Court in Colorado. The motion to transfer venue is denied. Plaintiff next asserts that
[i]t has come to be known and judicial notice is requested as to Chief Judge Hogan maintains a secret sentencing Council. He quoted one of it member's opinions at my sentencing in case No. 60019-HO-01. The statement contained a biased remark from a member Judge of the secret Council, Hogan refuses to disclose the members' names and transcripts of the illegal proceeding. It can be assumed that all or any District Judge of Oregon is a member of this council. . . . These judges are disqualified to preside over any of my proceedings.
Motion for Transfer of case and Demand for Disqualification of Presiding Judge and District of Oregon (#42) at p. 1. Plaintiff also raises concerns as to Judge Jones' impartiality, to whom this case was originally assigned.
The court treats the motion as a motion to recuse all judges of this district. "The standard for recusal is `whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'" Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)). The alleged "judicial bias must arise from extrajudicial sources." In re Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 839 (9th Cir. 1989). The factors that determine whether an act by a judge is a judicial one relate to the nature of the act itself. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). The critical inquiry is whether the function is normally performed by a judge. Id.
A judge's previous order alone is not a sufficient basis for recusal of the judge. Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984). Moreover, a judge is not disqualified by a litigant's intemperate and scurrilous attacks. United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff's frivolous attacks against the judges of this district do not provide a basis for recusing any judge of this district. The motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's motion to transfer this case to the District of Colorado and disqualify the Judges of this District (#42) is denied.