Knudson v. Knudson

5 Citing cases

  1. Ebbert v. First Nat. Bank of Condon

    131 Or. 57 (Or. 1929)   Cited 3 times

    No previous appeal to this court has required us to determine what section of our statute of limitations is applicable to the action provided for by this act. In Malarkey v. O'Leary, supra, and in Knudson v. Knudson, 128 Or. 635 ( 275 P. 663), we determined the purpose of "the sum of $100 damages" and held it penal in character. With that conclusion we remain satisfied.

  2. Nordling v. Johnston

    205 Or. 315 (Or. 1955)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Nordling v. Johnston, 205 Or. 315, 326, 283 P.2d 994, 999 (1955), the Oregon Court of Appeals, in drawing a distinction between liquidated damages and penalties, rejected the argument that ORS 652.150 was a provision for liquidated damages.

    Malarkey v. O'Leary, 34 Or. 493, 499, 56 P. 521. Since the provision for the recovery of $100.00 is a "penal one", it must be strictly construed. Knudson v. Knudson, 128 Or. 635, 642, 275 P. 663. And in Ebbert v. First Nat. Bank of Condon, 131 Or. 57, 64-66, 70, 279 P. 534, we held that an action to recover under that provision was governed by the three-year statute of limitations applying to "an action upon a statute for penalty or forfeiture."

  3. Head v. Crone

    279 P.2d 1064 (Idaho 1955)   Cited 17 times

    No provision is contained in such section of the statute requiring a tender of expense or fees by mortgagor to mortgagee as a condition precedent to the latter's execution and delivery of a satisfaction of the mortgage or entering a release of record. Idaho's statute differs from Oregon Laws, section 9891, involved in the case of Knudson v. Knudson, 128 Or. 635, 275 P. 663, upon which respondent relies; such section of Oregon's statute then provided that the mortgagee must be tendered his reasonable charges before executing a satisfaction of the mortgage or releasing it of record. Respondent insists that there was no duty on his part to execute the mortgage release, joint in form, which appellants caused to be prepared, intended to release all six chattel mortgages, since there was lack of consideration for the first chattel mortgage, dated January 22, 1942.

  4. Smith v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation

    2004 Ct. Sup. 11114 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

    Davis v. Forman School, 54 Conn. App. 841, 851, 738 A.2d 697 (1999), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); see Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 782 A.2d 679, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926, 783 A.2d 1028 (2001). Such statutes are strictly construed against those seeking to impose the penalty and in favor of those on whom such penalties would be imposed. Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 318, 417 A.2d 343 (1979); Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 125, 394 A.2d 716 (1978); see Grooms v. Hannon, 59 Ala. 510, 511 (1877); see Harding v. Home Ins. Savings Co., 49 Idaho 64, 74, 286 P. 920 (1930); Sinks v. Kimmel, 221 Ill. App. 416, 419 (1920); Wing v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 155 Mo. App. 356, 137 S.W. 11, 12 (1911); Brown v. Yarbrough, 130 Miss. 715, 94 So. 887, 888 (1923); Bullington v. Lowe, 94 Okla. 234, 235, 221 P. 502 (1923); Knudson v. Knudson, 128 Or. 635, 641-42, 275 P. 663 (1929); Werner v. Automobile Finance Co., 347 Pa. 217, 218-19, 31 A.2d 898 (1943); Phillips v. Cottage Grove Bank Trust Co., 8 Tenn. App. 98, 103 (1928); Hector, Inc. v. United Savings Loan Assn., 741 P.2d 542, 545 (Utah 1987); Perkins v. Factory Point National Bank, 137 Vt. 577, 580, 409 A.2d 578 (1979); construing statutes analogous to § 49-8(c); see also 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 483 (1998); 55 Am.Jur.2d, Mortgages § 436 (1996). "A statute may partake of the nature of both a remedial and a penal statute . . .

  5. Smith v. GMAC Mortgage Corp.

    859 A.2d 981 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

    Davis v. Forman School, 54 Conn. App. 841, 851, 738 A.2d 697 (1999), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); see Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 782 A.2d 679, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926, 783 A.2d 1028 (2001). Such statutes are strictly construed against those seeking to impose the penalty and in favor of those on whom such penalties would be imposed. Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 318, 417 A.2d 343 (1979); Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 125, 394 A.2d 716 (1978); see Grooms v. Hannon, 59 Ala. 510, 511 (1877); Harding v. Home Investment Savings Co., 49 Idaho 64, 74, 286 P. 920 (1930); Sinks v. Kimmel, 221 Ill. App. 416, 419 (1920); Brown v. Yarbrough, 130 Miss. 715, 724, 94 So. 887 (1923); Wing v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 155 Mo. App. 356, 358, 137 S.W. 11 (1911); Bullington v. Lowe, 94 Okl. 234, 235, 221 P. 502 (1923); Knudson v. Knudson, 128 Or. 635, 641-42, 275 P. 663 (1929); Werner v. Automobile Finance Co., 347 Pa. 217, 218-19, 31 A.2d 898 (1943); Phillips v. Cottage Grove Bank Trust Co., 8 Tenn. App. 98, 103 (1928); Hector, Inc. v. United Savings Loan Assn., 741 P.2d 542, 545 (Utah 1987); Perkins v. Factory Point National Bank, 137 Vt. 577, 580, 409 A.2d 578 (1979); construing statutes analogous to § 49-8 (c); see also 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages § 436 (1996); 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 483 (1998). A statute may partake of the nature both of a remedial and of a penal statute. . . .