The district court properly held that the 1987 amendment had shortened the statute of limitations applicable to Farrell's claim, and thus would apply retroactively to bar his claim only if he had a "reasonable" time to file his claim against McDonough after the amendment. Giesen, 956 F.2d at 741-42; Pearson, 933 F.2d at 526; see Knox v. Lane, 726 F. Supp. 200 (N.D.Ill. 1989); Phillips Prods. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 94 Ill.2d 200, 68 Ill.Dec. 500, 502, 446 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1983). The determination whether the period is reasonable is made on a case-by-case basis and has varied from as short as nine months to as long as fifteen months.
Illinois courts have found delays of more than one year unreasonable where the plaintiff knew of a claim before the shortening amendment took effect. See Knox v. Lane, 726 F. Supp. 200, 203 (N.D.Ill. 1989) and cases cited therein (regarding delays of fifteen to twenty-two months), but each case must stand on its own facts. The plaintiff claims that throughout 1986 and 1987 prison officials restricted his ability to file suit by placing him in segregation, shuttling him between institutions, and pursuing the criminal charges against him.
Characterized in this way, the district court correctly noted that Illinois courts apply such an amendment retroactively "if application of the amendment leaves the claimant with a reasonable amount of time after the amendment's effective date to file his claim." Knox v. Lane, 726 F. Supp. 200 (N.D.Ill. 1989) (quoting Phillips Prods. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 94 Ill.2d 200, 68 Ill.Dec. 500, 502, 446 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1983)). The relevant period of time is "between the amendment's effective date and the date when the claim would be barred under the terms of the amendment."
Further, Illinois no longer tolls the statute of limitations for inmates. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1992); Knox v. Lane, 726 F.Supp. 200, 201-02 (N.D.Ill. 1989). Because more than two years have elapsed now since plaintiff's claim against defendants arose, a new action, after all his grievances are completed, would be time-barred.
Illinois no longer tolls the statute of limitations for inmates. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1992); Knox v. Lane, 726 F.Supp. 200, 201-02 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Although state law governs the length of the statute of limitations, federal law governs the accrual date of the cause of action.
Illinois no longer tolls the statute of limitations for inmates. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1992); Knox v. Lane, 726 F. Supp. 200, 201-02 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Although state law governs the length of the statute of limitations, federal law governs the accrual date of the cause of action. See Sellars v. Perry, 80 F.3d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1996).
Illinois no longer tolls the statute of limitations for inmates. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738. 741 (7th Cir. 1992); Knox v. Lane, 726 F. Supp. 200, 201-02 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Although state law governs the length of the statute of limitations, federal law governs the accrual date of the cause of action.
Further, Illinois no longer tolls the statute of limitations for inmates. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1992); Knox v. Lane, 726 F. Supp. 200, 201-02 (N.D. Ill. 1989). At the time the plaintiff filed this lawsuit, it was within the two-year limit, if he sued the proper parties at that time.
Illinois no longer tolls the statute of limitations for inmates. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1992); Knox v. Lane, 726 F. Supp. 200, 201-02 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Because more than two years have elapsed since Miller's claim against the defendants arose, this action is time-barred. The court has given Miller an opportunity to show otherwise.
Illinois no longer tolls the statute of limitations for inmates. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1992); Knox v. Lane, 726 F. Supp. 200, 201-02 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Although state law governs the length of the statute of limitations, federal law governs the accrual date of the cause of action.