Cf. Williamson v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 260 (2) ( 275 S.E.2d 42) (1981). 2. (a) An order overruling a traverse to garnishment is not, as contended by the appellant in case 62945, a final judgment, and an appeal from such a ruling is premature. Marbut Co. v. Capital City Bank, 148 Ga. App. 664 ( 252 S.E.2d 85); Knox v. Knox, 151 Ga. App. 144 ( 259 S.E.2d 150) (1979); Turner v. Wood, 159 Ga. App. 850 ( 285 S.E.2d 589). The overruling of a traverse is not appealable in and of itself. (b) However, the order overruling the defendant's traverse also contains the following: "Further ordered that the Clerk of the Superior Court of Muscogee County, Ga., shall disburse to plaintiff's attorneys all funds currently being held by the Clerk pursuant to summons and resummons of garnishment in the above matter."
See Turner v Wood, 159 Ga App 850 (285 S.E.2d 589) (1981) ("Although the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff with regard to defendant's traverse, there is no order of the trial court disbursing the funds answered into court by the garnishee No final order has been entered in the main case The appeal is accordingly premature") (citation and punctuation omitted); Knox v Knox, 151 Ga App 144 (259 S.E.2d 150) (1979)
The appeal is accordingly premature." Knox v. Knox, 151 Ga. App. 144 ( 259 S.E.2d 150) (1979). See also Marbut Co. v. Capital City Bank, 148 Ga. App. 664 ( 252 S.E.2d 85) (1979).
The other requirement — entry of a final order granting judgment to the plaintiff — has not been satisfied. It is only such final order as would, under the facts of this case, be "adverse" to appellants and appealable by them. Knox v. Knox, 151 Ga. App. 144 ( 259 S.E.2d 150) (1979). No final order having been entered in the garnishment proceeding, this appeal is premature and must be dismissed.