Opinion
No. 85-01759.
Decided December 9, 1987.
Sharon M. Knoll and Daniel Knoll, pro se. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General, for defendant.
Findings of Fact
On November 22, 1983, at approximately 4:00 p.m., plaintiff Sharon M. Knoll (herein "Knoll") was admitted to Ward 6 Right at Cleveland Psychiatric Institute (herein "CPI"). At the time of her admittance, CPI had three types of wards. The wards either consisted of all male patients, all female patients or a combination of both male and female patients. The pertinent ward in this case, Ward 6 Right, was one of the two wards at CPI consisting of both sexes.
When Knoll arrived on Ward 6 Right she was observed as being disconnected from reality, hallucinating, acutely psychotic, and wandering about aimlessly. Shortly after Knoll's arrival, at approximately 4:45 p.m., the CPI staff members were made aware of her presence. The staff was cognizant that Knoll would require close monitoring based upon her aforesaid condition.
At approximately 5:00 p.m., all the patients with floor privileges on Ward 6 Right were escorted to the cafeteria on the second floor for dinner. Michael Preston (herein "Preston"), a male patient, had floor privileges, but he refused to leave the ward. Two staff members remained on Ward 6 Right to monitor the four patients that did not attend dinner, including Knoll and Preston.
Shortly after 5:00 p.m. it was reported that Harlan Gray, another patient, was found impermissibly touching Knoll. As a result of this incident, a staff member placed Harlan Gray into seclusion. While the staff member was away, Preston forced Knoll into his room and forced her to perform oral sex on him; Preston subsequently raped her. Upon searching for Knoll for several minutes, a staff member located her in Preston's room hyperventilating, delusional, coughing and crying. The staff member observed that Knoll's pants and undergarments were down by her ankles and fecal matter was present on her pants and her groin area.
Dr. Saroj Brar, a physician, was summoned to examine Knoll. Dr. Brar diagnosed Knoll as having been raped. Thereafter, Dr. Brar sent Knoll to Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital where she was examined in the emergency room by a physician who specialized in gynecology. This physician confirmed that Knoll had been raped. Later that evening, Daniel Knoll, Knoll's husband, was contacted by Dr. Brar and informed of the incident.
The Ohio State Highway Patrol was subsequently summoned to investigate the matter. Trooper Timothy DelVecchio determined that Preston was admitted on seventeen separate occasions to state mental facilities. Preston's prior mental facility admission records indicated that he was excitable and violent. Additionally, Preston was convicted of gross sexual imposition and sentenced to two to five years in prison for attacking a nurse at Metropolitan General Hospital.
In the case at bar, Preston was indicted by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury for the rape and sexual battery of Knoll. Through the plea bargaining process the assailant pled guilty to the felony of attempted sexual battery.
Knoll's confrontation with Preston at CPI caused her to be admitted to Woodruff Hospital where she remained until February 29, 1984. Knoll was readmitted, however, to Woodruff Hospital for medical attention concerning her instability, flashbacks, decompensation and post-traumatic stress as a direct result of the circumstances of the incident.
Issues
The following issues are before this court for consideration:
1. Whether the defendant was negligent on or about November 22, 1983, in assigning Knoll to Ward 6 Right, in a room situated directly across from Preston?
2. If defendant was negligent, was such negligence the proximate cause of the rape of Knoll by Preston on November 22, 1983?
3. If defendant was negligent, what percent of negligence may be attributed to the defendant and what is full and fair compensation for such injury to Knoll and her husband, Daniel Knoll, for his loss of consortium?
Conclusions of Law
Upon review of the case, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that upon Knoll's admission to defendant's hospital the defendant knew it was assigning the plaintiff to a place of danger, i.e., to Ward 6 Right where Preston was assigned with a freedom range. In the exercise of ordinary care defendant knew or should have known, by availing itself of information and experience already at hand, that Preston's presence in the same ward, situated directly across from Knoll, presented a dangerous condition and, thus, constituted negligence and the proximate cause of plaintiff's rape and injury.
The defendant had a duty to place Knoll in an area where, under the circumstances, she would be safe and free from said dangerous condition. In Johnson v. Grant Hosp. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 169, 179, 61 O.O.2d 413, 419, 291 N.E.2d 440, 446, the court held that "[a] hospital owes a duty to its patients to exercise such reasonable care for their safety as their known mental and physical condition may require."
In this regard, when a psychotherapist determines, or when the standards of the profession deem, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect others from harm. The discharge of this duty may require a therapist to take one or more various steps, depending on the nature of the case and what is reasonable under the circumstances. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California (1976), 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334; Emery v. Littlejohn (1915), 83 Wn. 334, 145 P. 423; Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (D.Neb. 1980), 497 F. Supp. 185.
The hospital had a duty to exercise reasonable care in both assigning Knoll to a proper ward, in consideration of her condition, and in rendering nursing care and protection for Knoll. It was the state's duty to select a ward which was equipped with a staff sufficient to render proper care. Once Knoll was accepted and placed in the hospital, she was entitled to receive ordinary care in medical service and safety. Under the circumstances, it was foreseeable that Preston would attack and rape not only patients but members of the staff.
The care and treatment of patients at CPI, including, but not limited to, the continued placement of a patient in a particular ward, is an act of professional judgment. Plaintiffs demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that CPI abused its discretion in assigning Knoll to an unsafe area, Ward 6 Right.
Therefore, it is the opinion of this court that the defendant was negligent in performance of its duty owed to Knoll and such negligence was the proximate cause of the aforesaid incident.
The damage to Knoll is difficult to assess because of her original mental condition which required intermittent custodial treatment of a month or more, two or three times a year. Her mental condition, diagnosed as schizophrenia differential, is always weakened and triggered by stress. Her mental condition, while possibly permanent from the time of admittance, was also proximately aggravated by the incident. The rape and psychological stress suffered thereafter hampered Knoll's ability to care for her children and husband; Knoll's husband's damages include loss of consortium.
Conclusion
Upon review of the evidence, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Knoll incurred $70,000 in hospital and medical expenses between November 23, 1983 and February 29, 1984. The evidence indicates that $40,541.96 remains unpaid and shall not be reimbursed by a collateral source.
Knoll's life expectancy is 52.6 years and she will require additional medical care during her life; the court finds that one third of such need was proximately caused by defendant's negligence. The total amount for future hospitalization and medical care is found by the court to be $150,000 with the defendant being responsible for $50,000.
The court further finds that for pain and suffering Knoll suffered damages in the amount of $10,000.
The court also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Daniel Knoll suffered damages for loss of consortium in the amount of $3,000.
Accordingly, a judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Sharon Knoll in the total amount of $100,541.96 and Daniel Knoll in the amount of $3,000. Costs assessed to defendant.
Judgment for plaintiffs.
GUY G. CLINE, J., retired, of the Pickaway County Probate/Juvenile Court, sitting by assignment.