Opinion
A22-1003
12-16-2022
Deanna Sue Knoll, Respondent, v. Richard Theodore Knoll, Appellant, Douglas County, Respondent.
Douglas County District Court File No. 21-FA-18-1614
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
RENEE L. WORKE, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In December 2018, respondent Douglas County (the county) filed a contempt motion, requesting that the district court hold appellant Richard Theodore Knoll in constructive contempt of court for failing to comply with a 2005 child-support order.
2. In August 2019, the district court found Knoll to be in constructive civil contempt and directed his confinement for 45 days in the county jail, stayed with purge conditions, including monthly payments toward child-support arrears.
3. On February 20, 2020, the county filed a contempt motion, requesting that the district court hold Knoll in constructive contempt of court for failing to make his monthly payments. The district court filed an order to show cause. But on April 10, 2020, the district court dismissed the order to show cause because personal service upon Knoll was unable to be accomplished.
4. Over two years later, on June 23, 2022, Knoll filed an affidavit for proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP). Knoll filed a motion for summary judgment. He alleged that the county "by aggressive and excessive enforcement actions . . . rendered any reasonable resolution unattainable. . . . [Because] [t]he enforcement actions have substantially impacted [his] ability to pay . . . and significantly contributed to his unemployment." He claimed that the county was in civil contempt and breach of contract for failing to reinstate his driver's license. He claimed that the county refused to accommodate his requests to modify child support. He claimed that child support was withheld while he had physical custody of the child while mother was incarcerated and then paid to her. He claimed that he cannot pay child support without a "comprehensive accounting." And he claimed that he provided healthcare coverage, which is child support, and in this case, represents an overpayment of child support.
5. On June 28, 2022, the district court denied Knoll's IFP application, concluding that Knoll's motion was "frivolous."
6. Knoll appeals the district court's order denying his IFP application.
7. A litigant may proceed IFP if he cannot pay the costs of litigation and the action is not frivolous. Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd. 3(a)-(b) (2022). An action is frivolous if it lacks any reasonable basis in law or equity and cannot be supported by a good-faith argument to modify or reverse existing law. Maddox v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 400 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn.App. 1987). The district court's denial of an IFP application will not be reversed absent an abuse of its broad discretion. Id.
8. Knoll presents no argument as to how the district court abused its discretion by denying his IFP application. His brief, instead, is basically a copy of the summary-judgment motion. Our review is limited to the denial of the IFP application; thus, these matters are beyond the scope of review. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that this court generally considers only issues presented to and considered by the district court); see also Dep't of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address inadequately briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn.App. 2007) (applying Wintz in family-law appeal).
9. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the action was frivolous. There was no pending matter. Knoll filed a motion for summary judgment in an action to collect child support. He filed the motion two years after the district court attempted to hold a show-cause hearing to address Knoll's alleged noncompliance, but the show-cause order was dismissed because personal service upon Knoll could not be accomplished.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.