Opinion
FA114116956S.
11-06-2012
Trina C. KNOLL v. Anthony KNOLL.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
NAZZARO, J.
This is an action for dissolution of marriage. The court has jurisdiction. All statutory stays have expired. The plaintiff is a self-represented party. The defendant is a self-represented party. On July 27, 2012 this matter proceeded to trial. In evidence are a number of exhibits, some of which the court may reference in the course of this decision. In addition, the court heard the testimony of the parties. The plaintiff filed proposed orders and the court heard argument by the parties. The court observed the demeanor and carefully evaluated the testimony and credibility of each witness, reviewed and considered the exhibits, sworn financial affidavits, and claims for relief. The court will enter judgment upon the plaintiff's complaint, but at all times has also considered the relief sought by the defendant.
The court has considered carefully the statutory criteria set forth, inter alia, in General Statutes §§ 46b-81, 46b-82, 46b-84, 46b-56, 46b-56c and 46b-62, as well as the applicable case law in reaching the decisions reflected in the orders that issue in this decision. The parties were able to reach agreement as to some issues. The court will adopt those agreements which the parties did reach, given that such are fair, equitable and consistent with the relevant statutory criteria.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties were married in Portsmouth, New Hampshire on June 15, 2002. The plaintiff has resided in Connecticut continuously for more than twelve months prior to instituting this action. The court has jurisdiction and all statutory stays have expired. The marriage has irretrievably broken down, without hope of reconciliation, and judgment will enter dissolving the marriage on this ground.
There are no children issue of this marriage. The plaintiff wife is now 40 years of age. The plaintiff is unemployed. She testified credibly that she last worked in 2009 in some type of administrative assistant position. She worked as a tax preparer part time for an oil company. She has a high school diploma, attended North Shore Community College and the Three Rivers Community College in Norwich. She admits to collecting unemployment compensation for two years, in 2009 and 2010. Before unemployment, the plaintiff states she worked fifteen years in (office) administration. Since April 2010, she testified she applied for employment " everywhere." She did not succeed in finding work. The only income in her financial affidavit is the $150 per week pendente lite alimony. The plaintiff agrees she has some type of earning capacity, could possibly earn twelve to fifteen dollars per hour for a forty-hour work week. The plaintiff believes, therefore, she could earn $480 per week.
During their ten-year marriage, the parties were a blended family. The plaintiff had one son from a prior relationship. The defendant had two sons from his prior marriage. The plaintiff avers that for much of the marriage, she cared for the defendant's boys as well as her own son. She appeared, she claims, numerous times with the defendant's son or sons in court and in no immodesty cared for Alex, one of the defendant's sons, " more than his (the defendant's) own mother." All the children are now majority age and according to the defendant, had moved out by the time the plaintiff commenced this action. It is clear the plaintiff feels in plain-speak shortchanged and ill used in this marriage. The parties co-own a residence at One St. Paul Court, Groton, Connecticut. The value is approximately $120,000. The plaintiff desires the home which appears to have negative equity. There are some miscellaneous cars, motorcycles and related trailers and equipment. Except for a motorcycle trailer the plaintiff agrees to the proposed distribution of assets which the defendant sets forth in his proposed orders. In her financial affidavit, the plaintiff discloses approximately fourteen thousand dollars in debt. She says she incurred some ten thousand dollars in legal fees connected to this action. She is asking that the court divide the fourteen thousand dollar debt between the parties. The court shall address other claims by each party later in this memorandum.
The defendant husband is 44 years old. He retired as an E7 Chief Petty Officer in the U.S. Navy after twenty years of service. He has an associates degree in engineering from Granthem University and a bachelor's of some sort. He is employed as a test engineer with the Electric Boat division (EB) of General Dynamics Corporation in Groton, Connecticut. The defendant's affidavit reflects that he earns $78,000 annually. He also receives a military retirement and Veterans Administration disability benefits. His affidavit reflects weekly net earnings of $1,306.60. His expenses total $1,099 weekly. Both he and his wife are insured through Tricare, an entity established for military personnel and their dependents. Upon divorce, husband's insurance premiums without his wife will be reduced. She has the option for COBRA benefits at a reduced cost for 36 months.
The parties have been separated for an uncertain amount of time. He first left the home in 2008 and then returned. At present the defendant is staying with a friend to whom he pays rent. He admits the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
Regarding fault, each party blames the other for the marriage breakdown. Each levels allegations of abuse at the other. The plaintiff admits she drinks alcohol quite frequently, just not to the excess described by the defendant. The plaintiff claims the defendant drinks every day and has been an alcoholic for many years. He states she also has been physically and emotionally abusive. He says she uses the courts to accomplish her ends. There was credible evidence that Groton Town police officers visited the residence on at least four calls during 2011-2012. The nature of these contacts are characterized as domestic in nature, although somewhat vague and ambiguous. What is clear, however, after a review of the Groton Town reports (defendant's exhibits B1-4) is that the plaintiff was often intoxicated and throwing objects. It appears neither party was willing to leave the residence on most of these occasions. The parties here as husband and wife led the unenviable plight of being " separated" in an emotional and spiritual sense, yet continued to live under the same roof which, according to these four police contacts, made for anything but a peaceful existence. It's clear the parties' relationship was, at times, volatile. The plaintiff claims the defendant " became himself" once he retired from the Navy. The court infers this period to mark the time when the relationship changed for the worse. The defendant, on the other hand, claims the plaintiff exaggerates her under-employability, is extremely unstable and has threatened him with bodily harm or in her words, " to siphon what's left of his (the defendant's) gut" when he proceeded to court. About the family and all of its children and himself, the defendant laments, " She, (the plaintiff) has pushed each one of us out of the home ... [S]he uses the court to attack us." The plaintiff describes the relationship as " Chaos." It does not appear the defendant challenges that conclusion. The plaintiff states the defendant has a borderline personality disorder. He denies that. He says, with credibility, the plaintiff is an abusive alcoholic prone to rage and hyperbole. Notwithstanding all this upheaval and emotionality, curiously, the plaintiff, upon divorce, still wishes to retain the defendant's last name of Knoll. The defendant, on the other hand, seeks an order which upon dissolution restores the plaintiff to her former name.
The parties claim each has been unfaithful to the other. The plaintiff clearly bears a great deal of animus towards the defendant. At one point in the conflict the plaintiff left the defendant for a period of six months. She criticizes the defendant for not checking in on her during this time. The defendant does not dispute that he did little to contact her during this time. In 2008, the parties previously litigated a divorce only to reconcile in 2010 when the matter was about to proceed to judgment. The plaintiff clearly views herself a victim. She faults the defendant for not making better efforts at counseling. The defendant, rather convincingly, testified the couples' issues transcend even the best counseling. The plaintiff claimed the defendant was unwilling to financially support the plaintiff's return to college. (Plaintiff's exhibit 8b.) The defendant admits he never wanted to be the sole income provider for the family. He is resentful. She claims he calls her a " pig" and a " coward." He says she refuses to give him his clothes back and rammed his car into his truck. The defendant also appears emotionally exhausted, if not beaten down. At this point the defendant desires divorce with the attendant division of assets and liabilities.
The defendant earns $78,000 annually at Electric Boat. He also receives a retirement from the U.S. Navy in the amount of $295 per week and a weekly VA disability payment in the amount of $102 per week. He has reasonable deductions. His expenses weekly total about $1,100. He contributes $90 per week to a 401k plan. His expenses include $258 toward the mortgage on the Groton home occupied by the plaintiff and $100 per week for a rental property he stays at. Both parties list as assets the Groton home which is valued between $114,000 and $122,000. They also agree the property is encumbered by between $120,000 and $122,000 debt. The plaintiff's claim that the home has negative equity has gone unchallenged. The defendant lists a Navy Federal Visa debt of nearly $12,000, a Navy Federal Mastercard owing $15,000, and a Star credit card with a balance of $800.00 The plaintiff has no income save the $150 per week alimony pendente lite. Notably, during the pendency of this action, the defendant has paid the mortgage and all related household bills on the Groton residence. He has been paying, therefore, at least $1300 per month, perhaps more in gross. The plaintiff lists debts that include a Navy Federal Credit Union amount of $9,099, a Capitol One debt of $400 and a Discover credit card in the amount of $3,972. Both parties list cars and motorcycles which will be addressed later. The plaintiff values certain of these at $6,100. The defendant values these and a motorcycle and trailer at $8,100. The defendant lists as assets an EB 401k retirement account valued at $41,000 and a Navy thrift Savings plan of $3,500. The defendant also lists bank accounts which total $2,025. The plaintiff's Navy account totals $200. The defendant lists in his affidavit a $5,300 tax debt owing to the Internal Revenue Service. He testified, however, the debt was $14,000. It's not clear whether the defendant put any of this debt on any of the charge cards referenced. The plaintiff testified credibly that there is no longer any IRS debt. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.
DISCUSSION
The defendant has submitted proposed orders for the division of the parties' assets and liabilities. Except for a motorcycle trailer, the plaintiff is in agreement on the proposed distribution. The plaintiff also seeks an award of a portion of the defendant's military retirement, $3,000 a month alimony for seven years, three hundred of which she describes as punitive in nature, the marital home, negative equity and all, family dogs, a Navy Federal account with $510, a portion of some type of child support award from Mr. Knoll's ex-wife Kirsten Courtney, a Freedom Riders USA Motorcycle club vest, thirty-six months of coverage, for healthcare, and to retain her married name of Knoll. In addition to the $600 per month alimony pendente lite, the defendant apparently has been paying an additional $700 per month to cover the mortgage, taxes, cable, oil and electric bills related to the home. Mr. Knoll, suffice it to say, does not want the court to award the plaintiff a portion of his military retirement, does not want to pay the alimony demanded, would like the motorcycle trailer, is willing to pay for six months of health care coverage, would like to keep his wedding band, would like to keep the Navy thrift savings plan with $5,680, and does not want the court to award the plaintiff a portion of his 401k fund. As if there weren't enough acrimony, the defendant does not want his wife to retain his last name.
CGS § 46b-82 sets forth the criteria which is to be considered by the court in awarding any alimony. " In determining whether alimony is awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear the witnesses ... shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and ..." (Ellipsis added.) Thus, CGS § 46b-82 describes circumstances under which a court may award alimony. " The court is to consider these factors in making an award of alimony, but it need not give each factor equal weight ... As long as the trial court considers all of these statutory criteria, it may exercise broad discretion in awarding alimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chyung v. Chyung, 86 Conn.App. 665, 669-70, 862 A.2d 374 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 904, 868 A.2d 744 (2005). Here, the parties have been married approximately ten years. The plaintiff has a substantial earning capacity which she has never fully realized. Doubtless the challenging economy hasn't helped the plaintiff to be re-employed. However, it appears her self-admitted substance abuse, alcohol in particular, has contributed to her lack of stability and return to the work force. For the last several years, in this court's view, the plaintiff has been enmeshed in a cycle of conflict, substance abuse and dependency physical and/or psychological on a number of medications. Her health is somewhat compromised. She is forty years of age. That notwithstanding, considering all factors pursuant to law, an award of $3,000 per month alimony is not justified here. $450 alimony per week for five years, for roughly half the length of the marriage is appropriate. She is unemployed and has been entirely dependent on the defendant. The alimony is rehabilitative in nature. It may take some time for the plaintiff to reestablish herself in the job market. Re-employment appears a necessity. The alimony also recognizes that the plaintiff contributed significantly during the marriage to the maintenance of the household. The plaintiff has not proven that the defendant is at fault for the breakdown of the marriage. Moreover, the defendant has established that the plaintiff's substance abuse contributed significantly to the breakdown of this relationship and the blended family members who now are of the majority age. In addition, the plaintiff should be awarded one-half the value of the defendant's 401k plan for the term of the marriage via a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) and twelve and one-half percent of the Navy pension. By the same token, the wife was with the husband for ten years and five years during which time he was in the military. It is equitable for the wife to receive a share of this pension. In Cifaldi v. Cifaldi, 118 Conn.App. 325 (2009), the Appellate Court observed the importance of such pension benefits in these times.
It is well established that pension benefits are a form of property under General Statutes § 46b-81. Our Supreme Court has held that ‘ property’ as used in § 46b-81, includes the right, contractual in nature, to receive vested pension benefits in the future." Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 798, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). There is no question that a party's property interest in a pension is an important consideration in an allocation of property pursuant to a dissolution judgment. " Pension benefits are widely recognized as among the most valuable assets that parties have when a marriage ends ... Pension benefits are an economic resource acquired with the fruits of the wage earner spouse's labors which would otherwise have been utilized by the parties during the marriage to purchase other deferred income assets ... Both [spouses] have the same retirement goals and expectancies regarding the pension benefits as they would if they provided for their later years by using wage income to purchase other investments ... It would be unfair and contrary to the purpose of the statute to strip the nonemployee spouse of the value of the retirement asset by precluding [the trial court] from evaluating its worth prior to adjudicating the property rights of the estranged marriage partners." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 118 Conn.App. 325, 331-32.
Here, it is appropriate for the defendant to be awarded a portion of the plaintiff's pension. Awarding the plaintiff 12 1/2% of the pension is reasonable. The plaintiff was married to the defendant for five of his twenty years of military service. This excludes the amount specified for the disability related hearing loss which the defendant sustained while in service.
Considering the length of the marriage, the causes for the dissolution, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of the parties, the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income as well as the contribution of each in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates,
The court orders as follows:
1. The marriage is dissolved on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown.
2. All orders to take effect immediately, except as otherwise noted.
3. The defendant shall quitclaim his interest in One St. Paul Court, Groton, Connecticut within sixty days. The parties shall share the cost of this transfer equally. The plaintiff shall within 90 days or sooner if agreed upon refinance any debt on said property and hold the plaintiff harmless for any debts or obligations on said property. Coincident with transfer of title, the plaintiff shall assume all indebtedness on the Groton property including taxes, insurance and maintenance costs. The items designated as " Items that stay with the House" in the defendant's proposed orders shall convey to the plaintiff.
4. Except where specified herein, the parties are to each be responsible for the debts listed on his/her financial affidavits. The court finds there is no IRS debt to be paid at this time. If for some reason there is an IRS debt or will be IRS or tax debt which is claimed against the joint parties in the future, the parties shall share said debt on a fifty/fifty basis, unless otherwise agreed upon. The parties shall each pay 1/2 of any balance on the Navy Federal Mastercard account listed on defendant's financial affidavit.
5. The parties are to each divide any household furnishings acquired during the marriage within thirty days in accordance with the defendant's proposed orders, except where specified herein.
6. The plaintiff is to retain ownership of the 2008 G6 Car, 2001 or 2003 Chrysler Sebring convertible, 1998 Camaro Z28 IROC, and 1987 Honda motorcycle. The defendant is to execute documents to effectuate transfer of vehicles to the possession and ownership of plaintiff within thirty days; the plaintiff is to assume any indebtedness and liabilities thereon and hold the defendant harmless for same.
7. The defendant is to retain the 1987 Ford Explorer, 1970 Ford Mustang and its parts, the 2003 Indian motorcycle, and motorcycle trailer, assume any indebtedness and liabilities thereon and hold the plaintiff harmless for same. The plaintiff, if necessary, is to execute any documents to effectuate transfer of said vehicles within thirty days.
8. Husband is to pay wife alimony in the amount of $450 per week for five years. Alimony shall terminate upon plaintiff's remarriage, death or cohabitation with an unrelated person pursuant to the Connecticut General Statutes (CGS), whichever is the first to occur. Said alimony is modifiable. No alimony is awarded to husband.
9. Husband is to retain his 401k retirement fund with Electric Boat. The defendant shall transfer to the plaintiff one-half of his interest in said fund for the period of the marriage and shall designate the plaintiff as a beneficiary of said plan. The transfer shall be made via a QDRO with the parties sharing equally the cost for preparation of such QDRO.
10. The plaintiff is awarded 12-1/2% of the defendant's military retirement. This provision shall be effectuated by a QDRO and the court shall retain jurisdiction to enter and enforce such order. The QDRO shall include the following components:
i. Plaintiff shall have the right to select the Survivor's Benefit Plan (SBP) as a former spouse up to the base amount of her interest in defendant's retirement/retainer pay, and the parties shall share equally the cost of said premium;
ii. Plaintiff's retirement amount will be calculated based upon defendant's retirement pay without reduction for any waiver or transfer of any payment and/or benefits to the Veterans Administration or other program, and as if defendant's full retirement/retainer pay was paid through DFAS unreduced by any waiver or transfer of any payment and/or benefit and that in the event DFAS does not automatically pay defendant the full amount, defendant is to make such shortfall payments directly to plaintiff;
iii. In the event defendant's retirement/retainer pay is reduced due to a recoupment required by law or the result of any other waiver of defendant's retirement pay that is not the result of action or inaction taken or not taken by plaintiff, her share of the retirement shall be calculated as if the reduction was not applied; if DFAS will not pay the full amount directly to her, then defendant will be responsible for paying the difference directly to her;
iv. In the event defendant's disposable retirement pay is reduced due to his selection of SBP for any other person, plaintiff's share of the retirement will be calculated as if the recoupment had not been applied, and if DFAS will not pay the full amount directly to her, then defendant will be responsible for paying the difference directly to her;
v. In the event defendant elects to take REDUX or any other voluntary reduction in the amount of his retirement or retainer pay, plaintiff's percentage of retirement pay shall be applied against the retirement pay as if such election had not occurred, and if DFAS will not pay the full amount directly to her, then defendant will be responsible for paying the difference directly to her;
vi. In the event defendant accepts an early-out or other buy-out provision or takes any other waiver or reduction of his retirement pay due to future employment (including, but not limited to, future employment with the federal government), plaintiff's percentage of retirement pay shall be applied against the retirement pay as if such election had not occurred, and if DFAS will not pay the full amount directly to her, then defendant will be responsible for paying the difference directly to her;
vii. Defendant shall, at all times, cooperate with plaintiff to sign and submit any documents or instruments that may be necessary to secure her interest in his Navy retirement or retainer pay. The parties shall share on a fifty/fifty basis the cost for preparing the QDRO;
viii. The retirement calculations shall not include sums for disability payments to the defendant.11. The defendant is to obtain a life insurance policy in the amount of $120,000 within 90 days and designate the plaintiff as his sole beneficiary. The policy shall remain in full force and effect for the period of time defendant is ordered to pay alimony to the plaintiff.
12. Except where provided herein, each party shall maintain his/her own health insurance at his/her own cost. The defendant shall pay the cost of health insurance through COBRA or continued coverage through Tricare for the plaintiff for a period of one year or 12 months. The defendant shall communicate with his benefit's administrator to permit COBRA coverage availability to the plaintiff in accordance with these orders. Nothing herein shall preclude the plaintiff from seeking COBRA or continued coverage through Tricare at her expense for an additional 24 months for a total of 36 months or greater if allowed by law.
13. Except where provided herein, each party to retain his/her individual checking and savings accounts. The defendant shall transfer to the plaintiff all interest in his Thrift Savings Plan. The defendant shall retain his Navy Federal Credit Union (NFCU) checking and savings account in his name. The plaintiff shall retain her NFCU checking and savings account(s).
14. Wife and husband shall divide their personal property, including dogs and other items within thirty days, or within such time as to be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the proposed orders filed by the defendant.
15. Each party is to promptly execute all documents necessary to effectuate these orders.
16. The plaintiff may retain the name of Knoll.
17. Plaintiff's request for a portion of some type of child support order running from the defendant's ex-spouse to the defendant is denied.
18. Plaintiff's request for return of the motorcycle club vest is denied.
19. The parties may retain any wedding band, engagement ring, etc ., given in contemplation of marriage.