Knight v. Tripp

2 Citing cases

  1. Livingston v. Superior Court

    117 Cal. 633 (Cal. 1897)   Cited 14 times
    In Livingston v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 633, [49 P. 836], it was held that, under section 155 of the Civil Code, where a husband has no separate property, and there is no community property, and the husband is unable, by reason of infirmity, to support himself, an action would lie to compel the wife to support him out of her separate property.

    In what action, at law, could the court ascertain and determine what monthly allowance should be made for the future support of the husband, and enter a judgment awarding an execution each month for the amount?           [49 P. 838] If such a thing could be done the remedy would not be adequate. A defendant who, in defiance of the injunction of the court, transferred her property to put it beyond the reach of an execution, would easily so delay the collection as to render the relief of no avail. An action by the administrator of the husband for damages for permitting him to starve, in violation of her duty, is not a support for the husband.

  2. Rogers v. Kimball

    5 Cal. Unrep. 725 (Cal. 1897)   Cited 2 times

    Plaintiffs testified that the only information of the payment made by Kimball was in the deposition of Howard taken in the Boston suit, and that their first information of the payments made by Luce and Gordon was obtained after this action was commenced. No payments appear to have been indorsed upon the original note, and if Mrs. Rogers had paid the full amount of the note upon Howard’s demand, without suit, and without knowledge of the prior payment by defendants, no payments being indorsed thereon, we see no reason why she could not recover upon the defendants’ express contract [5 Cal.Unrep. 735] to indemnify the plaintiffs for a loss ‘in any manner sustained on account of said note.’ The sixth finding, therefore, does not justify a conclusion of law that Mrs. Robers is not entitled to recover in this action, unless it can be presumed from the bare fact therein stated that the defendants had paid the note in full before judgment; that is, that she must be presumed to have known of facts transpiring 3,000 miles away, and which were carefully concealed from her, or that she permitted judgment to be taken against her knowing that she had a perfect defense.