Opinion
No. 54129-3-I
Filed: March 21, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No. 03-2-27325-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 03/19/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Richard a Jones.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Roger W. Knight (Appearing Pro Se), P.O.BOX 3444, Seattle, WA 98114.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Lianne Schain Malloy, Attorney at Law, 670 Woodland Sq Loop SE, PO Box 40124, Olympia, WA 98504-0124.
Roger Knight appeals the superior court order affirming a decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings upholding the suspension of his driver's license for failure to comply with a child support order. Because each of his constitutional claims have been addressed on the merits by other courts, and because the statute at issue here provides procedural due process, unlike other statutes recently held to be unconstitutional in City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004), we affirm.
FACTS
A dissolution decree entered in 1991 requires Roger Knight to pay $851.76 per month in child support through the Washington State Support Registry. Following his accumulation of past-due child support debt of over $50,000, the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) Division of Child Support (DCS) notified Knight of his noncompliance and the resulting suspension of his driver's license under RCW 74.20A. An administrative law judge heard his challenge to the suspension and entered a final order concluding that Knight had failed to comply with the child support order and upholding the license suspension. The ruling was based on findings that the child support order had not been modified and Knight had accumulated at least six months in arrearages. Recognizing that Knight did not dispute that the license was properly suspended under state law, the superior court affirmed, holding that Knight's constitutional claims were barred under collateral estoppel and res judicata, and that if it were to reach the merits, Knight's claims would still fail. Knight appeals.
ANALYSIS
Judicial review of agency orders in adjudicative proceedings is governed by RCW 34.05.570(3), which provides in pertinent part:
The court shall grant relief from an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding only if it determines that: . . .
(a) The order, or the statute or rule on which the order is based, is in violation of constitutional provisions on its face or as applied;
(b) The order is outside the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency conferred by any provision of law;
(c) The agency has engaged in unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow a prescribed procedure;
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) The order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court, which includes the agency record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court under this chapter;
(f) The agency has not decided all issues requiring resolution by the agency;
. . . . [or]
(i) The order is arbitrary or capricious.
The appellate court applies these standards `directly to the record before the agency, sitting in the same position as the superior court.' Burnham v. Dep't of Soc. Health Serv., 115 Wn. App. 435, 438, 63 P.3d 816, review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1013 (2003). Although we may substitute our judgment for that of an administrative agency on questions of law, we will accord substantial weight to the agency's view of the law it administers. St. Francis Extended Care v. Dep't of Soc. Health Serv., 115 Wn.2d 690, 692, 801 P.2d 212 (1990). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. Id. at 695. Additionally, `The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity[.]' RCW 34.05.570(1)(a).
Knight does not challenge the administrative hearing officer's findings of fact and does not dispute that he failed to pay child support. Relying on Shuman v. Dep't of Licensing, 108 Wn. App. 673, 681-82, 32 P.2d 1011 (2001), Knight first contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in asserting the preclusive effect of unpublished opinions in his prior federal cases by failing to submit the entire record, which would demonstrate that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to decide or were required to abstain from deciding issues he raised. We disagree. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of claims and issues that were litigated, or might have been litigated, in a prior action, and applies where a prior judgment and a subsequent action are identical as to (1) persons and parties, (2) cause of action, (3) subject matter, and (4) the quality of persons for or against whom the claim is made. Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 763, 887 P.2d 898 (1995). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies when (1) the issues are identical; (2) the prior adjudication ended with a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) application of the doctrine does not work an injustice. Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wn.2d 552, 561-62, 852 P.2d 295 (1993).
Shuman involved the collateral estoppel effect of a district court order in a criminal prosecution on license revocation proceedings by the Department of Licensing. 108 Wn. App. at 675. The Department argued that the trial court record in the criminal case failed to demonstrate that the order in question was the result of a `fully litigated and contested' hearing, such that collateral estoppel should not apply. Id. at 679-80. But this court stated, `[A]lthough the reasons for its decision are not clear from the record, the district court and the parties clearly recognized that the circumstances of Mr. Shuman's breath test were important and necessary to the criminal litigation. No more should be required.' Id. at 682. The case was remanded to determine whether the Department was in privity with the prosecuting authority in the criminal case, such that collateral estoppel would apply. Id.
Here, the unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions provided by the State and cited in the trial court's order, Knight v. Serpas, No. 03-35016, 2003 WL 21418609 (9th Cir. June 18, 2003) (Dist.Ct. No. CV-02-01641-JCC), and Knight v. City of Mercer Island, No. 03-35116, 2003 WL 21480340 (9th Cir. June 23, 2003) (Dist.Ct. No. CV-02-00879-RSL), demonstrate that the federal court had jurisdiction to decide, and actually considered and rejected Knight's constitutional claims on the merits. Knight provides no authority that actually supports his contention that a reviewing court must examine the entire trial and appellate records, including briefs, before applying res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Repeatedly incorporating by reference his briefing below, Knight next claims that RCW 74.20A is (1) an unconstitutional ex post facto law; (2) violates due process and equal protection in violation of the state and federal constitutions; (3) a bill of attainder; (4) a multi-subject bill in violation of the state constitution; and (5) a violation of the federal Anti-Peonage Act. As the State points out and Knight does not dispute, Knight has asserted each of these claims in his prior actions against the State and each one has been addressed on the merits and rejected. Because Knight offers no authority or sensible reason to prevent the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel to bar his admittedly identical claims and issues, we decline to revisit the merits.
Finally, Knight contends that the recent opinion in City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004) constitutes a change in the law preventing preclusion of his due process claim. In Moore, our Supreme Court held that two statutes involving driver's license suspension, RCW 46.20.289 and .324(1) violated due process. Id. at 669. Knight contends that Moore supports his contention that RCW 74.20A is unconstitutional. We rejected this argument in Amunrud v. Board of Appeals, Wn. App., 103 P.3d 257 (2004). Unlike the statutes at issue in Moore, RCW 74.20A provides an opportunity for an administrative hearing, with the right of appeal to the courts, as well as the option to initiate a modification proceeding. Amunrud, 103 P.3d at 261. RCW 74.20A does not violate the right to procedural due process. Id.
In sum, Knight again fails to demonstrate any invalidity in the State's action in suspending his license.
Affirmed.
APPELWICK and COX, JJ., concur.