That understanding is implicit in the words of the Chief Justice discussing procedural safeguards in revocation proceedings for parole violations in Morrissey v. Brewer at 486 when he acknowledged that ". . . not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." As concerns the overall rights and plenary hearing to determine whether to revoke probation, the court must provide the minimum standards of due process synopsized from Scarpelli and Morrissey and outlined with greater explanation in Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 321. The guidelines set forth by Chief Judge Orth in Knight remain viable in the light of Scarpelli.

Based upon the quoted events before the hearing judge, Lau argues that (1) he "was denied [the] assistance of counsel during the hearing on revocation of probation" and he ". . . was denied Due Process of Law by the procedures utilized to terminate his probation." This Court in Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 324-25, 255 A.2d 441, 448 (1969), addressing the same subject as now posed to us, said: "In the instant case there is no question that the sentence was not deferred; the sentence was imposed at the trial at the time of the conviction of the appellant of the substantive offense. It was its execution which was conditionally suspended.

III On 25 June 1969 this Court decided the case of Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313. We discussed the nature of a revocation of probation proceeding.

Historically, the right to counsel at a probation hearing was dependant upon the nature of the suspended sentence which was rendered by the court at the trial of the substantive offense. If the sentencing court suspended the imposition of the sentence and not just execution of the sentence already imposed, then the probation revocation proceeding was considered part of the sentencing process and the probationer had a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present. Laquay v. State, 16 Md. App. 709, 716-18, 299 A.2d 527 (1973); Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 322-25, 255 A.2d 441 (1969). If, on the other hand, sentence was imposed at the trial of the substantive offense and merely its execution was suspended, then it was not a denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel to conduct the probation hearing without defendant's attorney present.

Id. at 348. If the facts incline a reasonable and impartial mind to the belief that the probationer has violated a term of his probation, that is sufficient to revoke or modify. Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 318, 255 A.2d 441 (1969). Procedural due process is satisfied if the probationer is given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, i.e., a hearing to explain his conduct.

The Maryland courts have long held that probation is a matter of grace, not of right. Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 438 A.2d 1335 (1982); Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 400 A.2d 419 (1979). See also Herold v. State, 52 Md. App. 295, 449 A.2d 429 (1982); Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 255 A.2d 441 (1969). In Kaylor, 285 Md. at 75, 400 A.2d 419, we observed that:

Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275, 208 A.2d 575 (1965). See Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 255 A.2d 441 (1969); Sweeney v. State, 1 Md. App. 233, 229 A.2d 141 (1967). Probation should not be allowed to develop into a grant of immunity from punishment.

When a condition of probation was found to have been violated, the suspension could be stricken, probation revoked and the sentence originally prescribed was to be executed. Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 324-325, 255 A.2d 441 (1969). See Costello v. State, 240 Md. 164, 213 A.2d 739 (1965).

The holding of Swan has been reaffirmed on several occasions. Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 235-236, 210 A.2d 716 (1965); Coleman v. State, 231 Md. 220, 222, 189 A.2d 616 (1963); Edwardsen v. State, 220 Md. 82, 88-89, 151 A.2d 132 (1959); Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 317, 255 A.2d 441 (1969); Finnegan v. State, 4 Md. App. 396, 401, 243 A.2d 36 (1968); Welborn v. Warden, 2 Md. App. 351, 354, 234 A.2d 633 (1967). The plain language of § 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, authorizing an appeal by a defendant from a final judgment entered in the District Court in a criminal case, coupled with the consistent holdings that an order revoking probation is a final judgment, would seem to compel the conclusion that the statute permits an appeal from a District Court order revoking probation.

In Allen, although we specifically refrained from stating that appointment of counsel for indigent probationers was required, we remarked that the policy of appointing counsel at such times was a wholesome one — an observation which we now repeat. Their analysis of the nature of the revocation proceeding has led numerous state courts to the conclusion that appointment of counsel is not required. Dutton v. Willis, supra; State v. Hewett, supra; In re Griffin, supra; Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 255 A.2d 441 (1969); Petition of DuBois, Nev., 445 P.2d 354 (1968); State v. Phillips, Mo., 443 S.W.2d 139 (1969); Application of Jerrel, 77 S.D. 487, 93 N.W.2d 614 (1958); Cole v. Holliday, Iowa, 171 N.W.2d 603 (1969); State ex rel. Riffle v. Thorn, W.Va., 168 S.E.2d 810 (1969). "The right to counsel clause of Section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution refers to `criminal prosecution' and states that in such prosecution the party accused shall have the right to `appear and defend in person and with counsel'.