Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2894 SECTION "N"
June 28, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant RPM Pizza, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident between Plaintiff Angela Smith Knight ("Knight") and Leonard Jones ("Jones") on August 31, 1998. Jones is an employee of Defendant RPM Pizza Inc. ("RPM"), a Domino's Pizza franchisee, and the accident allegedly occurred while Jones was delivering pizzas. On June 4, 1999 Knight executed a release which discharged Jones and his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), from liability in return for payment of $10,000. The release was on a pre-printed form, referred specifically to Jones and Allstate, and contained general language discharging all other entities from any possible claims arising from the accident.
That portion of the release said: "in consideration for the sum of [Ten Thousand Dollars (handwritten)] . . . I do hereby release and forever discharge [Leonard Jones and Allstate (handwritten)] and any other person, firm or corporation charged or chargeable with responsibility or liability, their heirs, representatives and assigns, from any and all claims."
On August 25, 1999 Knight filed suit against RPM in state court. RPM subsequently removed to this Court, and now seeks summary judgment on Knight's claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of fact exists where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323(1986). If the opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need not submit evidentiary documents to properly support its motion, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party's case. See Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991). To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set forth specific facts to establish a genuine issue of material fact and cannot merely rest on allegations and denials. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In support of its motion for summary judgment, RPM asserts that Knight released it from liability. Alternatively, RPM argues that Knight's release of Jones extinguished any underlying liability attributable to RPM.
RPM first asserts that the release bars Knight's suit because she intended to release "any other person, firm or corporation charged or chargeable with responsibility" for the accident. However, Knight used a pre-printed release form, and under Louisiana law, such a release discharges only the parties typed or written onto the printed form. See Cates v. Wausau Ins. Co., 508 So.2d 1031, 1032 (La.Ct.App. 5th Cir. 1987); Tinsley v. Packard Truck Lines, Inc., 846 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1988). Since only Jones and Allstate were specifically included on the form, the release does not bar suit against RPM. Accordingly, on the issue of whether the release discharged RPM, RPM's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Secondly. RPM argues that the release of its employee Jones extinguished RPM's liability. Under Louisiana law, an employer and an employee are solidarily liable for the torts of the employee. See Foster v. Hampton, 381 So.2d 789, 790 (La. 1980). This civil law concept is the functional equivalent of the common law principle of joint and several liability. See Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885, 889 (La. 1993). Louisiana Civil Code article 1803 provides that settlement with one solidary obligor entitles the other solidary obligor to a reduction of liability in the amount of the discharged obligor's virile portion. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts 1803 and 1804 (West 1987). In the present case, Knight alleges that Jones was solely responsible for the accident. Compl. ¶ V. Therefore, RPM argues that Jones' virile share is 100% and Jones' release completely extinguishes any liability attributable to RPM.
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed RPM's argument. InSampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So.2d 326 (La. 1981), the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and filed suit against the driver and the driver's employer. When the plaintiff settled his claim with the driver, the employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the release of the employee discharged the employer from any further liability. The court held that the release of an employee does not preclude recovery against the employer. Id. at 328. See also Etienne v. National Automobile Ins. Co., No. 99-2610, 2000 WL 471515 (La. April 25, 2000) (reaffirming the Sampay holding); Bienville Parish Police Jury v. United States Postal Service, 8 F. Supp. 563 (W.D.La. 1998) (holding that, in an automobile accident case, the release of an employee-driver did not extinguish claims against the employer). Accordingly, on the issue of whether settlement with Jones extinguished RPM's liability, RPM's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant RPM Pizza, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.