Opinion
No. 63198.
03-13-2017
In the Matter of the Application of Charles KNIGHT, Petitioner, v. LAKE PLACID VILLAGE COURT and Justice of Lake Placid Village Court Hon. William Hulshoff, Respondents.
Gregory LaDuke, Lake Placid, for petitioner. Janet H. Bliss, Lake Placid, for respondents.
Gregory LaDuke, Lake Placid, for petitioner.
Janet H. Bliss, Lake Placid, for respondents.
ROBERT J. MULLER, J.
On June 18, 2016, a police officer stopped petitioner Charles Knight in the Village of Lake Placid, Essex County, after observing his vehicle cross a double yellow line. Petitioner's blood alcohol level tested at .23%, and he was charged with the misdemeanors of driving while intoxicated and aggravated driving while intoxicated as well as the violation of failure to keep right. After a June 30, 2016 appearance was adjourned at his attorney's request, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all charges on July 7, 2016. Because his license was subject to suspension pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(e)(7), a Pringle hearing (see Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 N.Y.2d 426 [1996], cert denied 519 U.S. 1009 [1996] ) was scheduled for July 21, 2016. On that date, respondent William Hulshoff, a Justice of respondent Lake Placid Village Court, suspended petitioner's license and issued him a hardship license (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7][e] ). Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to vacate the suspension of his license.
"The prompt suspension law is implicated every time a person is arrested for DWI in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2), (2–a), (3) or (4–a) and is alleged to have had a blood alcohol level of .08% or more as indicated by a chemical test (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7][a], [b] )" (Matter of Schermerhorn v. Becker, 64 AD3d 843, 845 [2009] ). In order to issue a suspension under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(e)(7), the Court must find that "(1) the accusatory instrument conforms with CPL 100.40, and (2) reasonable cause exists to believe that the driver operated a motor vehicle with '.08 of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in his or her blood as was shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva" ' (Matter of Vanderminden v. Tarantino, 60 AD3d 55, 59 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 708 [2009], quoting Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e] [7][b] ; see Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 N.Y.2d at 432 ). "Where such an initial determination is made, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(e)(7) further provides that the driver 'shall be entitled to an opportunity to make a statement regarding these two issues and to present evidence tending to rebut the court's findings" ' (Matter of Vanderminden v. Tarantino, 60 AD3d at 59 [brackets omitted], quoting Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7][b] ). The Pringle hearing is a civil administrative proceeding separate from the underlying criminal prosecution and, where the initial determination regarding the accusatory instrument and blood alcohol level is not rebutted, a court must suspend the driver's license (see Matter of Schermerhorn v. Becker, 64 AD3d at 846 ; see also Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 N.Y.2d at 429–430 ).
Respondents' answer, which is verified by Hulshoff, states that the record before Hulshoff at the Pringle hearing included, among other things, the supporting deposition of the arresting officer as well as the various documentation setting forth the result of petitioner's breath test. Copies of the documents that were before Hulshoff are annexed to respondents' answer. Petitioner does not directly challenge in this proceeding the sufficiency of such proof. Instead, he contends, first, that Hulshoff made his determination based on ex-parte testimony [Petition, ¶ 9] and "legal advice he received outside the record and before the hearing began" [Petitioner's Memorandum of Law, unnumbered page 3]. Petitioner further argues that he was not given an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.
Petitioner's first argument is premised upon a colloquy between Hulshoff and petitioner's counsel, Gregory LaDuke, during the Pringle hearing. At the beginning of the Pringle hearing, LaDuke requested that Hulshoff adjourn the hearing without date and allow petitioner to submit weekly samples establishing that he had tested negative for alcohol consumption. The colloquy continued:
"MR. LADUKE: And we just submitted a sample that he is negative for alcohol this week.
THE COURT: I understand that, but I also ran this by a number of people that I was at justice court training and I am strongly advised that I cannot do that. I have to suspend.
MR. LADUKE: Okay. I don't—I still don't think the paperwork is appropriate.
THE COURT: I think the paperwork is correct. It is certified.
MR. LADUKE: Okay.
THE COURT: And I'll try to get it this weekend too.
MR. LADUKE: Well, I disagree. Please don't get mad at me.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm not mad at you. I'm just—I understand what you're trying to do for your client. Okay? But I also understand the predicament I'm in and what I'm required to do.
MR. LADUKE: Can I have proof—.
THE COURT: I have the big session—yesterday was justice training. I have the big session on—.
MR. LADUKE: Judge, I have proof that he's employed. We would ask for a hardship.
THE COURT: I understand. I have no question about that. I have no problem with giving you a hardship license, but I very clearly question whether or not this is a certified copy and I was explained by several attorneys that it is.
MR. LADUKE: Okay. Well, I disagree. It's not in CPLR form so that's my opinion, but
we could take it up on another jurisdiction if we have to."
Initially, the Court notes that nothing in this colloquy or the other papers before the Court indicate that any ex parte testimony was considered by Hulshoff. It is apparent from the colloquy that Hulshoff had recently been to a training session and, in fact, the verified answer adds that he had spent the two days prior to the Pringle hearing at a training session for Town and Village Court Justices. Non-lawyer Town and Village Justices, such as Hulshoff, are required to attend training sessions in each calendar year (see 22 NYCRR § 17.2 [b]; see also N.Y. Const, art 6, § 20 [c] ), a requirement which was strengthened following the November 2006 release of the Unified Court System's "Action Plan for the Justice Courts" (hereinafter referred to as "Action Plan"). Judges are permitted to "consult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities" ( 22 NYCRR § 100.3 [B][6][c] [Code of Judicial Conduct] ), and the term "court personnel" should be interpreted to include staff provided by the Office of Court Administration to assist and support non-lawyer, part-time justices (see Advisory Comm On Judicial Ethics, Op 15–209 [Dec. 3, 2015] ). Such an interpretation is not only supported by the cited ethics opinion, but also is consistent with the Action Plan's goal to "provide the Justice Courts with more resources and support they need to meet their heavy responsibilities" (Action Plan, Preface). It is hardly surprising that various issues implicated by DWI charges, including Pringle hearings, would be an important topic at a training session for Town and Village Court Justices. The fact that Hulshoff received information about and spoke with instructors regarding such issues does not, in the Court's view, reflect that his determination was tainted or made on improper matters outside the record.
The Action Plan is available on the internet at: http://nycourts.gov/publications/pdfs/ActionPlan-JusticeCourts.pdf
It merits noting that the instruction he ostensibly received regarding the mandatory nature of the prompt suspension law appears to have been legally sound (see Matter of Schermerhorn v. Becker, 64 AD3d at 846 ).
Next, the Court considers petitioner's contention that he was not permitted an opportunity to rebut the evidence supporting suspension of his license. The transcript reveals various efforts by petitioner's counsel to avoid suspension. While perhaps the better practice would have been for Hulshoff to affirmatively ask after his initial determination whether petitioner wished to make an additional statement or present evidence, nonetheless it is apparent that petitioner—through experienced counsel—had an ample opportunity to present his position regarding the suspension.
Finally, petitioner's argument that Hulshoff had pre-judged the case since the hardship license was dated the day before the hearing (which Hulshoff states resulted from a simple error of putting in the wrong date) has been considered and found unpersuasive.
Based upon the foregoing analysis and upon review of the papers as enumerated hereinafter, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that any relief not specifically addressed has nonetheless been considered and is hereby expressly denied.
The above constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of this Court.
The original of this Decision, Order and Judgment has been filed by the Court together with petitioner's Notice of Petition, dated October 5, 2016. Counsel for respondents is hereby directed to promptly obtain a filed copy of the Decision, Order and Judgment for service with notice of entry upon counsel for petitioner in accordance with CPLR 5513.