Opinion
EP-21-CV-00313-FM
11-09-2022
KNIGHT SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. JBR EXPRESS, INC.; JORGE I. BUCIO CARDOSO; PAULA NIETO, Surviving Spouse; and MARIA CAMPUSANO, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL AND MOTION TO CONTINUE
FRANK MONTALVO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before the court are “Defendants' Motion to Compel Production of Documents” (“Motion to Compel”) [ECF No. 24], filed July 14, 2022, by Paula Nieto (“Defendant” or “Nieto Defendant”); and “Defendants' Motion for Continuance of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Motion to Continue”) [ECF No. 30], filed August 1, 2022, by Defendant. After due consideration, Defendant's Motion to Compel and Motion to Continue are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
This case involves a dispute over insurance coverage. Plaintiff is Defendant JBR Express, Inc's insurer. Defendant JBR Express, Inc. is a corporation owned by Defendant Jorge I. Bucio Cardoso and whose principal is Defendant Maria Campusano (collectively, the “JBR Defendants”). Defendant Paula Nieto is the surviving spouse of Mr. Edgar Nieto. Mr. Nieto was killed in November 2019 while driving a semi-tractor owned by the JBR Defendants and “in the course and scope of his employment with [them].”
“Knight Specialty Insurance Company's Original Complaint for Declaratory Judgment” (“Compl.”) 2, ECF No. 1, filed Dec. 30, 2021.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
B. Procedural Background
Defendant Nieto brought suit in state court “against each of the JBR Defendants for negligence and negligence per se under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act and the New Mexico Workers Compensation Act.” In December 2021, Plaintiff filed its complaint here, seeking declaratory judgment “regarding its rights and obligations” under the insurance policy it issued to Defendant JBR Express, Inc. Specifically, it argues it is “not obligated to defend or indemnify the JBR Defendants” since 1) the policy allegedly does not cover injuries to JBR Express, Inc. employees (like, Mr. Nieto) that arise from the course of their employment and 2) Defendants Cardoso and Campusano do not “qualify as ‘insureds' under the policy.”
Id. at 4 ¶ 4.3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 9, 8.
“Knight Specialty Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support” (“Pl. Mot.”) 18, ECF No. 25, filed July 19, 2022.
In June 2022, the court entered a scheduling order requiring the parties to complete discovery by November 10. Defendant asked Plaintiff to produce “[its] complete file on JBR Express, Inc. and its principals,” to include
“Scheduling Order” 2, ECF No. 22, entered on June 10, 2022.
all bonds placed with USDOT permitting JBR Express, Inc. to operate (MCS 90); Underwriting file, claims, correspondence, record search and safety/inspection files on JBR Express, Inc. and its principals; All agent/surplus lines agent agreements and files, compensation paid to them and Texas taxes paid on this policy; and All workers compensation insurance or occupation injury plan information per Section 641 of the Texas Transportation Code.
“Defendants' Motion to Compel Production of Documents” (“Def. Mot. Compel”) 2, ECF No. 24, filed July 14, 2022.
Plaintiff responded with a blanket rejection, asserting Defendant's request was “vague and ambiguous,” “overbroad,” “unduly burdensome,” “not proportional to the needs of the case,” and “privileged or otherwise exempt.”
Id.
On July 14, Defendant filed her Motion to Compel, citing Plaintiff's refusal to produce any discoverable documents. Five days later, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, only then producing as an exhibit part of what Defendant sought during discovery (the insurance policy). On August 1, Defendant filed a motion to continue Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and allow the parties to proceed with more fulsome discovery.
Id.
See Pl. Mot.
“Defendants' Motion for Continuance of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25)” (“Def. Mot. Continue”) 4, ECF No. 30, filed Aug. 1, 2022.
C. Parties' Arguments
First, Defendant seeks to compel discovery, arguing Plaintiff's generalized and blanket refusal to produce documents is insufficient to discharge its obligations. Defendant asserts Plaintiff, as the party resisting discovery, has the burden of establishing why the request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome, out of proportion, or privileged. Furthermore, Defendant asserts the documents sought are highly relevant given that Plaintiff may have 1) put up the bond that permitted JBR Express, Inc. to operate on the roads despite the fact JBR Express, Inc. did not carry “minimum levels of financial responsibility”; 2) “represented to the U.S. Government that JBR [Express, Inc.] was qualified [to operate] when it was not” given JBR Express, Inc. did not provide worker's compensation or accident injury coverage; and 3) violated the [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration] and therefore has a duty to indemnify.”
Def. Mot. Compel at 3.
Id. at 5-6.
Plaintiff counters that, except for the insurance policy itself, “none of the documents requested are relevant to the determination of [Plaintiff's] coverage obligations under the policy” since, “[u]nder Texas law, the duty to defend is determined solely by a comparison of the four corners of the insurance policy and the four corners of the pleading filed against the insured in the underlying lawsuit-which has been labeled the ‘eight-corners' rule.” Further, “whether JBR Express had workers compensation or accidental insurance coverage is immaterial” since such obligations rest on JBR Express, Inc., not Plaintiff.
“Plaintiff Knight Specialty Insurance Company's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel Production of Documents” (“Resp. to Compel”) 3, ECF No. 27, filed July 19, 2022.
Id. at 9.
Regarding the Motion to Continue, Defendant requests additional time to respond to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment since she was not given a prior opportunity to conduct any meaningful discovery. As such, it would be unjust for this court to determine, as a matter of law, that Defendant “has failed to produce any evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.”
Def. Mot. Continue at 8.
Id. at 2.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Discovery
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(b)(1), parties “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Discovery rules “are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.”Once the requesting party has established that the material sought is relevant and proportional, “the burden shifts to the party resisting discovery to show why the discovery is irrelevant, overly broad, unduly burdensome or oppressive, and thus should not be permitted.”
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
Camoco, LLC v. Leyva, 333 F.R.D. 603, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
If a party resists discovery, it must “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request” and it must do so for each item. “[S]imply objecting to requests as overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant, without showing specifically how each request is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive, is inadequate to voice a successful objection.” Even when the full scope of a request is ambiguous or overbroad, a responding party must nevertheless disclose that information which is clearly contemplated by the request or well within the proper scope.
Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 483-84 (quoting McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1484-86 (5th Cir. 1990) (cleaned up).
Id. at 487 (“[A] responding party has a duty to respond to or answer a discovery request to the extent that it is not objectionable.”).
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute over a material fact is genuine “when there is evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.”
Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. When considering only admissible evidence in the pretrial record, the court will “view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and draw all factual inferences in the nonmovant's favor. If the moving party cannot demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is inappropriate.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Fowler v. Smith, 68 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1995).
Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 582 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The nonmoving party's burden is not satisfied with “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” The court does not, “in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” When reviewing the parties' submissions, the court does not “weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”Once the nonmovant has had the opportunity to make this showing, summary judgment will be granted “if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 1075 (emphasis removed).
Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant seeks to compel production of Plaintiff's file on JBR Express, Inc. and its principals. Plaintiff rejected Defendant's discovery request, claiming it was “vague and ambiguous,” “overbroad,” “unduly burdensome,” “not proportional to the needs of the case,” and “privileged or otherwise exempt.”
Def. Mot. Compel at 2.
Id.
Plaintiff's objections are legally insufficient to rebuff a discovery request. Even if the discovery requests are arguably vague, ambiguous, or overbroad, Plaintiff has wholly failed to comply by disclosing that information which is plainly not ambiguous, irrelevant, or outside of reasonable scope. Finally, Plaintiff may not resist discovery requests merely by claiming privilege without describing “the nature of the documents . . . not produced or disclosed” and doing so “in a manner that . . . will enable other parties to assess the claim.” “Blanket assertions of a privilege are unacceptable.”
United Invs. Life Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 233 F.R.D. 483, 486 (N.D. Miss. 2006) (citing U.S. v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 541 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Plaintiff also rejected Defendant's discovery request on the basis that only the insurance policy itself is “relevant to the determination of [Plaintiff's] coverage obligations under the policy,” since “the duty to defend is determined solely by . . . the insurance policy and . . . the pleading filed against the insured in the underlying lawsuit,” i.e., the “eight corners” rule.
Def. Mot. Compel at 3.
The court is unpersuaded. First, Plaintiff relies on TIG Ins. Co. v. Woodsboro Farmers Coop., for the proposition that, because only the “eight corners” are relevant in a claim for declaratory judgment concerning an insurer's duty to defend or indemnify, denial of a motion to compel discovery of documents outside the “eight corners” is therefore appropriate. But Plaintiff muddles TIG Ins. Co. The Court there distinguished between a duty to defend, which “is determined solely by the [eight corners rule],” and the duty to indemnify, which “is based on the actual evidence developed in discovery or at trial in the underlying litigation.”
Resp. to Compel at 4 (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Woodsboro Farmers Coop., No. 5:18-CV-191, 2020 WL 12573285 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2020)).
TIG Ins. Co., 2020 WL 12573285, at *4 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also City of Coll. Station, Tex. v. Star Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2013) (“An insurer's duty to indemnify is distinct from its duty to defend: whereas the duty to defend is exclusively a function of the facts alleged in the pleadings, the duty to indemnify must generally be determined on the basis of the actual evidence pertaining to liability developed during discovery or at trial.”).
Second, Plaintiff applies the wrong standard for discovery scope: parties are entitled to discover “ any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party S claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant's request is wholly irrelevant to any of her claims.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Finally, even if it were true that the only important document in this case turned out to be the insurance policy, Plaintiff's unresponsiveness weighs in favor of granting Defendant's motions: Defendant has allegedly been requesting a copy of the insurance policy “since before the parties' Rule 26 conference.” Yet Plaintiff never produced it. Defendant only got access to the policy when Plaintiff attached it as an exhibit to its motion for summary judgment months later.
Def. Mot. Continue at 2.
See Pl. Mot.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court enters the following orders:
1. It is HEREBY ORDERED that “Defendants' Motion to Compel Production of Documents” [ECF No. 24] is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ORDERED to respond meaningfully and in good faith to Defendant's discovery request.
2. It is FURTHER ORDERED that “Defendants' Motion for Continuance of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment” [ECF No. 30] is GRANTED. All future deadlines in this case will be advanced. An updated scheduling order will follow.
3. It is FURTHER ORDERED that “Plaintiff Knight Specialty Insurance Company's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply in Response to Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Continuance of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment” [ECF No. 34] is DENIED.
SIGNED AND ENTERED.