The trial court held this was not shown. Although our review is de novo we give weight to the trial court's findings. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 247 Iowa 785, 799, 74 N.W.2d 679, 687; Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1395, 72 N.W.2d 494, 498. See also Luebke v. Freimuth, 248 Iowa 58, 67, 78 N.W.2d 473, 479. While the case may be close, when we give these findings the weight to which they are entitled we are not justified in reaching a contrary conclusion.

And defendant argues the decree should be upheld upon this ground. [1] Although our review is de novo we are justified in giving weight to the trial court's findings, especially so far as they relate to credibility of witnesses, in view of his better position to determine the real truth. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 252 Iowa 414, 419, 107 N.W.2d 114, 117, and citations; Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1395, 72 N.W.2d 494, 498, and citations. [2] Of course delivery is essential to the validity of a deed.

" This statement was cited with approval in the recent cases of Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 519, 284 N.W. 397, and Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1393, 72 N.W.2d 494. Also see Menary v. Whitney, 244 Iowa 759, 56 N.W.2d 70, and 15 C.J.S., Confidential, pages 821, 822. Thus the burden of showing a confidential relationship is upon the parties so alleging that fact. Mallow v. Walker, supra; Else v. Fremont Methodist Church, 247 Iowa 127, 73 N.W.2d 50. [12] While the relationship of parent and child is nearly always given as an illustration of confidential relations, it does not follow that all transactions between persons occupying that relation are presumptively invalid.

Coughlin v. St. Patrick's Church, 201 Iowa 1268, 203 N.W. 812, 209 N.W. 426; Humphrey v. Norwood, 213 Iowa 912, 918, 240 N.W. 232; Roller v. Roller, 201 Iowa 1077, 1082, 203 N.W. 41; Stonewall v. Danielson, 204 Iowa 1367, 1370, 217 N.W. 456; O'Neil v. Morrison, 211 Iowa 416, 233 N.W. 708. Indeed few relationships in name only do carry such import, but the true test has been set forth in several of our cases and reaffirmed as late as our past session. See Dibel v. Meredith, 233 Iowa 545, 549, 10 N.W.2d 28; Merritt v. Easterly, 226 Iowa 514, 284 N.W. 397; Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 72 N.W.2d 494. The object back of the rule is to prevent one standing in a confidential relationship with another from gaining an advantage in a transaction with the cestui que trust, which may reasonably be the result of the confidence reposed. Thus before one is allowed to retain the advantages of the transaction, he must show that the cestui acted with freedom, intelligence and full knowledge of all the facts.

We review equitable actions de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4; Keener, 728 N.W.2d at 193. When an action at law and an action in equity are consolidated and tried in equity, our review of both matters is de novo. Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1389-90, 72 N.W.2d 494, 495 (1955). "In equity cases, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, the court gives weight to the fact findings of the district court, but is not bound by them."

Nevertheless, "we are justified in giving weight to the trial court's findings, especially so far as they relate to credibility of witnesses, in view of his better position to determine the real truth." Watts v. Archer, 252 Iowa 592, 596, 107 N.W.2d 549, 551 (1961) (citing Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 252 Iowa 414, 419, 107 N.W.2d 114, 117 (1961); Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1395, 72 N.W.2d 494, 498 (1955)). III. Discussion

"[M]ere importunity that does not go to the extent of controlling the will of the grantor does not establish undue influence." Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1391, 72 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1955). Freedom from undue influence is presumed.

A client waives objection to an attorney's testimony when the client testifies to the communications. Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1396, 72 N.W.2d 494, 499. There we approved Kelly v. Cummens, 143 Iowa 148, 151, 121 N.W. 540, 541, where we said: "* * * a client who goes upon the stand in an attempt to secure some advantage by reason of transactions between himself and his counsel waives his right to object to the attorney's being called by the other side to give his account of the matter.

Neither is there any basis upon which to conclude Mertz acted other than in good faith, or that he or the bank stood to profit in any degree by virtue of possible benefits conferred upon Barbers by the decedent. See Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1392-1393, 72 N.W.2d 494; Menary v. Whitney, 244 Iowa 759, 764-765, 56 N.W.2d 70; and 24 Am.Jur., Fraud and Deceit, section 256, page 88. The trial court found no indicia of fraud or overreaching by Mertz or Isal Barber. We are satisfied that finding is factually consistent with the record.

[3] We have frequently held we will ordinarily consider a case upon appeal as being in the same forum in which it was heard in the trial court. This would mean we would consider this appeal as in equity and review the evidence de novo. McCullough Investment Co. v. Spencer, 246 Iowa 433, 436, 67 N.W.2d 924, 925, 926, and citations; Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1390, 72 N.W.2d 494, 495; Laughlin v. Franc, 247 Iowa 345, 347, 73 N.W.2d 750, 751, 752. However, appellant's brief twice recognizes, and cross-appellant's brief asserts, the record on this appeal is not reviewable de novo. Since the opposing briefs agree on this point, we are not justified in reviewing the evidence de novo and therefore treat the appeals as those from similar orders are usually considered.