Opinion
NO. 2022 CA 0508.
11-04-2022
Joyce KNECHT and Penelope Walters v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Carlos S. Green and Trenesse L. Davis.
HESTER, J.
In this matter arising out of a motor vehicle accident, plaintiffs appeal the judgment of the trial court finding they failed to prove a breach of any legal duty by defendant and dismissing their claims against defendant. For the following reasons we affirm the judgment of the trial court. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 11, 2014, Joyce Knecht was driving a 2013 Lexus 300 on Pontchartrain Drive in the right lane of travel with her daughter, Penelope Walters, as her guest passenger. Around the same time, Carlos Green was driving a 1993 Toyota Corolla on Old Spanish Trail approaching Pontchartrain Drive and failed to stop at the stop sign at Old Spanish Trail's intersection with Pontchartrain Drive, causing him to crash into Trenesse Davis who was driving a 2012 Mercedes Benz 300 in the same direction as Knecht on Pontchartrain Drive in the left lane of travel. Davis entered into the right lane of travel occupied by Knecht and struck the left side of Knecht's vehicle. After the accident, Knecht and Walters (sometimes hereafter referred to as the plaintiffs) filed suit, naming as defendants, Davis and her insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; Green; and State Farm Automobile Insurance Company as the UM/UIM carrier for Knecht and Walters. Green did not answer the suit and a preliminary default was entered against him by the deputy clerk on October 1, 2019.
State Farm as the UM/UIM carrier for Penelope Walters was dismissed by summary judgment on September 15, 2016.
On August 26, 2021, by joint consent judgment, the parties agreed to bifurcate the bench trial on liability and damages and set the trial on the issue of liability alone for October 26, 2021. Over seven years after the accident, a bench trial was conducted on October 26, 2021 and November 18, 2021. At the conclusion of the trial, the court determined in written reasons that the plaintiffs failed to prove any breach of any legal duty by Davis. In so concluding, the trial court relied on the testimony of an eyewitness to the accident who testified that Green ran a stop sign and crashed into Davis, causing Davis to strike the plaintiffs. A judgment considering the written reasons for judgment was signed on November 19, 2021, in favor of State Farm and Davis and against Knecht and Walters, dismissing their petition with prejudice. It is from his judgment that Knecht and Walters appeal.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In civil cases, the appropriate standard for appellate review of factual determinations is the manifest-error clearly-wrong standard which precludes the setting aside of a trial court's finding of fact unless the finding is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). A reviewing court may not merely decide if it would have found the facts of the case differently. Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 2003-1734 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 98. Rather, in order to reverse a trial court's factual conclusions, there must be no reasonable factual basis for the conclusion and the finding must be clearly wrong. Hayes Fund for First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 2014-2592 (La. 12/8/15), 193 So.3d 1110, 1115-1116; Stobart v. State Through, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993).
When the trial court's findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error standard demands great deference to the factfinder's conclusions, because "only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said." Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844. Thus, where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell, 549 So. 2d at 844.
The plaintiffs raised five assignments of error on appeal. Their first three assignments of error are premised on their argument that there were two separate collisions: the first being Davis leaving her lane of travel, unlawfully entering Knecht's lane of travel, crashing into the left rear driver's side of Knecht's vehicle, and continuing up the left side of the vehicle; and the second being a separate impact between Green and Davis. It is their position that the actions of Davis, including making an improper lane change, constituted negligence per se because she violated certain traffic regulations and her negligence "if not the sole cause, at the very least, ... is a cause-in-fact of harm to Plaintiffs, and a "substantial factor" in bringing about the wreck."
The plaintiffs contend that causation was established by Davis's negligence in making an improper lane change in violation of La. R.S. 32:78 and 32:79, failure to maintain control of/or careless operation of her vehicle in violation of La. R.S. 32:58 and failure to maintain a safe speed in inclement weather, in violation of La. R.S. 32:64.
During trial, the court heard from six witnesses, including Knecht; Walters; and Davis; as well as Deputy Keith McQueen, who investigated the accident; Joseph Martin, who witnessed the accident; and Ray Burkhard, who was qualified as an expert in forensic accident reconstruction.
Walters testified that prior to the accident, she was turned talking to her mom and saw Davis's vehicle change lanes from the left lane to the right land and strike them. She testified that there was one impact and she did not hear a prior "boom" or "crash" before the impact with Davis. She said she did not give a statement to any officer that day. Knecht also testified that she was in her lane when a car hit her, and that she did not see or hear another crash before impact. She testified that she very briefly spoke with an officer after the accident. Davis testified that she only vaguely remembers the accident and "just remember[s] being hit." Walters, Knecht, and Davis did not provide a written statement on how the accident happened to Officer McQueen on the day of the accident.
Martin, who was travelling on Pontchartrain Drive in the right-hand lane behind the Lexus on the day of the accident, testified that he witnessed the July 11, 2014 accident. He said that as he approached the intersection of Old Spanish Trail, he noticed a Toyota Corolla sliding through the stop sign at the intersection of Old Spanish Trail and Pontchartrain Drive and watched the Toyota Corolla impact the Mercedes and the Mercedes turn and then impact the Lexus. He testified that once the officer came on the scene, he gave him the information that he had, and he wrote down a witness statement that day stating how the accident happened. On cross, when Martin was again asked if he was sure he observed the Toyota Corolla strike the Mercedes before the Mercedes struck the Lexus, he said he was absolutely sure.
Deputy McQueen testified that he investigated the July 11, 2014 accident. He said he spoke to Martin at the scene and Martin provided a written statement stating that Green struck Davis and it appeared that the collision pushed Davis into Knecht. Deputy McQueen agreed that the only driver that he felt was at fault was Green. When asked if Davis making an improper lane change could be the cause of the motor vehicle wreck between Davis and Knecht, Officer McQueen stated "I had no evidence whatsoever at the scene to support that." In his report, Deputy McQueen placed Green at fault for the accident for disregarding a stop sign. He also cited Green for no insurance.
Burkhart testified that he reviewed several documents in connection with his analysis of the July 11, 2014 accident. He concluded based on the physical damage to the vehicles shown in the photographs and the "laws of physics" that prior to the impact with the Toyota Corolla, the Mercedes changed lanes, impacting the left rear end of the Lexus. He found that based on the damage to the Mercedes and Lexus, there was no way the Mercedes could have been pushed into the Lexus.
At the conclusion of the testimony and evidence, the trial court issued written reasons. In its reasons, the court found the testimony of Martin, an independent eyewitness, "extremely credible" and noted that Martin observed the Toyota Corolla run a stop sign, T-bone the Mercedes and cause the Mercedes to then strike the Lexus. The trial court also pointed out that Deputy McQueen testified that the physical damages he observed lined up precisely with the testimony of Martin. The trial court noted that Burkhart was qualified by training and experience, but afforded his opinion no weight because the court found Burkhart's testimony in this particular matter "to be unreliable as his opinion was without any basis or foundation in science." The court noted that Burkhart was not retained until six years after the accident, conducted no scientific tests, consulted no textbooks or reference materials, and summarily dismissed the credible testimony of the independent eyewitness Martin and the accident observations of Deputy McQueen. For these reasons, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove any negligence on the part of Davis.
In determining that the plaintiffs failed to prove any negligence by Davis, the trial court made a factual finding that Green struck Davis, causing Davis to collide with the plaintiffs. In so ruling, the trial court made credibility determinations that are amply supported by the record and therefore cannot be manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, we find no merit to the plaintiffs' first three assignments of error premised on their assertion that Davis made an improper lane change and crashed into them prior to being struck by Green.
In the plaintiffs' fourth and fifth assignments of error, they argue that the trial court erred in failing to apply the guest passenger presumption in favor of Walters and in refusing to allow into the record property damage estimates as evidence of fault. The guest passenger presumption provides that when an innocent third party, such as a guest passenger in a motor vehicle, is injured as a result of a collision between two drivers, each of the drivers is presumed guilty of negligence, and the burden of proof falls upon each to exculpate himself from negligence proximately causing injury to the third party. Parker v. Travelers Insurance Company, 369 So.2d 1120, 1122 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 371 So.2d 1342 (La. 1979). This is an evidentiary rather than a substantive rule, because it does not exempt the plaintiff from the ultimate burden of proving his or her case. Smith v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 49,136 (La.App. 2d Cir. 8/13/14), 146 So.3d 944, 947-48. This presumption is not applicable herein where the trial court made a factual finding that there were three cars involved in the accident, and Walters never alleged any negligence on the part of Knecht, the driver of the vehicle in which she was a guest passenger. Moreover, even if the presumption was applicable herein, the trial court's acceptance of Martin's version of the incident rebutted any presumption of negligence that otherwise may have been applied to Davis. Furthermore, we find no merit to the plaintiffs' argument that the trial court legally erred in not allowing the admission of the property damage estimates for Davis's Mercedes and Knecht's Lexus into evidence. Whether evidence is relevant is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion. Boudreaux v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 2005-2453 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/06), 950 So.2d 839, 845, writ denied, 2006-2775 (La. 1/26/07), 948 So.2d 171. The plaintiffs contended that the damage estimates are the best evidence to prove the mechanics of the accident. The trial court concluded that the damage estimates were not relevant in a bifurcated trial addressing only liability, and the trial court noted Davis testified she did not know about the damages to her car and could not offer any relevant evidence as to the property damage estimate because she never saw the Mercedes after the accident. While the trial court excluded the damage estimates, it allowed the introduction of several photographs showing the location of the damages to both vehicles, which were utilized by the plaintiffs to argue about the mechanics of how the accident happened. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that the damage estimates showing the cost of repairs were not relevant in the liability trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff-appellants, Joyce Knecht and Penelope Walters.