Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-1253 (LEK/DEP)
01-17-2019
APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF: [last known address] CHRISTOPHER LEE KNAPP, Pro se Broome County Correctional Facility P.O. Box 2047 Binghamton, New York 13902-2047 FOR DEFENDANT: [NONE]
APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF: [last known address]
CHRISTOPHER LEE KNAPP, Pro se
Broome County Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 2047
Binghamton, New York 13902-2047 FOR DEFENDANT: [NONE] OF COUNSEL: DAVID E. PEEBLES CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ORDER, REPORT, AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by pro se plaintiff Christopher Lee Knapp, a former Broome County Correctional Facility ("BCCF") prison inmate who was released from custody on December 6, 2018, and whose whereabouts is not currently known to the court. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Sean M. Fox, a New York State Trooper, subjected him to the use of excessive force at the time of his arrest, in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Since his release from prison, plaintiff has failed to provide notice to the court advising of his new address. Mail sent by the court to plaintiff's last known address has been returned as undeliverable. Since it is apparent that plaintiff has failed to comply with the court's requirement that he notify the court of his further change of address, I recommend that his complaint be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action on or about October 24, 2018. Dkt. No. 1. At the time, plaintiff was confined in the BCCF, located in Binghamton, New York. Id. On October 30, 2018, Senior District Judge Lawrence E. Kahn issued an order administratively closing this action and denying plaintiff's in forma pauperis ("IFP") application as incomplete. Dkt. No. 5. In that decision, plaintiff was directed to either file a proper IFP application, signed and certified by an appropriate official at the facility, or pay the full $400.00 filing fee, within thirty days of the date of the order. Id.
Plaintiff filed a second application for IFP status, together with an inmate authorization form, on November 13, 2018. Dkt. No. 7. Senior District Judge Kahn thereafter issued a decision and order on November 14, 2018, staying the thirty-day deadline established in the October Order, Dkt. No. 5, and ordering the Broome County Sheriff, or an authorized official with the County, to either 1) complete, sign, and submit to the court the "Certificate" portion of plaintiff's second IFP; or 2) submit an affidavit explaining the reason he or she declines to do so. Dkt. No. 8. Upon receiving the completed IFP, Dkt. No. 9, Senior District Judge Kahn granted plaintiff's IFP application and the case was reopened. Dkt. No. 10. On that same date, the clerk issued a summons, together with General Order 25, and forwarded those items to the United States Marshals Service for service upon the named defendant. Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.
Judge Kahn's decision and order, the summons, and General Order 25 were mailed to the plaintiff at the BCCF. That mailing, however, was returned to the court as undeliverable. Dkt. No. 14. By letter dated December 17, 2018, a representative of the Broome County Sheriff's Office confirmed that plaintiff was released from the BCCF on December 6, 2018. Dkt. No. 13. Despite his change of circumstances, however, to date, plaintiff has failed to provide a current address where he can be reached for purposes of communications from the court and defendant's counsel.
II. DISCUSSION
For reasons that are self-evident, this court's local rules require that "[a]ll attorneys of record and pro se litigants immediately notify the Court of any change of address." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 10.1(c)(2) (emphasis omitted). As one court has observed with respect to this requirement,
[i]t is neither feasible nor legally required that the clerks of the district courts undertake independently to maintain current addresses on all parties to pending actions. It is incumbent upon litigants to inform the clerk of address changes, for it is manifest that communications between the clerk and the parties or their counsel will be conducted principally by mail. In addition to keeping the clerk informed of any change of address, parties are obliged to make timely status inquiries. Address changes normally would be reflected by those inquiries if made in writing.Dansby v. Albany Cty. Corr. Facility Staff, No. 95-CV-1525, 1996 WL 172699, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1996) (Pooler, J.) (quoting Perkins v. King, No. 84-3310, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 31736, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 1985)). Plaintiff was initially informed of this requirement when he was provided with the court's pro se notice and handbook. See Dkt. No. 4 at 2 ("You must immediately notify the Court of any change of address."). Plaintiff was to have been reminded of this obligation by Senior District Judge Kahn in the decision and order dated December 11, 2018. See Dkt. No. 10 at 9. Unfortunately, however, that decision and order was sent by the court to plaintiff's last known address and was subsequently returned as undeliverable. Dkt. No. 14.
All unreported decisions cited to in this report have been appended for the convenience of the pro se plaintiff.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may, in its discretion, order dismissal of an action based on a plaintiff's failure to prosecute or comply with an order of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Baptiste v. Sommers, 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014); Rodriguez v. Goord, No. 04-CV-0358, 2007 WL 4246443, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007) (Scullin, J. adopting report and recommendation by Lowe, M.J.). That discretion should be exercised when necessary to "achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31. In addition, it should be exercised with caution and restraint because dismissal is a particularly harsh remedy, especially when invoked against a pro se plaintiff. Baptiste, 768 F.3d at 216-17.
Although Rule 41(b) grants a defendant leave to move for dismissal based on a plaintiff's failure to prosecute or comply with a court order (rather than grant the court explicit authority to dismiss sua sponte), "courts retain the 'inherent power' to sua sponte 'clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief.' " Rodriguez, 2007 WL 4246443, at *2 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). Indeed, the local rules of this court recognize this authority and mandate that the court exercise it under certain circumstances. See, e.g., N.D.N.Y. L.R. 41.2(a).
A determination of whether to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b) is informed by consideration of five specific factors, including (1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with court orders; (2) whether the plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal; (3) whether the defendant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings; (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in a fair chance to be heard; and (5) whether the imposition of sanctions less drastic than dismissal is appropriate. Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Jackson v. City of New York, 22 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1994); Alvarez v. Simmons Mkt. Research Bureau, Inc., 839 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1999).
Based upon careful consideration of the foregoing relevant factors, I conclude that dismissal of plaintiff's complaint at this juncture is warranted. The inability of the court to communicate with plaintiff is due solely to plaintiff's failure to provide the court with his new address. While only a couple of months have elapsed since the time of commencement of this action, and the duration of plaintiff's failure to proceed in this action is therefore modest, its effect on the litigation is nonetheless substantial, and there is no end to plaintiff's inaction in sight. Given plaintiff's manifest disinterest in pursuing his claims in this action, I find that the need to alleviate congestion on the court's docket and the defendant's interest in defending against the claims asserted by the plaintiff outweigh his right to receive a further opportunity to be heard in this matter. As required, I have considered less-drastic sanctions, but reject them as ineffective. For example, I am persuaded that issuing an order reprimanding plaintiff for his conduct would be futile, given that such an order would, in all likelihood, never reach plaintiff due to his failure to provide the court with a current address following his release from custody.
III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter obviously cannot proceed without notification to the court by the plaintiff of his current address. Since plaintiff has failed to fulfill his obligation to provide such notification, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the telephonic Rule 16 Conference in this action, currently scheduled for March 21, 2019 at 10:00 AM in Syracuse, is adjourned without date; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's complaint in this action be DISMISSED in its entirety, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon his failure to prosecute and to comply with this court's orders and local rules of practice.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections must be filed with the clerk of the court within FOURTEEN days of service of this report. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this order, report, and recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order, report, and recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
It is hereby ORDERED that the clerk of the court serve a copy of this report and recommendation upon the parties in accordance with this court's local rules.
/s/_________
David E. Peebles
U.S. Magistrate Judge Dated: January 17, 2019
Syracuse, New York