The financial affidavits indicate that respondent's income has risen from approximately $9,100 in 1980 to $11,180 at the time of this proceeding. Although this increase is hardly substantial, given the minimal amount of support initially set and the readily apparent increase in the needs of growing children, we conclude that the modest increase in child support was clearly warranted (see Matter of La Blanc v. La Blanc, 96 A.D.2d 670; Ward v. Ward, 79 A.D.2d 683, mot for lv to app den 52 N.Y.2d 705; Klubek v. Schad, 49 A.D.2d 669). Family Court aptly recognized that the initial support order was geared more towards respondent's ability to pay than the children's actual needs. ¶ Order affirmed, without costs.
The record demonstrates that he has long been a man of substantial financial means. It is also clear that the only changes in the needs of the child from 1974 to the date of the hearing were those resulting from inflation, from his maturing, and from his transfer from public school to private school. The mere fact that a child has grown two years older and prices have become inflated will not, standing alone, serve as a basis for increased support (Riposo v Riposo, 60 A.D.2d 790; cf. Klubek v Schad, 49 A.D.2d 669). Nor may the cost of the child's private education be charged to respondent where, as here, it is demonstrated that the child was able to function in the public school system (Wagner v Wagner, 51 Misc.2d 574, 576, affd 28 A.D.2d 828, mot for lv to app dsmd 20 N.Y.2d 803; Brotherton v Brotherton, 73 A.D.2d 1062; Matter of Monesi v Monesi, 55 A.D.2d 1020). Thus, petitioner failed to demonstrate a basis for upward modification of support.
It also appears that she is presently a resident of Florida; respondent is a New York resident. While the record is somewhat sketchy, we believe that there are facts alleged in the moving papers sufficient to require a hearing on the issue of child support and the hearing directed will consider the $2,530 increased expense to appellant for the children's orthodontia (Bruno v. Bruno, 60 A.D.2d 788; Klubek v. Schad, 49 A.D.2d 669). Absent compelling proof, not present here, that the issue of child support can be resolved on motion papers, a hearing is necessary (Nogid v. Nogid, 54 A.D.2d 961; Matter of Garritano v. Garritano, 49 A.D.2d 906).
Family Court erred in dismissing the petition without allowing appellant to prove respondent's financial circumstances. An order increasing child support payments may be made upon a finding that circumstances have changed with respect to the father's means and the children's needs (see Matwijow v. Hay, 63 A.D.2d 859; Raphan v. Raphan, 63 A.D.2d 624; Coen v. Coen, 56 A.D.2d 810, app dsmd 42 N.Y.2d 966; Klubek v. Schad, 49 A.D.2d 669). Appellant adduced sufficient proof to support a finding that the children's needs had increased and was entitled to an opportunity to prove that the respondent's means had also increased.
Here, however, the matter was not heard until September 21, 1977. Inasmuch as the delay in hearing the motion does not appear to have been attributable to respondent, Special Term had the authority to order a retroactive increase in child support payments nunc pro tunc as of September 21, 1977. Nevertheless, we find that it was an improvident exercise of discretion for the court to increase respondent's payments. While we have approved an increase in support payments where a child's needs as she grew older were considerably greater, in that case the father's earnings were substantially greater (Klubek v Schad, 49 A.D.2d 669). The mere fact that children have grown older and prices have become inflated does not serve, absent any other showing as a basis for increased support (e.g., Riposo v Riposo, 60 A.D.2d 790). Here, petitioner asserted that she was temporarily disabled; however, she was receiving weekly disability income payments of $68.71 and she did not dispute respondent's assertion that the disability income was greater than her earnings on the date of the separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the judgment of divorce.
Indeed, Special Term specifically found that there was no evidence of any increase in the husband's financial condition from 1971. It granted modification solely on the basis of inflation in the cost of living and the passage of six years which brought three of the minor children to their teens with accompanying increased expenses. While we have approved an increase in support payments where a child's needs as she grew older were considerably greater, in that case there was also a specific finding that the father's earnings were substantially greater (Klubek v Schad, 49 A.D.2d 669). The mere fact that the children have grown older and prices have become inflated does not serve, absent any other showing, as a basis for increased support (Matter of Gould v Hannan, 57 A.D.2d 517, 518; Coen v Coen, 56 A.D.2d 810; Liebmann v Liebmann, 19 A.D.2d 821). In considering an application to increase support payments fixed in a separation agreement or in a judicial decree, the prime consideration must always be the best interests of the child, insuring that it is adequately provided for regardless of the provisions and terms of the separation agreement entered into by its parents.
Surely the increased needs of the growing child are a fundamental fact of family economics, well within the province of judicial notice (cf. Klubek v Schad, 49 A.D.2d 669). In that case, the court, in awarding an upward modification of child support, originally granted when the child was two years old, said: "She is now eight years of age and her needs are considerably greater, without any consideration of inflationary impact upon the allowance.