We have previously set forth bases for determining whether a disputed fee is a property tax or an excise tax in a long series of cases involving a variety of taxes. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wn. 402, 405-07, 25 P.2d 91 (1933) (business and occupation tax measured as tax on gross income of business upheld as excise); Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wn. 625, 626-31, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935) (sales tax upheld as excise); Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wn. 317, 320-21, 49 P.2d 14 (1935) (use tax upheld as excise); State ex rel. Hansen v. Salter, 190 Wn. 703, 705-06, 70 P.2d 1056 (1937) (motor vehicle tax measured as percentage of vehicle's value upheld as excise); City of Spokane v. State, 198 Wn. 682, 89 P.2d 826 (1939); (tax on use of personal property purchased at retail upheld as excise); Klickitat County v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 380, 130 P.2d 880 (1942) (sales tax on courthouse construction upheld as excise); St. Paul Tacoma Lumber Co. v. State, 40 Wn.2d 347, 354, 243 P.2d 474 (1952) (use tax on timber company's use of its logs and lumber products in its own operations upheld as excise); Mahler v. Tremper, 40 Wn.2d 405, 243 P.2d 627 (1952) (real estate conveyance tax upheld as excise); Black v. State, 67 Wn.2d 97, 99-100, 406 P.2d 761 (1965) (sales tax on lease of vessel as floating hotel upheld as excise); P. Lorillard Co. v. City of Seattle, 83 Wn.2d 586, 589-92, 521 P.2d 208 (1974) (city business tax on wholesalers of tobacco held an excise); High Tide Seafoods v. State, 106 Wn.2d 695, 699-700, 725 P.2d 411 (1986) (tax on transfer of commercial food fish held an excise), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1073, 107 S.Ct. 1265, 94 L.Ed.2d 126 (1987); and Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wn.2d 874, 889-91, 905 P.2d 324 (1995) (fee on all residential property owners for improvement of city streets held a property tax). The majority declines t
1941 Wn. Laws, ch. 178, § 2. See Klickitat County v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880 (1942). The sale of building items to the contractor then became a nontaxable wholesale transaction.
The incident of a retail sales tax is a transaction involving the relevant good or service, regardless of whether the transaction resulted in net income or profit to the seller. See, e.g. , Morrow , 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 ; Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford , 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935) ; Klickitat County v. Jenner , 15 Wash.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880 (1942) ; Mahler v. Tremper , 40 Wash.2d 405, 243 P.2d 627 (1952). That makes sense.
We have repeatedly rejected similar arguments that taxes were in reality taxes on property. See Mahler v. Tremper, 40 Wn.2d 405, 243 P.2d 627 (1952); St. Paul Tacoma Lumber Co. v. State, 40 Wn.2d 347, 243 P.2d 474 (1952); Klickitat Cy. v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880 (1942); State ex rel. Hansen v. Salter, 190 Wn. 703, 70 P.2d 1056 (1937); Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wn. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935); Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wn. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935). To the extent that the per curiam opinion in Apartment Operators Ass'n v. Schumacher, 56 Wn.2d 46, 351 P.2d 124 (1960), may seem to make statements inconsistent with the above outlined principles, it is hereby deemed not controlling in the instant case.
In order to render the statute consistent, we can only construe it as requiring the lessee to pay the sales tax likewise, even though his lessor has paid a similar tax. In Klickitat County v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880, a comparable change in the taxing statutes lifted the burden of the sales tax from contractors who purchased materials for installation in buildings which they constructed and placed it upon the owners. This court held that the owners were liable for the tax on the improvements made subsequent to the effective date of the act, even though their contractors had evidently paid a sales tax when they acquired the materials, where the materials were purchased by them prior to that date.
" (Italics mine.) Among the many examples that may be cited to illustrate the liberal interpretation which this court has given general titles of statutes are Klickitat County v. Jenner (1942), 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880 "An Act relating to revenue and taxation," held broad enough to encompass the imposition of a retail sales tax upon the construction of a county courthouse where the supplies were furnished by the builder); Holzman v. Spokane (1916), 91 Wn. 418, 157 P. 1086 ("An act relating to local improvements in cities and towns, . . ." held sufficient for the inclusion of a section governing the effect of local assessments in foreclosure actions by holders of certificates of delinquency for general taxes); and State v. Blaine (1911), 64 Wn. 122, 116 P. 660 ("An act relating to crimes and punishments and the rights and custody of persons accused or convicted of crime, . .. " held adequate to encompass a provision that "every person convicted of a crime shall be a competent witness in any civil or criminal proceedings," but that his conviction may be proved by any competent evidence for the purpose of impeachment). I certainly cannot agree with the first conclusion of the majority opinion — that
This compensation, of course, included reimbursement to the contractor for form lumber consumed in the construction work. The exact change in language by which these results were achieved by the 1941 legislature is pointed out in Klickitat County v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880, and need not be repeated here. Commenting upon the significance of this change in the statutes, we there said: "It will be noted that, by its 1941 amendment to the revenue act, the legislature, in effect, excluded from the `retail sale' category the sale of tangible personal property to a building contractor and brought within that category the repairing or otherwise altering or improving, and so forth, of real property `of consumers or for consumers.' . . .
It is our opinion that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action. We have reviewed State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wn. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (business and occupation tax); Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wn. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (sales tax); Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wn. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (compensating tax); Klickitat County v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880 (sales tax); Gruen v. State Tax Commission, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (soldiers bonus — cigarette tax); and numerous other cases. [1] The tax incidence in the case at bar relates to the sale of real estate.
"The definition of `consumer' in Sec. 5 (r) of the Act is not applicable to the definition of that word as used in Sec. 31, Title IV." (We have heretofore held that "consumer," as defined in Title II, Business and Occupation Tax, was not intended to apply to the word "consumer" as used in Title III, Tax on Retail Sales. Klickitat Co. v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880.) [6] We are convinced that the company was a consumer within the generally recognized meaning of the word, i.e., "One who uses (economic) goods, and so diminishes or destroys their utilities; — opposed to producer."
" Klickitat County v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880, had to do with the question of whether the sales tax would have to be paid on courthouse construction. In deciding the case, it was held: