Opinion
06-15-2016
In the Matter of Abraham KLEIN, respondent, v. John S. PEREIRA, etc., appellant.
Troutman Sanders LLP, New York, NY (Lee W. Stremba, John P. Campo, and Bennet J. Moskowitz of counsel), for appellant. Pryor Cashman LLP, New York, NY (Lisa M. Buckley and Ross M. Bagley of cousnel), and Mendel Zilberberg & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Sam Karpel of counsel), for respondent (one brief filed).
Troutman Sanders LLP, New York, NY (Lee W. Stremba, John P. Campo, and Bennet J. Moskowitz of counsel), for appellant.
Pryor Cashman LLP, New York, NY (Lisa M. Buckley and Ross M. Bagley of cousnel), and Mendel Zilberberg & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Sam Karpel of counsel), for respondent (one brief filed).
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, ROBERT J. MILLER, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to confirm an arbitration award dated March 31, 2009, John S. Pereira, as Bankruptcy Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Christine Persaud, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), dated July 10, 2014, which granted the petition to confirm the arbitration award and denied his motion to vacate the arbitration award.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Pursuant to CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii), an arbitration award may be vacated where the arbitrator “exceeded his [or her] power.” However, a party seeking to overturn an arbitration award on this basis bears a heavy burden, and must establish entitlement to vacatur of the award by clear and convincing evidence (see Matter of Quality Bldg. Constr., LLC v. Jagiello Constr. Corp., 125 A.D.3d 973, 4 N.Y.S.3d 294 ).
Here, John S. Pereira, as Bankruptcy Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Christine Persaud, failed to establish that the arbitrator exceeded any specifically enumerated limitation on his power (see Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v. Transport. Workers' Union of Am., Local 100, AFL–CIO, 6 N.Y.3d 332, 336, 812 N.Y.S.2d 413, 845 N.E.2d 1243 ). The arbitration clause in the agreement at issue was broad, and included only a general limitation that the arbitrator could not “change any [of the agreement's] terms or deprive any party to this agreement of any rights or remedies expressed” therein. The arbitrator's chosen mechanisms for resolving the parties' dispute did not exceed his authority, as the arbitration clause in the agreement expressly conferred on him the power to “deal with any business dispute and decide on any dispute regarding the operation of the [business]” (see Matter of Town of Callicoon [Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Town of Callicoon Unit], 70 N.Y.2d 907, 909, 524 N.Y.S.2d 389, 519 N.E.2d 300 ; D'Amato v. Leffler, 290 A.D.2d 475, 736 N.Y.S.2d 689 ; Matter of National Coverage Corp. [Kulesh], 202 A.D.2d 368, 610 N.Y.S.2d 191 ).
Accordingly, the petition to confirm the arbitration award was properly granted, and the motion to vacate it was properly denied.