Opinion
3:23-cv-00189-MMD-CSD
08-13-2024
DANIEL ELIYAHSHUA KLEIN, Plaintiff, v. NDOC MEDICAL DIRECTOR, etal., Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
MIRANDA M. DU, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I. SUMMARY
On January 2, 2024, the Court issued an order screening pro se Plaintiff Daniel Klein's first amended complaint (“FAC”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (ECF No. 9.) The Court dismissed the FAC without prejudice and with leave to amend. (Id.) Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 11.) The Court accepts the SAC as the operative complaint in this case. The Court now screens the SAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff filed an unsigned copy of the SAC (ECF No. 10), so the Court accepts the signed copy (ECF No. 11) as the operative complaint in this case.
II. SCREENING STANDARD
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person's claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp, of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. See id.
Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. .. [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may be dismissed sua sponte if that person's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
III. SCREENING OF SAC
In the SAC, Plaintiff sues multiple Defendants for events that occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). (ECF No. 11 at 1.) Plaintiff sues Defendants Romero Aranas, Bitar, G. Bryant, Charles Daniels, Mangapit, Michael Minev, State of Nevada, A.G. Aaron Ford, Harold Wickham, James Dzurenda, Benson, Gaylene, Christy, Vanessa, Manalong, Dr. Halki, Barrett, Jessica Rambur, Brian Williams, Sherrie Bean, Mattinsen, Ruby Cardera, J. Cabrera, NDOC, and Malisia Mitchell. (Id. at 1-4.) Plaintiff brings two grounds for relief and seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. (Id. at 2-14.)
The Court dismisses all claims against the State of Nevada with prejudice because amendment would be futile. Plaintiff can neither raise 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims nor state law claims against the State of Nevada based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state ... The Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief sought is legal or equitable in nature.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (holding that states are not persons for purposes of § 1983); NRS § 41.031(3) (stating that the State of Nevada does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity). The Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity for supplemental state law claims.” Stanley v. Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, USS-34 (9th Cir. 2006).
The Court dismisses with prejudice all claims against NDOC because amendment would be futile. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that NDOC, a state agency, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment).
The SAC alleges the following. In November 2020, Plaintiff began suffering from a loose tooth, which grew into excruciating pain. (Id. at 4.) On November 27,2020, Plaintiff filed a medical request, and he received a response stating that he would be scheduled for an appointment. (Id.) On December 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance, which was answered the next day. (Id.) On December 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed a second emergency grievance stating that he was starving, in extreme pain, and in need of emergency help. (Id.) On December 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed a third emergency grievance, noting that he had developed a hole in the side of his cheek. (Id.) The medical department's “Supervision SID” responded that Plaintiff should be provided ibuprofen and that he had received antibiotics on December 6, 2020. (Id.)
The Court notes that Plaintiff organizes the SAC by various sections, including facts and history, caselaw, and grounds. (ECF No. 11 at 4-10.) However, each of these sections includes factual allegations. The Court will summarize all the facts alleged in the SAC and then consider Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff also attached several exhibits to the SAC. (Id. at 15-27.1 The Court does not consider the exhibits in screenino the SAC.
Medical staff at HDSP known only as DDS Bitar, DDS Mangapit, Sherrie Bean, Ruby Cardera, and John Doe SID Supervisor, ignored Plaintiffs requests for dental treatment for well over a year and nine months. (Id. at 5.) As a result, Plaintiff pulled his own tooth. (Id.) Plaintiff pulled his tooth by cutting away the gumline and using a nail clipper to extract the tooth. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff made each of these Defendants aware that he was going to extract his own tooth because he was in so much pain, but he never received an adequate response. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff consistently complained of ongoing tooth issues, and Dental Assistant Scheme Bean, Nurse Mattisen, and John Doe SID Supervisor were well aware of Plaintiff's dental issues. (Id. at 8.) Rather than scheduling Plaintiff to have his problem tooth extracted, John Doe SID Supervisor only prescribed Plaintiff ibuprofen, which allowed the infection to continue to get worse and ultimately caused the loss of additional teeth. (Id.) Defendant Cabrera also failed to provide Plaintiff dental care. (Id. at 12.)
Defendants Dzurenda and Aranas have constructive institutional knowledge of Plaintiff's case, if not direct knowledge through his grievances. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff's grievances should have put NDOC administrators on notice that they needed to change their policies to prevent the same sort of occurrence from repeating. (Id.) Defendants Dzurenda, Aranas, and Minev failed to correct systemic problems facing inmates by not training dental staff to avoid further injuries. (Id.) They knew that HDSP had insufficient dental staff and that, as a result, dental staff were avoiding necessary dental treatment. (Id.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff bring a claim of “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment and a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 8-9.) The Court construes Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim as a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious dental need. On the title page of the SAC, and in the caselaw section of the SAC, Plaintiff also refers to negligence. (Id. at 1,6.) The Court will consider each of these claims in turn.
A. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Dental Need
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.'” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with “deliberate indifference” to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,828 (1994). “To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective standard-that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment-and a subjective standard-deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012).
To establish the first prong, “the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). To satisfy the deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff must show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). When a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury. See Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference”). Prisoners can establish an Eighth Amendment violation with respect to dental care if they can prove that there has been a deliberate indifference to their serious dental needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198,200 (9th Cir. 1989).
A defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. “There is no respondeat superior liability under [§]1983.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
“A showing that a supervisor acted, or failed to act, in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights is sufficient to demonstrate the involvement-and the liability-of that supervisor.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). “Thus, when a supervisor is found liable based on deliberate indifference, the supervisor is being held liable for his or her own culpable action or inaction, not held vicariously liable for the culpable action or inaction of his or her subordinates.” Id. at 1207. As such, “a plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based upon the supervisor's knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates.” Id. “Supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Defendants Bitar, Mangapit, Bean, Cardera, Mattisen, Cabrera, and John Doe SID Supervisor
The Court finds that Plaintiff states a colorable claim of deliberate indifference to a serious dental need against Defendants Bitar, Mangapit, Bean, Cardera, Mattisen, Cabrera, and John Doe SID Supervisor. The Court liberally construes the SAC as alleging that Plaintiff had ongoing dental issues. At various times, he informed Defendants Bitar, Mangapit, Bean, Cardera, Mattisen, Cabrera, and John Doe SID Supervisor about his ongoing dental pain. He also told each of these Defendants that his dental pain was so extreme that he would pull his own tooth out. But none of these Defendants took any action to provide Plaintiff adequate dental care. As a result, Plaintiff ended up pulling out his own tooth. The delay in dental treatment also allowed his infection to spread, which caused him to lose additional teeth. These allegations are sufficient to state a colorable claim at this preliminary screening stage. This claim will proceed against Defendants Bitar, Mangapit, Bean, Cardera, Mattisen, Cabrera, and John Doe SID Supervisor, when Plaintiff learns his or her identity.
Although the use of “Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored, flexibility is allowed in some cases where the identity of the parties will not be known prior to filing a complaint but can subsequently be determined through discovery. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637,642 (9th Cir. 1980). If the true identity of any of the Doe Defendants comes to light during discovery, Plaintiff may either move to substitute the true names of the Doe Defendant(s) or move to amend his complaint to assert claims against the Doe Defendants at that time.
Plaintiff also alleges that other John or Jane Doe Defendants failed to provide him with appropriate dental care. (ECF No. 11 at 5.) But the SAC does not provide any specific information about what any other John or Jane Doe did. As such, the Court does not allow any other claims to proceed against John or Jane Doe Defendants at this time. If Plaintiff learns both the identity and the specific role that any other individual played in denying him dental care, he may file a motion for leave to amend at that time.
2. Defendants Dzurenda, Aranas, and Minev
The Court finds that Plaintiff states a colorable supervisor liability claim against Defendants Dzurenda, Aranas, and Minev. Plaintiff does not allege that any of these Defendants were directly involved in the alleged failure to provide him with dental care. However, the Court liberally construes the SAC as alleging that Dzurenda, Aranas, and Minev put into place policies of underfunding and undertraining dental staff. Dzurenda, Aranas, and Minev knew that this underfunding and undertraining of dental staff would lead to inmates not receiving necessary dental treatment, and these policies led directly to the failure to provide Plaintiff adequate dental care. These allegations are sufficient to state a colorable supervisory liability claim at this preliminary screening stage.
3. Other Defendants
The SAC does not include any allegations about Defendants Bryant, Daniels, Minev, Ford, Wickham, Benson, Gaylene, Christy, Vanessa, Manalong, Dr. Halki, Barrett, Jessica Rambur, Brian Williams, and Mitchell. Therefore, the SAC does not state a colorable claim against any of these Defendants and the Court dismisses these Defendants from the entirety of the case without prejudice.
B. Due Process
Plaintiff argues that when grievances are not processed in a way to alert NDOC management of the severe issues going on it violates due process. (ECF No. 11 at 10.) But prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a state's unpublished policy statements establishing a grievance procedure do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest in the processing of appeals because there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process).
The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a colorable due process claim based on the handling of his grievances. Plaintiff does not have a right to have prison officials process or investigate his grievances in any specific way. The Court denies Plaintiff's due process claim based on the handling of his grievances with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
C. Negligence
Negligence is a state law tort claim. Under Nevada law, the State of Nevada has generally waived sovereign immunity for state civil actions in state court. See NRS § 41.031(1); see also Pineda v. Nev. Dep't of Prisons, 459 Fed. App'x 675 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that NRS § 41.031 allows tort and contract claims against the State of Nevada). In order to sue the State of Nevada or a state employee, a plaintiff is required to sue the State of Nevada or an appropriate political subdivision. See NRS § 41.031(2) (“In any action against the State of Nevada, the action must be brought in the name of the State of Nevada on relation of the particular department, commission, board or other agency of the State whose actions are the basis for the suit.”).
In Craig v. Donnelly, the Nevada Court of Appeals addressed whether a plaintiff had to name the State as party in a state court case and held that “while a plaintiff must name the State as a party to any state tort claims in order to comply with NRS 41.031 and NRS 41.0337, this statutory requirement does not apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, even when brought in the same complaint as a plaintiff's state tort claims.” 439 P.3d 413 (Nev. App. 2019). “Indeed, the State cannot be named as a party to a plaintiff's § 1983 civil rights claims.” Id. at 414.
With respect to federal court cases, the State of Nevada does not waive its sovereign immunity. See NRS § 41.031(3). Generally, the State of Nevada and arms of the state cannot be sued in federal court. See O'Connor v. State of Nevada, 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Nevada has explicitly refused to waive its immunity to suit under the eleventh amendment. . . The Supreme Court has made it clear that section 1983 does not constitute an abrogation of the eleventh amendment immunity of the states.”). In Stanley v. Trustees of California State University, the Ninth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity for supplemental state law claims. See 433 F.3d 1129, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2006). Although the State of Nevada may consent to federal court jurisdiction for state law claims through removal, this is not a removed case. See Lapides v. Bd. of Univ. Sys. Of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (holding that state's removal of suit to federal court constitutes waiver of its sovereign immunity).
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's state law negligence claim without prejudice, but without leave to amend, because the State of Nevada is an indispensable party to Plaintiff's claim, and Plaintiff cannot bring his claim against the State of Nevada in this court. See Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1264 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that, where Montana law deemed governmental entities indispensable parties in a state tort claim against a state employee, the federal court had no supplemental jurisdiction over the state tort claim if it had no jurisdiction over the indispensable party).
VI. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that the Court accepts the second amended complaint (ECF No. 11) as the operative complaint in this case. The Clerk of the Court will send Plaintiff a courtesy copy of the second amended complaint.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to a serious dental need will proceed against Defendants Bitar, Mangapit, Sherrie Bean, Ruby Cardera, Mattisen, and J. Cabrera, as well as John Doe SID Supervisor when Plaintiff learns his or her identity.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim based on a policy of providing inadequate training and funding for dental staff will proceed against Defendants Dzurenda, Romero Aranas, and Michael Minev.
It is further ordered that Plaintiffs due process claim based on the handling of his grievances is dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
It is further ordered that Plaintiffs state law negligence claim is dismissed without prejudice, but without leave to amend, because Plaintiffs state law negligence claim must be brought in state court.
It is further ordered that Defendants G. Bryant, Charles Daniels, A.G. Aaron Ford, Harold Wickham, Benson, Gaylene, Christy, Vanessa, Manalong, Dr. Halki, Barrett, Jessica Rambur, Brian Williams, and Malisia Mitchell are dismissed from the entirety of the case without prejudice.
It is further ordered that Defendants State of Nevada and Nevada Department of Corrections are dismissed from the entirety of the case with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
It is further ordered that, given the nature of the claim(s) that the Court has permitted to proceed, this action is stayed for 90 days to allow Plaintiff and Defendant(s) an opportunity to settle their dispute before the Court determines whether to grant Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application, the $350.00 filing fee is paid, an answer is filed, or the discovery process begins. During this 90-day stay period and until the Court lifts the stay, no other pleadings or papers may be filed in this case, and the parties may not engage in any discovery, nor are the parties required to respond to any paper filed in violation of the stay unless specifically ordered by the court to do so. The Court will refer this case to the Court's Inmate Early Mediation Program, and the Court will enter a subsequent order. Regardless, on or before 90 days from the date this order is entered, the Office of the Attorney General must file the report form attached to this order regarding the results of the 90-day stay, even if a stipulation for dismissal is entered prior to the end of the 90-day stay. If the parties proceed with this action, the Court will then issue an order setting a date for Defendants to file an answer or other response. Following the filing of an answer, the Court will issue a scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
“Settlement” may or may not include payment of money damages. It also may or may not include an agreement to resolve Plaintiffs issues differently. A compromise agreement is one in which neither party is completely satisfied with the result, but both have given something up and both have obtained something in return.
It is further ordered that if the case does not settle, then the Court will determine whether to grant Plaintiffs in forma pauperis application. Plaintiff will be required to pay the full $350.00 statutory filing fee for a civil action regardless of whether the Court grants Plaintiffs in forma pauperis application. This fee cannot be waived, and the fee cannot be refunded once the Court enters an order granting Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis. If Plaintiff is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, the fee will be paid in installments from Plaintiffs prison trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). If Plaintiff is not allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, the full $350 statutory filing fee for a civil action plus the $52 administrative filing fee, for a total of $402, will be due immediately.
It is further ordered that if any party seeks to have this case excluded from the inmate mediation program, that party must file a “motion to exclude case from mediation” no later than 21 days prior to the date set for mediation. The responding party will have seven days to file a response. No reply may be filed. Thereafter, the Court will issue an order, set the matter for hearing, or both.
It is further ordered that if Plaintiff needs an interpreter to participate in the mediation program, Plaintiff will file a notice identifying the interpretation language and the need for the interpreter within 30 days from the date of this order.
The Clerk of Court is further directed to add the Nevada Department of Corrections to the docket as an Interested Party and electronically provide a copy of this order and copies of all items previously filed in this case by regenerating the Notices of Electronic Filing on the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada by adding the Attorney General of the State of Nevada to the interested party on the docket. This does not indicate acceptance of service.
It is further ordered that the Attorney General's Office must advise the Court within 21 days of the date of the entry of this order whether it will enter a limited notice of appearance on behalf of Interested Party for the purpose of participation in the Early Mediation Program. No defenses or objections, including lack of service, will be waived because of the filing of the limited notice of appearance.
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAI RE: RESULTS OF 90-DAY STAY
NOTE: ONLY THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WILL FILE THIS FORM. THE INMATE PLAINTIFF MAY NOT FILE THIS FORM.
On ______ [the date of the issuance of the screening order], the Court issued its screening order stating that it had conducted its screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and that certain specified claims in this case would proceed. The Court ordered the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada to file a report 90 days after the date of the entry of the Court's screening order to indicate the status of the case at the end of the 90-day stay. By filing this form, the Office of the Attorney General hereby complies.
REPORT FORM
[Identify which of the following two situations (identified in bold type) describes the case, and follow the instructions corresponding to the proper statement.]
Situation One: Mediated Case: The case was assigned to mediation by a court-appointed mediator during the 90-day stay. [If this statement is accurate, check ONE of the six statements below and fill in any additional information as required, then proceed to the signature block.]
________ A mediation session with a court-appointed mediator was held on ___________ [enter date], and as of this date, the parties have reached a settlement (even if paperwork to memorialize the settlement remains to be completed). (If this box is checked, the parties are on notice that they must SEPARATELY file either a contemporaneous stipulation of dismissal or a motion requesting that the Court continue the stay in the case until a specified date upon which they will file a stipulation of dismissal.)
________ A mediation session with a court-appointed mediator was held on ___________ [enter date], and as of this date, the parties have not reached a settlement. The Office of the Attorney General therefore informs the Court of its intent to proceed with this action.
_________ No mediation session with a court-appointed mediator was held during the 90-day stay, but the parties have nevertheless settled the case. (If this box is checked, the parties are on notice that they must SEPARATELY file a contemporaneous stipulation of dismissal or a motion requesting that the Court continue the stay in this case until a specified date upon which they will file a stipulation of dismissal.)
______ No mediation session with a court-appointed mediator was held during the 90-day stay, but one is currently scheduled for________ [enter date].
______ No mediation session with a court-appointed mediator was held during the 90-day stay, and as of this date, no date certain has been scheduled for such a session.
None of the above five statements describes the status of this case. Contemporaneously with the filing of this report, the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada is filing a separate document detailing the status of this case.
*****
Situation Two: Informal Settlement Discussions Case: The case was NOT assigned to mediation with a court-appointed mediator during the 90-day stay; rather, the parties were encouraged to engage in informal settlement negotiations. [If this statement is accurate, check ONE of the four statements below and fill in any additional information as required, then proceed to the signature block.]
______ The parties engaged in settlement discussions and as of this date, the parties have reached a settlement (even if the paperwork to memorialize the settlement remains to be completed). (If this box is checked, the parties are on notice that they must SEPARATELY file either a contemporaneous stipulation of dismissal or a motion requesting that the Court continue the stay in this case until a specified date upon which they will file a stipulation of dismissal.)
______ The parties engaged in settlement discussions and as of this date, the parties have not reached a settlement. The Office of the Attorney General therefore informs the Court of its intent to proceed with this action.
______ The parties have not engaged in settlement discussions and as of this date, the parties have not reached a settlement. The Office of the Attorney General therefore informs the Court of its intent to proceed with this action.
______ None of the above three statements fully describes the status of this case. Contemporaneously with the filing of this report, the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada is filing a separate document detailing the status of this case.