Klein v. Herring

11 Citing cases

  1. Cummins Alabama, Inc. v. Allbritten

    548 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 13 times
    Requiring objection and motion for mistrial to preserve issue for new trial motion

    (R. 755). In support of its conclusion that appellant made two impermissible golden rule arguments, the court cited Bullock v. Branch, 130 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), and Klein v. Herring, 347 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), as controlling and requiring a new trial. A golden rule argument suggests to jurors that they put themselves in the shoes of one of the parties, and is impermissible because it encourages the jurors to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.

  2. Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc.

    585 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1978)   Cited 73 times
    Affirming that it was not in error for the trial judge to refuse to deliver an instruction made only after the jury had been instructed

    There is just no way to adequately compensate them, but that is the best way we have."See, e. g., Chicago N.W. Ry. v. Kelly, 8 Cir. 1936, 84 F.2d 569, 576; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 5 Cir. 1934, 74 F.2d 439, 442-43; Klein v. Herring, Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977, 347 So.2d 681, 682; Delaware Olds, Inc. v. Dixon, Del. 1976, 367 A.2d 178, 179; Colgan v. Raymond, 1966, 275 Minn. 219, 146 N.W.2d 530, 535; Miku v. Olmen, Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1966, 193 So.2d 17, 18, cert. denied, Fla. 1967, 201 So.2d 232; Copiah Dairies, Inc. v. Addkison, 1963, 247 Miss. 327, 153 So.2d 689, 694; Roth v. Jelden, 1962, 80 S.D. 40, 118 N.W.2d 20, 25; Phillips v. Fulghum, 1962, 203 Va. 543, 125 S.E.2d 835, 839; Brant v. Wabash R.R., 1961, 31 Ill.App.2d 337, 176 N.E.2d 13, 14, rev'd on other grounds, 1962, 24 Ill.2d 541, 182 N.E.2d 181; Jackson v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 1960, 66 N.M. 458, 349 P.2d 1029, 1040; Faught v. Washam, Mo. 1959, 329 S.W.2d 588, 602; Red Top Cab Co. v. Capps, Tex.Civ.App. 1954, 270 S.W.2d 273, 275 n. 2. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

  3. Walton v. City of Manchester

    140 N.H. 403 (N.H. 1995)   Cited 12 times
    In Walton, we required a new trial because we concluded that the argument made by the city's attorney was: (1) calculated to encourage the jury to make a decision based upon personal interest and bias: (2) prejudicial; and (3) not based on evidence.

    [1] The plaintiff contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the city's closing argument constituted an impermissible "golden rule" argument. See Millen v. Miller, 308 A.2d 115, 117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973). A "golden rule" argument is made when counsel urges jurors to put themselves in a particular party's place, Klein v. Herring, 347 So.2d 681, 682 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977), or into a particular party's shoes. Courts generally condemn these arguments because they encourage the jury "to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence." Forrestal v. Magendantz, 848 F.2d 303, 309 (1st Cir. 1988); see 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 180 (1989).

  4. Cohen v. Pollack

    674 So. 2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding reversible error based upon the cumulative effect of counsel's improper argument that the jury should measure damages by considering pain that the plaintiff endured, and counsel's statements indicating his opinions and beliefs regarding the case

    See Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Morse, 653 So.2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 662 So.2d 932 (Fla. 1995); Kaas v. Atlas Chem. Co., 623 So.2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Asking the jury to imagine the injured party's anguish and frustration further constitutes reversible error. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Curry, 608 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Klein v. Herring, 347 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Here, during closing remarks, appellees' attorney suggested that the jury should measure damages by considering the pain Brittany endured. This, when combined with the improper statements that were repeatedly permitted, had the cumulative effect of tainting the trial.

  5. State Farm Mutual Automobile v. Curry

    608 So. 2d 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 2 times

    The judgment below is reversed for a new trial because the trial judge (a) instructed the jury in the precise manner determined to be erroneous in the later-decided and controlling case of State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gomez, 605 So.2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and (b) incorrectly overruled a defense objection to opposing counsel's statement — which may stand as the very definition of a golden rule argument — asking the jury to "[p]ut yourself in [the plaintiff's] position, you can imagine the mental anguish and frustration." See Klein v. Herring, 347 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Reversed and remanded.

  6. City Provisioners, Inc. v. Anderson

    578 So. 2d 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 6 times
    Holding plaintiff’s comment—"If you give him too much money, the judge can take away some of that money. It’s to be-he can order remittitur or cut it down. If you don’t give Mr. Anderson enough money, he can’t order more money"—was improper statement of law and inappropriate attempt to shift responsibility for verdict from jury to judge

    In some instances, these comments include expression of counsel's personal experiences or beliefs, evocation of "golden rule" or comparative verdict arguments, and reference to facts not in evidence. See Stokes v. Wet 'N Wild, Inc., 523 So.2d 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); S.H. Inv. and Dev. Corp. v. Kincaid, 495 So.2d 768 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 504 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1987); Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So.2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 488 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1986); Russell, Inc. v. Trento, 445 So.2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Wright Ford Millworks, Inc. v. Long, 412 So.2d 892 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Klein v. Herring, 347 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). "City Provisioners just flat doesn't want to fess up to their legal responsibility.

  7. Coral Gables Hosp., Inc. v. Zabala

    520 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 3 times

    The remark was an improper "golden rule" argument — an attempt to undermine the neutrality of the jury by asking its members to identify with the plaintiff and make a determination from a personal perspective. Reversal is often required in the face of such an argument, National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Bostic, 423 So.2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ("golden rule" violation constitutes reversible error), rev. denied, 436 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1983); Kleinv. Herring, 347 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (prejudicial remarks asking jury to put itself in plaintiffs' position mandate new trial), and is required in this case. Reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages only.

  8. Schreidell v. Shoter

    500 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that “[f]ailure to secure a ruling on an objection waives it, unless the court deliberately and patently refuses to so rule”

    An argument that jurors place themselves in the plaintiff's shoes, commonly referred to as a "golden rule" argument, is impermissible and constitutes reversible error. Klein v. Herring, 347 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Miku v. Olmen, 193 So.2d 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); Bullock v. Branch, 130 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). Such an argument is improper because it encourages the jury to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.

  9. Skislak v. Wilson

    472 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 6 times

    The statement made by counsel for Mr. Wilson that Mr. Skislak's insurer would have to pay was clearly improper. Case law solidly supports the rule that it is error to tell the jury the amount of insurance coverage that is available. Josey v. Futch, 254 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1971); Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d at 422; Beta Eta House Corporation, Inc. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970); Melrose Nursery, Inc. v. Hunt, 443 So.2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Klein v. Herring, 347 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Peppe v. Clow, 307 So.2d 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 339 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 1976). While the court in Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d at 422, held that the reference to the amount of insurance coverage was harmless error, it did so by examining the entire record and finding the statement had no adverse effect upon the jury's verdict.

  10. National Car Rental System v. Bostic

    423 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 15 times
    In National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Bostic, 423 So.2d 915 (Fla.App. 1983), petition for review denied, 436 So.2d 97, 99 (1983), the trial court held that the plaintiff could recover damages for his emotional pain and suffering caused not only by his own injuries, but also by the death of his mother.

    To do so constituted reversible error. See Klein v. Herring, 347 So.2d 681 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Magid v. Mozo, 135 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962); Bullock v. Branch, 130 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). In view of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's orders denying the appellant's motion to exclude testimony relating to emotional disturbance caused by being present and witnessing his mother's death and the motion to add an affirmative defense.