We affirm the trial court's determinations that TH Ryan did not have a bona fide dispute that its payment was due on Reed's compensation award and that TH Ryan should therefore bear his attorney fees. ¶ 31 TH Ryan's only attempt to dispute the amount of fees awarded is to state that the award should be "at minimum, reversed and remanded for a hearing because the attorney's fees far out proportion any sanction that should have been awarded based upon the facts of this case. See Kleiboeker v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1027, [602 N.E.2d 912, 917 (1992)]." This statement is the full extent of TH Ryan's presentation.
McGee, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 936-37, 596 N.E.2d at 1266. In Kleiboeker v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1027, 602 N.E.2d 912, 917 (1992), the Fifth District found the award of attorney fees and costs to be proper in light of the employer's refusal to pay the arbitration award but concluded the circuit court's award of $18,467.86 in fees was "far out of proportion to any sanction or penalty that should be awarded against the respondent under these facts." Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the circuit court for a hearing on the reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred with respect to the section 19(g) proceedings only. Kleiboeker, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1027, 602 N.E.2d at 917.
Therefore, a fee application may be unreasonable if it is "far out of proportion to any sanction or penalty that should be awarded against the respondent under these facts." Id. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 776, 856 N.E.2d at 7 (quoting Kleiboeker v. Indus. Comm'n., 236 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1027, 602 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). On the other hand, "attorney fees may be reasonable even if the fees are disproportionate to the monetary amount of an award."
We find that the defendant refused to pay the award to the plaintiff as that word is used in section 19(g) of the Act. See Kleiboecker v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 Ill. App.3d 1020, 602 N.E.2d 912 (1992) (employer made no effort to comply with the decision of the Commission for over one month). Because the defendant refused to pay the award of the Commission for over nine months, the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.