350 (1927); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 S.Ct. 349, 48 L.Ed. 525 (1904); C.J. Tower Sons v. United States, 71 F.2d 438, 21 CCPA 417, T.D. 46943 (1934). Clearly Congress acted within its constitutional powers in enacting the Antidumping Act of 1921, and its constitutionality has been expressly upheld in the case of Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446 (1933). Under that act Congress entrusted the making of the determination of dumping and injury to designated executive officers.
Therefore, it is to the courts that parties must have recourse whenever they deem that they have been injured by what they regard as executive abuse of legislative power, or legislative power exercised by the executive in excess of the terms of the congressional grant. What is involved in such cases was stated in Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332 at page 335, 21 CCPA 110, at page 115: "It is equally well established by the authorities that if the Secretary of the Treasury has proceeded in the method prescribed by the Congress, we may not judicially inquire into the correctness of his conclusions.
Ordinarily, those courts were not even permitted to review the agencies' decisions for substantial evidence; review was limited, normally, to certain purely legal issues. See City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994 (CCPA 1972); Kleberg & Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332 (CCPA 1933). An exception to that highly deferential review by both reviewing courts was in cases in which the administrative record was deemed inadequate, in which case the Customs Court would conduct de novo review, creating a record of its own, which would then be reviewed deferentially by the CCPA.
Before 1979, this court's predecessor, on appeal from the Customs Court, examined directly the administrative record for substantial evidence. See City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994 (CCPA 1972); Kleberg Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 334 (CCPA 1933). In City Lumber, however, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals did not ignore sound reasoning by the appellate term of the Customs Court.
* * * It is not the judicial function to review or to weigh the evidence before the Commission or to question the correctness of findings drawn therefrom. Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446 (1933), compare United States v. George S. Bush Co., 310 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 944, 84 L.Ed. 1259 (1940). As stated in Kleberg, our review of determinations of injury or likelihood of injury in antidumping cases does not extend beyond determining whether the Commission has acted within its delegated authority, has correctly interpreted statutory language, and has correctly applied the law.
The courts have a very limited power of review over the Commission's determinations. It is not the judicial function to review or to weigh the evidence before the Commission or to question the correctness of findings drawn therefrom. Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446 (1933); compare United States v. George S. Bush Co., 310 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 944, 84 L.Ed. 1259 (1940). As stated in Kleberg, our review of determinations of injury or likelihood of injury in antidumping cases does not extend beyond determining whether the Commission has acted within its delegated authority, has correctly interpreted statutory language, and has correctly applied the law.
Appellee suggests that we either accept the Tariff Commission's findings as those of the Secretary or reevaluate the evidence to make our own findings. In Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 335, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446 (1933), this court, after a review of the pertinent cases, said: "* * * we are not at liberty here to go into an investigation as to whether the facts shown on the trial below justified the issuance of the order complained of. Under the statute, the Secretary was not confined to any particular source of information or means of investigation.
In doing so, the court expressed the view that the terms "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair acts" were general and vague, but were sufficient, basing its judgment upon cases hereinbefore cited, dealing with the powers of the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Shipping Board. On principle, it is not seen in what respect the statute here involved is more vague and uncertain than others in which delegations of powers have been made to the President and to the Secretary of the Treasury, which have been the subject of recent discussions by this court and by the Supreme Court. Reference is had to Hampton, Jr., Co. v. United States, 14 Cust. App. 350, T.D. 42030, affirmed in 276 U.S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624; J.H. Cottman Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 344, T.D. 46114; Kleberg Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) ___, T.D. 46446. On this phase of the case we conclude that the statute involved is not unconstitutional as being vague and indefinite in its terms.
On this record and on the issues presented before us, we are unable to agree with counsel in this respect. Our general view of the administration of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 is stated in our recent decisions in Kleberg Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 110, T.D. 46446, and Tower Sons v. United States, 71 F.2d 438, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) ___, T.D. 46943. Further comment on this point seems, therefore, to be unnecessary. In view of these conclusions, the judgment of the United States Customs Court, Third Division, is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity herewith.
We must assume that there was a sufficient basis in these Niagara Falls entries for an assessment of dumping duty, in so far as the appraisement by the local appraiser is concerned. Having disposed of these preliminary issues, the more serious question arises: Is the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 within the constitutional power of the Congress to enact? It is insisted by the Assistant Attorney General that it is, and that this court has so held in the recent case of Kleberg Co., Inc., v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 110, T.D. 46446. In the case cited, however, the contention was made that the said act is unconstitutional, as a forbidden delegation of legislative power.