Kleberg Co. v. United States

22 Citing cases

  1. City Lumber Co. v. United States, (1970)

    311 F. Supp. 340 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1970)   Cited 16 times
    Upholding constitutionality of imposition of dumping duties under Antidumping Act

    350 (1927); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 S.Ct. 349, 48 L.Ed. 525 (1904); C.J. Tower Sons v. United States, 71 F.2d 438, 21 CCPA 417, T.D. 46943 (1934). Clearly Congress acted within its constitutional powers in enacting the Antidumping Act of 1921, and its constitutionality has been expressly upheld in the case of Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446 (1933). Under that act Congress entrusted the making of the determination of dumping and injury to designated executive officers.

  2. Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, (1961)

    200 F. Supp. 302 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1961)   Cited 8 times

    Therefore, it is to the courts that parties must have recourse whenever they deem that they have been injured by what they regard as executive abuse of legislative power, or legislative power exercised by the executive in excess of the terms of the congressional grant. What is involved in such cases was stated in Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332 at page 335, 21 CCPA 110, at page 115: "It is equally well established by the authorities that if the Secretary of the Treasury has proceeded in the method prescribed by the Congress, we may not judicially inquire into the correctness of his conclusions.

  3. NSK Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission

    542 F. App'x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

    Ordinarily, those courts were not even permitted to review the agencies' decisions for substantial evidence; review was limited, normally, to certain purely legal issues. See City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994 (CCPA 1972); Kleberg & Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332 (CCPA 1933). An exception to that highly deferential review by both reviewing courts was in cases in which the administrative record was deemed inadequate, in which case the Customs Court would conduct de novo review, creating a record of its own, which would then be reviewed deferentially by the CCPA.

  4. Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States

    99 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 8 times
    Questioning the Atlantic Sugar standard of review

    Before 1979, this court's predecessor, on appeal from the Customs Court, examined directly the administrative record for substantial evidence. See City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994 (CCPA 1972); Kleberg Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 334 (CCPA 1933). In City Lumber, however, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals did not ignore sound reasoning by the appellate term of the Customs Court.

  5. Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States

    475 F.2d 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 20 times
    Interpreting Antidumping Act of 1921 as "mandat[ing] the taking of prescribed remedial action in the event of dumping and resultant injury to an industry. . . ."

    * * * It is not the judicial function to review or to weigh the evidence before the Commission or to question the correctness of findings drawn therefrom. Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446 (1933), compare United States v. George S. Bush Co., 310 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 944, 84 L.Ed. 1259 (1940). As stated in Kleberg, our review of determinations of injury or likelihood of injury in antidumping cases does not extend beyond determining whether the Commission has acted within its delegated authority, has correctly interpreted statutory language, and has correctly applied the law.

  6. City Lumber Co. v. United States

    457 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 27 times

    The courts have a very limited power of review over the Commission's determinations. It is not the judicial function to review or to weigh the evidence before the Commission or to question the correctness of findings drawn therefrom. Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446 (1933); compare United States v. George S. Bush Co., 310 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 944, 84 L.Ed. 1259 (1940). As stated in Kleberg, our review of determinations of injury or likelihood of injury in antidumping cases does not extend beyond determining whether the Commission has acted within its delegated authority, has correctly interpreted statutory language, and has correctly applied the law.

  7. United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc.

    296 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1960)   Cited 17 times
    In Hansson, the Appellate Court found that "[a]t no time during the course of the entire investigation was any issue raised before the Secretary, either directly or through the Customs Bureau, of any procedural irregularities in the investigation * * *" (296 F.2d at 781, 48 CCPA at 94).

    Appellee suggests that we either accept the Tariff Commission's findings as those of the Secretary or reevaluate the evidence to make our own findings. In Kleberg Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 335, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446 (1933), this court, after a review of the pertinent cases, said: "* * * we are not at liberty here to go into an investigation as to whether the facts shown on the trial below justified the issuance of the order complained of. Under the statute, the Secretary was not confined to any particular source of information or means of investigation.

  8. In re Orion Co.

    71 F.2d 458 (C.C.P.A. 1934)   Cited 13 times
    Finding that the import of products produced using infringing methods abroad could be considered an unfair method of competition or unfair act under the Tariff Act of 1930

    In doing so, the court expressed the view that the terms "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair acts" were general and vague, but were sufficient, basing its judgment upon cases hereinbefore cited, dealing with the powers of the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Shipping Board. On principle, it is not seen in what respect the statute here involved is more vague and uncertain than others in which delegations of powers have been made to the President and to the Secretary of the Treasury, which have been the subject of recent discussions by this court and by the Supreme Court. Reference is had to Hampton, Jr., Co. v. United States, 14 Cust. App. 350, T.D. 42030, affirmed in 276 U.S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624; J.H. Cottman Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 344, T.D. 46114; Kleberg Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) ___, T.D. 46446. On this phase of the case we conclude that the statute involved is not unconstitutional as being vague and indefinite in its terms.

  9. Amtorg Trading Corporation v. United States

    71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934)   Cited 10 times
    In Amtorg, supra, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals allowed a New York corporation which was wholly owned by Soviet Russia to challenge an import duty.

    On this record and on the issues presented before us, we are unable to agree with counsel in this respect. Our general view of the administration of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 is stated in our recent decisions in Kleberg Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 110, T.D. 46446, and Tower Sons v. United States, 71 F.2d 438, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) ___, T.D. 46943. Further comment on this point seems, therefore, to be unnecessary. In view of these conclusions, the judgment of the United States Customs Court, Third Division, is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity herewith.

  10. C.J. Tower Sons v. United States

    71 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1934)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the statute's object is "to impose not a penalty, but an amount of duty sufficient to equalize competitive conditions between the exporter and American industries affected"

    We must assume that there was a sufficient basis in these Niagara Falls entries for an assessment of dumping duty, in so far as the appraisement by the local appraiser is concerned. Having disposed of these preliminary issues, the more serious question arises: Is the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 within the constitutional power of the Congress to enact? It is insisted by the Assistant Attorney General that it is, and that this court has so held in the recent case of Kleberg Co., Inc., v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 110, T.D. 46446. In the case cited, however, the contention was made that the said act is unconstitutional, as a forbidden delegation of legislative power.