Opinion
Case No. 4D03-4118.
Opinion filed March 23, 2005.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Susan F. Greenhawt, Judge, L.T. Case No. 93-25208 (37)(91).
Scott D. Rubinchik of Scott Rubinchik, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.
Caryn S. Grainer of Caryn S. Grainer, P.A., Hollywood, for appellee.
We affirm the order requiring appellant, Steven Klazkin, to pay for forty percent of his daughter's summer camp expenses and to reimburse his former wife for these expenses from past years.
The language of paragraph eighteen of the marital settlement agreement was ambiguous. Thus, the trial court was able to consider extrinsic evidence to explain or clarify the ambiguous language. See Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The purpose of an evidentiary hearing concerning ambiguous language is to allow each side to present evidence on the intent of the parties regarding the disputed provision. See Carlson v. Carlson, 671 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Wagner v. Wagner, 885 So. 2d 488, 492-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
On July 28, 2003, the trial court held a hearing on various issues, including the former wife's request for reimbursement for summer camp expenses. On September 4, 2003, the trial court entered an amended order which, inter alia, directed appellant to reimburse the former wife for summer camp expenses.
Although the former wife refers in her brief to testimony taken at the hearing, neither party has furnished this court with a transcript of the hearing. A ruling by the trial court is clothed with a presumption of correctness and the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate error. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1977). Without a transcript of this hearing, this court may reverse the trial court's decision "only if an error of law appears on the face of the final judgment." Whelan v. Whelan, 736 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). No such error appears here, in light of our conclusion regarding the ambiguity of the marital settlement agreement. Therefore, the trial court was within its discretion in ordering the former husband to pay for forty percent of his daughter's past and future summer camp expenses.
KLEIN and MAY, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL DISPOSITION OF ANY TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING.