Summary
recognizing a "plaintiff's interest in seeking vindication for alleged constitutional violations" and denying a request for a stay
Summary of this case from Melendres v. Maricopa CountyOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-2510-KHV
August 23, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Klaver construction company, Inc. ("Klaver") seeks injunctive relief against the Kansas department of transportation ("KDOT") and the United States Department of Transportation ("USDOT"), to enjoin the letting of federally-funded highway construction contracts in the State of Kansas. Klaver also sues E. Dean Carlson in his capacity as the Kansas Secretary of Transportation and Norman Y. Mineta in his capacity as the United States Secretary of Transportation. Specifically, plaintiff seeks to stop the USDOT from enforcing the Transportation Equity Act For The 21st Century ("TEA-21"), Pub.L. 105-178, Tit. I, §§ 1101(b), 112 Stat. 113, and the regulations which implement TEA-21 ( 49 C.F.R. part 26) on the grounds that (1) the race and gender classifications and preferences contained therein violate plaintiffs right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and (2) the statute and regulations constitute an improper exercise of congressional power. See Amended Complaint (Doc. #66) filed October 10, 2000, Counts I-II at 8-10. Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin the KDOT from enforcing its Disadvantaged Business Enterprise ("DBE") program on the grounds that it violates plaintiffs right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and 2000d. See Amended Complaint. Count IV at 10.
This matter comes before the Court on the Federal Defendants' Motion To Stay This Case Pending Disposition of Adarand Case By The United States Supreme Court (Doc. #70) filed July 30, 2001. Defendants urge the Court to stay the proceedings in this case pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in Adarand Const., Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Adarand Const., Inc. v. Mineta, 121 S.Ct. 1401 (Mar. 26, 2001), cert. modified, 121 S.Ct. 1598 (Apr. 13, 2001). InAdarand, the Tenth Circuit held under a strict scrutiny standard of review that the use of race-conscious policies under TEA-21 and 49 QF.R. part 26 in the federal highway construction program — as implemented by federal officials — was constitutional. See Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1187-88. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit found that (1) "the federal government has a compelling interest in not perpetuating the effects of racial discrimination in its own distribution of federal funds and in remediating the effects of past discrimination in government contracting markets created by its disbursements," id. at 1164-54; (2) the federal government presented evidence sufficient to support its compelling interest,see id. at 1166-75; and (3) the race-conscious programs were narrowly tailored for purposes of strict scrutiny, see id. at 1176-87. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review (1) whether the Tenth Circuit "misapplied the strict scrutiny standard in determining if Congress had a compelling interest to enact legislation designed to remedy the effects of racial discrimination" and (2) whether the USDOT current DDE program is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Adarand, 121 S.Ct. at 1598.
The state defendants have filed a memorandum in support of the motion to stay. See State Defendant's [sic] Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Stay Case No. 99-2510-KHV (Klaver) Pending The Disposition Of The Adarand Case By The United States Supreme Court (Doc. #87) filed August 8, 2001.
In Adarand, plaintiff did not have standing to challenge gender based policies in the federal program. See Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1156. In addition, Adarand did not address the use of race based policies in highway construction projects by state agencies. See id. at 1187-88.
The Tenth Circuit found that certain aspects of the race-conscious program which existed in 1996 were not sufficiently narrowly tailored; those provisions were amended after 1996, however, and are not in issue in this case. See id., at 1178-87.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the Court's inherent power "to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants."Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The Court has discretion whether to grant a stay. See id.; Pet Milk Co. v. Kitten 323 F.2d 586, 588 (10th Cir. 1963). In exercising its judgment, the Court "must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. The party requesting a stay "must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay [will] damage another party."Id.; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Chilcott Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 713 F.2d 1477, 1484 (10th Cir. 1983) (involving stay of proceedings in another court, but noting that standard applies even in cases where relief sought is stay of case in which motion is made); Span-Eng Assocs. v. Weidner, 771 F.2d 464, 468 (10th Cir. 1985) (same). The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that "[t]he right to proceed in court should not be denied except under the most extreme circumstances." Chilcott, 713 F.3d at 1484 (quoting Klein v. Adams Peck, 436 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1971)). "Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both." Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. The granting of a stay must be kept within the "bounds of moderation."Id. at 167. Courts abuse their discretion if they issue a stay of infinite duration in the absence of a pressing need. See id. at 166.
Defendants argue that staying this case "will promote the orderly course of justice by simplifying and clarifying the issues, proof, and questions of law that this Court would be required to consider in order to decide the merits of this case." Memorandum In Support Of Federal Defendants' Motion To Stay This Case Pending Disposition Of Adarand Case By The United States Supreme Court (Doc. #71) filed July 30, 2001 at 3. Defendants also assert that denying a stay will cause hardship to the parties because they will have to proceed with discovery without the benefit of the Supreme Court decision in Adarand. See id. at 6-8. Plaintiff responds that the Adarand decision will not resolve the issues in this case. Specifically, plaintiff argues that Adarand involves a constitutional challenge to racial preferences in direct federal procurement contracts, while this case involves a constitutional challenge to racial and gender preferences in federally-funded state highway contracts. Plaintiff also asserts that its interest in vindicating its constitutional rights outweighs the Court's interest in judicial economy or any alleged prejudice to defendants.See Plaintiffs Brief In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Stay (Doc. #75) filed August 2, 2001 at 1-2.
In evaluating the competing interests, the Court concludes that plaintiffs interest in pursuing its constitutional claims outweighs defendants' interest in staying the case. For purposes of this analysis, the following are relevant factors: (1) plaintiffs interests in proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on defendants; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest. See FDIC v. Renda, No. 85-2216-O, 1987 WL 348635, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 1987). The first factor weighs heavily in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that as a result of the KDOT DBE program it has lost — and will continue to lose — state highway contracts. The Tenth Circuit expressly stated that Adarand did not involve the letting of federally-funded construction contracts by state agencies. See Adarand. 228 F.2d at 1187-88 ("We do not have before us a sufficient record to enable us to evaluate the separate question of [Colorado's] implementation of race-conscious policies."). Thus regardless of a Supreme Court decision, the separate question regarding KDOT's implementation of the federally-funded program will remain undecided. In * addition, a Supreme Court decision will not resolve plaintiffs claims regarding gender based federal or state policies. If the Court were to stay this case, these issues would remain unresolved even after a Supreme Court decision. The mere possibility that the Supreme Court may clarify the legal standards which apply to these separate claims does not justify the potential prejudice of a delay to plaintiff. Compared to the potential prejudice to plaintiff, the burden on defendants is small. While it might be convenient for the Supreme Court to clarify the relevant legal standards before the parties conduct discovery,Adarand will not eliminate the need for discovery. The burden of conducting such discovery now, in light of possible alternative legal standards, is not great.
Defendants argue that allowing plaintiff to proceed is futile in light of the Tenth Circuit decision in Adarand. While this may be true with respect to plaintiffs claims based on race against the federal defendants, it is not necessarily the case with respect to plaintiffs remaining claims. The Tenth Circuit decision sets forth the controlling legal framework which this Court must apply. The decision does not, however, foreclose the possibility that plaintiff may prove unconstitutional the gender based policies of the federal government or the race and gender based policies of the KDOT.
The remaining factors also weigh in favor of denying the stay. The convenience to the Court of having the benefit of a Supreme Court decision does not outweigh the potential prejudice to plaintiff. The Tenth Circuit decision in Adarand provides controlling authority. If necessary, the Court can modify its rulings to conform with any changes which the Supreme Court mandates. Defendants do not identify any interests of third parties which are at stake in this matter. One could argue that beneficiaries of the minority and gender based classifications have an interest in continuing to receive preferential treatment, but that interest does not outweigh plaintiffs interest in seeking vindication for alleged constitutional violations. Finally, the public has an interest in prompt resolution of constitutional claims.
In sum, defendants have not demonstrated a clear case of hardship or inequity which "outweighs plaintiffs interest in proceeding with its claims in this case. Accordingly, the Court will overrule defendants' motion for stay. See, e.g., Pet Milk, 323 F.2d at 588 (district court did not abuse discretion in refusing to stay proceedings pending appellate decision involving identical questions).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Federal Defendants' Motion To Stay This Case Pending Disposition of Adarand Case By The United States Supreme Court (Doc. #70) filed July 30, 2001 be and hereby is OVERRULED.